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How can we reconcile individuality with strong social solidarity? In today’s 
society individuals are increasingly independent of each other and their 
direct environment for shaping their own lives. On the one hand, this can 
be seen as a highly valued modern achievement. On the other hand, many 
people fear that this trend towards individualization threatens social 
cohesion and solidarity. Individuals may become increasingly selfish and 
unwilling to take the interest of others or the collective at heart. Although 
both individuality and social solidarity are highly valued, the general 
assumption is that the two are somehow opposites of one another. Society 
can either consist of independent individuals and fall apart or consist of 
interdependent citizens and be highly cohesive. Groups can either have 
diversity and conflict or have homogeneity and unity. Individuals can either 
be distinctive from others and alone or be similar to others and included. In 
other words, the distinctiveness of individuals is thought to undermine the 
unity and cohesiveness of collectives and, vice versa, an overly strong 
attachment to collectives is thought to threaten individual distinctiveness. 
But is this assumption always correct? Or is it possible to form groups in 




In the present dissertation, we1 argue that such reconciliation is 
possible. We propose that individual group members can actively contribute 
to the formation of shared group identity—a bottom-up process that 
involves each group member as an individual. These inductive processes of 
group formation, we argue allow for feelings of individual distinctiveness 
and feelings of strong group attachment to become mutually reinforcing. In 
other words, there can be a reciprocal and positive association between 
feeling and acting independently, and a strong sense of attachment to the 
group. In this way, individuality and social cohesion become positively 
interdependent. 
The possibility of inductive processes of social identity formation 
and the reconciliation between individual and group it may provide is 
explored in different ways in the research conducted over the course of this 
dissertation project. More specifically the following questions are addressed: 
Can people feel individually distinct and at the same time identify with a 
group? Can people identify with a group and at the same time express 
individuality? Can groups be diverse but at the same time develop strong 
unity and group cooperation? All these questions are addressed in different 
chapters by focusing on the way in which groups are formed. We propose 
that the degree to which individual group members plays an active part in 
the formation of the group’s social identity has important consequences for 
the relation between individual and group.  
Together these different lines of research provide a novel insight in 
the interplay between individual distinctiveness and group membership. 
While being a distinctive individual can be difficult in groups whose identity 
                                                
1 I use the term “we” instead of “I” throughout this dissertation as I feel that this 
dissertation is a product of my collaboration with my advisors ―Tom Postmes and Karen 
van der Zee ― and others. “We” is based on all our individual contributions (or using the 




is formed on the basis of superordinate commonalities that are imposed on 
members top-down as might for instance be the case in the army or the 
police (a mechanical or deductive process), this dissertation shows that 
individuality can be reconciled more easily with strong social cohesion when 
group identity is formed organically (or inductively) out of individuals’ 
contributions. The purpose of this dissertation is not just to illustrate how 
individual differences can be integrated in (small) groups, but also to point 
to a new direction for thinking about social cohesion in general, and about 
social identity processes in particular. We believe that adopting this new 
(more organic) perspective on how individuals co-operate to dynamically 
construct a sense of individuality and social cohesion provides interesting 
new insights. Taking into account not just how groups and individuals are 
cognitively perceived but also how they physically interact, enhances the 
capacity to use theoretical concepts such as “social identity” and 
“individuality” to explain group processes and group functioning, and does 
justice to the complex interplay between the individual and the group in 
modern Western society. 
By way of introducing the different lines of research and the 
associated studies, we will first sketch some of the theoretical foundations 
upon which this dissertation is built. We will start by elaborating the societal 
importance of understanding the relationship between individuality and 
group membership, and will discuss one of the most influential perspectives 
on this relationship within social psychology, provided by the social identity 
approach. Next, we will discuss alternative research and theoretical models 
that challenge the antagonistic relationship between individuality and group 
membership as assumed by social identity theorists. After describing these 
differential perspectives on groups and group formation, we will introduce 
our theoretical model of social identity formation and the interplay between 
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the individual and the group it proposes. Finally, we will explain how this 




During the last decades, Western societies have become increasingly 
individualistic (see SCR, 1998, for statistics in the Netherlands). This could 
be seen as the latest developments in an on-going trend that has its roots in 
the renaissance (Elias, 1939/2000), although some trace it to an even earlier 
“discovery” of the individual in the late Middle Ages (Morris, 1972). Either 
way, it seems that increased urbanization, industrialization, and technology 
have created the opportunity for individuals to be increasingly independent 
of each other and their direct environment. Within individualistic cultures 
(Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995), individuals appear to experience personal 
matters (goals, uniqueness, control) as central to life whereas collective 
matters are pushed to the periphery of their awareness (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). 
Many have feared that this trend towards individualization hampers 
a sense of solidarity and communion in society. Putnam (2000) uses the 
metaphor “bowling alone” to describe the disappearance of particular 
forms of American communal activities and relates this to a striking 
elevation of the level of individual independence during the 1980s and 
1990s. An example in the Netherlands can be found in the present debate 
about whether the solidarity principle in health insurance still fits today’s 
individualistic society. 
But the more society embraces the agency of the individual as our 
(collective) ideal, the more nagging doubts and suspicions about this trend 




for the well-being of individuals, and the viability of society is dependent on 
active and willing cooperation towards common goals and by common 
moral standards. One illustration of this paradox can be found in the area 
of health. On the one hand, individuals are increasingly being held 
responsible for their own (mental) health (Dehue, 2008). For example, 
children’s hyperactivity is increasingly seen as an internal “illness” that 
should be cured by the child taking medication and undergoing treatment. 
At the same time, research confirms the common sense idea that health, 
well-being, and the successful recovery from illness are furthered if 
individuals are members of (many or strong) social groups (Jetten, Haslam, 
& Haslam, 2011) and that loneliness is a killer (Cacioppo, Hawkley, & 
Berntson, 2003).  
The Dutch queen described this issue in her 2012 Christmas speech, 
stating that collective solidarity is necessary for individuals’ full expansion 
and society not falling apart. Thus, in a society that is becoming increasingly 
individualistic, there is an increasing concern that some essential social 
qualities are vanishing: solidarity is being eroded and communities are 
falling apart (e.g., Putnam, 2000). Indeed, in a society where the rise of the 
individual comes with the fall of collectives, there is cause for concern. But 
in this dissertation, we suggest that in many ways individuality and 
community do not need to be antagonistic: rather than assuming that 
individuality and society are at opposite ends of a spectrum, we can also 
look for ways in which individuality and group membership can be 




The Social Identity Approach 
The widespread assumption that the individual and the group are in 
opposition is not just restricted to lay theorists but is also present 
throughout the social sciences (see Tilly, 1973, for a review). Within social 
psychology, the social identity approach seems to have played a particularly 
central role in shaping thoughts about the relationship between being a 
distinctive individual and being a group member.  
 
Social identity theory. Social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979) proposes that human beings are not merely individuals or group 
members: Individuals are assumed to derive part of their self-concept, their 
social identity, from their knowledge of, and emotional attachment to group 
membership(s). In other words, individuals are assumed to internalize “the 
group” into their identity. Furthermore, because people are assumed to 
strive to think positively about themselves, SIT proposes that people will 
also strive for positive social identities by seeking positive in-group 
distinctiveness (Tajfel, 1978a). This should, according to SIT, have various 
consequences for intergroup behaviour (e.g., discrimination) but for the 
present dissertation we will focus on those aspects of SIT that are directly 
relevant for the implied relation between the individual and the group.  
According to SIT, people’s behaviour is located on an 
interpersonal-intergroup continuum, ranging from acting in terms of the 
individual self on one extreme to acting in terms of the group on the other 
extreme (Tajfel, 1978a). When behaviour is located on the intergroup 
extreme, ingroup members are expected to show little variance in their 
behaviour towards members from another group (out-group members), and 
treat all out-group members similarly, independent of the individual 




that it assumes that such intergroup behaviour is associated with a 
psychological shift from defining the self on the basis of self-other 
categorizations to defining the self on the basis ingroup-outgroup 
categorizations. This seems to imply that the more individuals act in terms 
of group membership (at the intergroup end of the continuum), the less 
they should be able to make self-other distinctions. This suggests that when 
acting in terms of social identities, individuals’ individuality will disappear. 
 
Self-categorization theory. Self-categorization theory (SCT; 
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) builds on SIT but 
focuses more on the process of psychological group formation and its 
consequences. Distinct from the interpersonal-intergroup continuum 
proposed by SIT, SCT proposes that human beings can categorize 
themselves at different levels of abstraction and that these different self-
categorizations are hierarchically structured (Turner, 1982; Turner et al., 
1987). That is, individuals are assumed to either define themselves as 
distinctive individuals (in terms of personal identity) or self-categorize in 
terms of shared social category membership (in terms of social identity), 
and these different hierarchical abstractions are assumed to be “functionally 
antagonistic”. This implies that if one defines the self as a distinctive 
individual (in a hypothetical situation in which personal identity salience is 
absolute) one cannot define the self as a group member, and vice versa. 
According to SCT, the level of self-categorization influences 
whether we think and behave as an individual or as a group member 
(Turner, 1982). When personal identity is salient, individuals are assumed to 
perceive themselves in terms of individual attributes that distinguish them 
from other ingroup members. Furthermore, their behaviour is assumed to 
be driven by personal norms and motives. This has overlap with the 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
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behaviour described by SIT as interpersonal2. In contrast, when individuals 
categorize themselves in terms of shared social category membership, they 
are expected to have some degree of social consensus about the defining 
features (e.g. norms, status) and boundaries of the group (Turner, Oakes, 
Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). Thus as social identity becomes salient and 
people define themselves in terms of the same shared identity, they see each 
other as more alike in terms of the defining attributes of this identity, 
perceive themselves as relatively interchangeable group members, and 
behave in line with internalized group norms and interests (Turner, 1991; 
Hogg & Turner, 1987). In this way, individuals’ self-perceptions become 
depersonalized and their personal identity is pushed to the background 
(Turner, 1982). This process of depersonalization is what, according to SCT 
makes group behaviour, cohesion, cooperation, and social influence 
possible. 
Following SCT (Turner, 1985), group formation depends on people 
defining themselves in terms of a shared social identity. A further important 
development of SCT is that it specifies when social identities become self-
defining or (in other words) “salient”. This process of self-categorization as 
a group member is assumed to be more likely to the extent that perceived 
differences between a set of “stimuli” (i.e., an ingroup) and other sets of 
stimuli (outgroups) is larger than the differences within each set of stimuli 
(i.e., differences within groups; Turner, 1985; Turner & Oakes, 1986). To 
rephrase, self-categorization as a group appears more likely to the extent 
that between-group differences are larger than the within-group differences: 
                                                
2 It should be noted that it appears Tajfel used the term “personal identity” only once, and 
then in a context in which he appeared to use the term differently than as it is used in SCT 
(Tajfel, 1978c, p. 159, 161). Thus, if one would place personal identity on the interpersonal 
end of the continuum, as we are implying here, it appears that one is blending elements of 




the principle of meta-contrast. For example, it should be easier to see an 
aggregate of women as a group when other aggregates are composed of 
men than when other aggregates are also composed of women, and it 
should be easier to see the Dutch as a group to the extent that they are 
looking, thinking, and behaving in a more similar way that is different from 
other nationalities (see also Campbell, 1958). Following the same principle, 
group members should be seen as more prototypical for the group as a 
whole to the extent that the perceived differences between a group member 
and other ingroup members are less than the perceived differences between 
a group member and outgroup members (Turner & Oakes, 1986). SCT sees 
this “cognitive redefinition” of the self and other group members as the 
defining feature of (psychological) group formation, whereas it considers 
interpersonal dynamics as unnecessary or corrosive to this process (Turner, 
1982, 1984). After all, any emphasis on the individual and their personal 
attributes would undermine the ability to form such depersonalized 
perceptions (see also Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 1998; Spears & Lea, 1992; 
Reicher, 1984). 
In sum, SCT proposes that there is a functional antagonism 
between defining oneself as an individual versus as a group member. First, 
following the principle of meta-contrast, the more salient individuality is 
and the more within-group differences there are, the less likely it should be 
that group members define themselves in group terms. Second, the process 
of depersonalization implies that when individuals do categorize in terms of 
a shared social category, they come to perceive themselves as similar, 
equivalent, and interchangeable with other group members, and behaviour 
becomes a function of their group membership. SCT thus seems to imply 
that individuality and social solidarity cannot go together, and that in a 
society that is becoming increasingly individualistic, individuals are unlikely 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
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to define themselves as group members and experience a strong sense of 
solidarity. 
 
Optimal distinctiveness theory. Later work inspired by the social 
identity approach, described the conflict between individuality and group 
membership in even sharper contrast. Whereas SCT attributes the 
functional antagonism between personal and social identity to cognitive-
perceptual principles derived from gestalt theory (i.e., the notion that figure 
and ground cannot be in focus at the same time), optimal distinctiveness 
theory takes this one step further by proposing that this antagonism is 
motivated. According to Brewer (1991), human beings have two conflicting 
fundamental needs: a need for belonging and inclusion, and a need for 
individuation and differentiation from others (see also Codol, 1984; Snyder 
& Fromkin, 1980). The opposition between these needs seems to imply that 
one cannot be a distinctive individual and group member at the same time. 
According to optimal distinctiveness theory, people search for ways to 
optimally satisfy both needs simultaneously, and a distinctive social identity 
is seen as a compromise between the two needs. By identifying with an 
optimally distinctive group, individuals are assumed to equally satisfy their 
need for inclusion through group membership and their need for 
differentiation through intergroup comparisons (see also Kampmeier & 
Simon, 2001). From this perspective, identifying as a distinctive individual 
(or small-group member) is too narrow and distinctive, and should 
therefore “threaten” one’s need for inclusion (in the sense of not satisfying 
it sufficiently), whereas identification with a large social category (e.g., a 
nation) is too broad and inclusive, and should threaten one’s need for 
distinctiveness. This reasoning seems to imply that one cannot be a 




and that one cannot identify with society at large because too much 
inclusion obstructs individuals’ distinctiveness. From this perspective it 
seems that current trends toward individualism might not only be harmful 
for solidarity in society, but also for the satisfaction of individuals’ need for 
inclusion. 
 In sum, although social identity theory, self-categorization theory, 
and optimal distinctiveness theory all have somewhat different approaches 
to the processes underpinning social identity, they all appear to converge on 
the same conclusion: there is a tension between being a distinctive 
individual and being a highly identified member of a cohesive group. By 
implication, these theories suggest that individuality and social cohesion are 
irreconcilable, and that if society continues in its progression towards 
increasing individualism, we will end up at a situation in which social 
solidarity is no more. But in this dissertation we question whether this 
“either/or” perspective is correct. 
 
Challenges for the Traditional Social Identity Approach 
Notwithstanding the broad popular appeal of the idea that there 
would be an incongruence between the independence of the individual and 
the cohesiveness and solidarity of groups, both in the theories discussed so 
far and in the social sciences more generally, this simple assumption is 
challenged by multiple observations of situations in which individuality and 
group membership are entwined and not (at first glance) incongruent or 
antagonistic at all. For example, in individualistic cultures, the expression of 
individuality may be an expression of one’s cultural group membership 
(Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002). Moreover, some groups appear to be 
founded on principles of individual self-expression and independence. For 
example, the strength of a multidisciplinary team lies in the differential 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
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background of its members, and the progression of the scientific 
community is dependent on the extent to which individual scientists make a 
distinctive contribution. Groups in general, such as friendship groups, 
families, political parties, and organizations seem to be partly dependent on 
the input of individual members. 
Indeed, researchers both from within the social identity tradition 
and beyond increasingly seem to recognize that (in many cases) there can be 
a surprising amount of individuality in highly cohesive groups and powerful 
social categories alike (Postmes & Jetten, 2006). This observation can pose 
a problem for the traditional social identity approach. If we look at the 
literature, we can find various perspectives that can create possibilities for 
individuality within a group and these different solutions challenge the 
traditional social identity approach to a greater or lesser extent.  
 
The content of group norms. One way of understanding the 
possibility for individuality within groups can be inferred from SCT itself. 
According to SCT, when social identity is salient, group members will 
internalize group norms and conform their behaviour in line with such 
norms (Turner, 1991; Hogg & Turner, 1987). Therefore, it has been 
proposed that the possibility for individuality within a group should be 
dependent on what group norms prescribe. For example, expressing 
individuality is completely in line with conforming to a cultural norm of 
individualism (Hornsey & Jetten, 2004; Jetten et al., 2002; Jetten, McAuliffe, 
Hornsey, & Hogg, 2006). Similarly, being critical and thinking 
independently is completely in line with a group norm of critical and 
independent thought (Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001). Finally, 
accepting group members who are “different” is completely in line with an 




Kleef, & De Dreu, 2007; Luijters, Van der Zee, & Otten, 2008). Reasoning 
from this self-categorization perspective, the possibility for individuality 
(and diversity) is thus fully dependent on the norms provided by the group. 
Individuality should be possible only to the extent that the group prescribes 
it.  
But while the content of group norms can provide a self-
categorization explanation for individuality within pre-existing groups, one 
could wonder how norms for individuality or diversity can emerge from a 
self-categorization perspective in the first place. In particular, if we consider 
the principle of meta-contrast, assumed by SCT to underlie psychological 
group formation, how can a collection of distinctive individuals ever come 
to perceive themselves as a group, or as prototypical group members? And 
who would be considered a prototypical group member if the norm 
prescribes individuality? It seems that these questions cannot easily be 
answered from within a self-categorization perspective. 
 
Individuality as a cognitive delusion. Another approach that 
suggests that it is possible for people to feel as an individual while being a 
group member is the perspective of Prentice and colleagues, who suggest 
that the subjective experience of agency and autonomy, and the social 
perceptions of individuality are, to a large extent, misperceptions (e.g., 
Prentice, 2006; Miller & Prentice, 1994). This perspective is not inconsistent 
with SCT, we note: To the extent that individuals subjectively experience 
their identity as a unified whole, the actions motivated by a particular social 
identity could be experienced as just as agentic and authentically self-chosen 
as the actions motivated by their personal identity.  
This cognitive misattribution of socially motivated behaviour to 
internal agency and autonomy thus also seems to provide a self-
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
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categorization explanation for individual’s being able to feel as a distinctive 
individual while being a group member. However the assumption that 
individuality might be nothing but a misattribution, cannot explain that 
some groups, or maybe to some degree all groups, seem to thrive on the 
individuality of its members. 
 
The type of group. We can infer another possibility for 
individuality within groups from the perspective that there are different 
“types” of groups (Lickel et al., 2000). The extent to which individuality and 
group membership are opposing depends on the type of group one is 
referring to. Broadly, a distinction has been made between groups as 
categories (defined on the basis of similarity or common identity), and 
groups as dynamic entities (defined on the basis of interaction or common 
bonds; Deaux & Martin, 2003, Prentice, Miller, & Lightdale, 1994; Wilder & 
Simon, 1998; see also Brewer, Hong, & Li, 2004). According to Wilder and 
Simon (1998), categorical group membership depends on the extent to 
which one is similar to other group members, whereas dynamic group 
membership depends on the extent to which one fits into the group’s 
structure. These differences seem to suggest that SCT, and its assumed 
antagonism between individual and group, might better fit with categorical 
groups than with dynamic groups (see also Moreland, Argote, & Krishnan, 
1996). In support of this suggestion, research has shown that the perceived 
groupiness (entitativity; Campbell, 1958) of dynamic and categorical groups 
is predicted by different antecedents (Ip, Chiu, & Wan, 2006; Rutchick, 
Hamilton, & Sack, 2008; Spencer-Rodgers, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2007). 
While categorical groups are perceived as a group because of perceived 
homogeneity, dynamical groups are perceived as a group because of 




between individuality and group membership might be reconciled within 
dynamic groups.  
Although a distinction between categorical groups and dynamic 
groups can provide an understanding for why individuality sometimes can 
be possible within groups, the distinction itself might not be that clear-cut. 
For example, research suggests that people can perceive the same group (i.e. 
a social caste, a political party, or a group of high school students) as 
dynamic and categorical, and this perception in turn determines whether 
similarity or interaction enhances entitativity (Rutchick et al, 2008). Given 
that all groups (even families) might be seen as categorical to some extent 
and in particular situations, it might be that self-categorization processes 
can apply to all groups to some extent (Postmes, Baray, Haslam, Morton, & 
Swaab, 2006). However, given that all groups might also be seen as dynamic 
entities, SCT appears to ignore the possibility that large social categories 
might form more dynamically and the implications this may have for the 
relation between individual and group. 
 
The relational self. The recognition that relations among 
individuals might be more important than SCT suggests, is incorporated in 
another perspective that might also provide opportunities for individuality 
within a group. Rather than assuming that groups can be construed as 
dynamic, others have suggested that individuals can construe themselves in 
terms of relations (a notion that is also central to identity theory, Burke, 
1980; McCall & Simmons, 1978; Stryker, 1968). Brewer, who as mentioned 
earlier was inspired by the social identity approach, suggested that there 
might be a level of self-construal “in between” personal identity and social 
identity. According to this perspective, individuals can, besides defining the 
self as an individual (personal identity) or as a group member (social 
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identity), also construe the self in terms of their role in relation to 
significant others (a relational identity; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; see also 
Stets & Burke, 2000). To the extent that such a relational identity is salient, 
individuals’ behaviour is expected not to be motivated by self-interests or 
by more abstract collective welfare but by the benefit for close others. 
Furthermore, self-evaluations are expected not to derive from interpersonal 
or intergroup comparisons but from the adeptness with which one 
performs “interpersonal roles” with significant others. Following this 
suggestion, when a relational identity is salient, individual distinctiveness 
might not hamper one’s position in a group and could possibly highlight the 
distinctive role one fulfils in relation to others. This reasoning fits with 
research showing that a relational identity allows for group cooperation 
despite within-group differences and without the necessity to categorize in 
terms of a shared social identity (Brickson, 2000; Vos & Van der Zee, 
2011). 
Although this research suggests that a relational identity might 
provide possibilities for individuals to be distinctive within a group, it also 
seems to affirm the notion that social identity cannot be reconciled with 
individuality. After all, the suggestion of an intermediate level of identity 
implies that one can only be distinctive within a group if one does not define 
the self as a distinctive individual or as a group member. Relational identity 
can thus be considered as a compromise between personal and social 
identity within the individual, reaffirming the idea that individuality and 
solidarity exist at two very different and irreconcilable levels of abstraction 
that can only be reconciled if we ignore them. 
Further support for the possibility of defining the self in terms of 
social roles to reconcile individual distinctiveness with group membership 




satisfaction (Bettencourt, Molix, Talley, & Sheldon, 2006; Bettencourt & 
Sheldon, 2001; Sheldon & Bettencourt, 2002). Their research shows that 
individuals can satisfy both self-oriented and socially-oriented psychological 
needs through their social role within a group (what they call “social-role 
identity”) as long as the characteristics and skills of an individual 
corresponds with the expectations and demands of their social role. Thus, 
in contrast to optimal distinctiveness theory, Bettencourt and Sheldon 
assume that needs for individuation (or autonomy) and needs for inclusion 
(or relatedness) are not necessarily opposing (see also self-determination 
theory; Deci & Ryan, 2000). This suggests that individuals’ needs for being 
a distinctive individual and being a group member might both be met 
through one’s role within a group. However, it should be noted that this 
social role solution for reconciling being a distinctive individual and being a 
group member appears rather “mechanical” (see Durkheim, 1893/1984). 
Although a social-role identity does not assume the process of 
depersonalization of the self in terms of an ingroup prototype, a particular 
social role is assumed to be associated with a particular set of expectations 
and norms (see also Stets & Burke, 2000). This suggests that being 
distinctive within a group is only possible to the extent that the 
distinctiveness of an individual fits with the particular social role he or she 
occupies.  
In sum, we can infer from these different perspectives (different 
group norms, different cognitive interpretations, different types of groups, 
and different self-construals) that there are various approaches that suggest 
that the conflict between being a distinctive individual and being a group 
member could be reconciled. By implication, the increased individualisation 
of Western societies might not necessarily result in the erosion of groups, 
communities, and society. 
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Cultural differences. Our general question of how individuals are 
related to collectives has also been of central concern in research on cultural 
differences. Cross-cultural psychologists have distinguished individualistic 
societies, such as The Netherlands and the United States of America, from 
more collectivistic societies, such as Indonesia (Hofstede 1980; Triandis, 
1995). In collectivistic cultures, such as in most countries in East Asia, 
collective fate, goals, and values seem to be centralized. Individuals in 
collectivistic cultures seem to make no distinction between personal and 
collective goals or, if they do so, subordinate their personal goals to 
collective goals (Triandis 1989). It appears that in such collectivistic 
cultures, individuals are conceived as aspects of collectives (Triandis, Chan, 
Bhawuk, Iwao, & Sinha, 1995). 
From a social identity perspective on the difference between 
individualistic and collectivistic cultures, we could infer that individuals 
from individualistic cultures might be more likely to self-categorize as 
independent individuals, whereas individuals from collectivistic cultures 
might be more likely to self-categorize as group members and to make 
comparisons on the intergroup level (cf., Triandis, McCusker & Hui, 1990). 
However, a meta-analysis shows that individuals in collectivistic countries 
might be less group-oriented than individuals within individualistic cultures 
(Oyserman, Koon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). 
Rather than focusing on a construal of the self as either a distinctive 
individual or group member, other cultural psychologists have focused on 
the distinction between independent and interdependent self-construals 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Whereas individuals in individualistic cultures 
seem more likely to construe the self as an independent, self-contained, and 
autonomous entity, individuals in collectivistic cultures are more likely to 




(see also Brewer & Gardner, 1996). This seems to suggest that SCT with its 
assumption that individuals either define themselves in terms of personal or 
social identity might not be well applicable in more collectivistic cultures, 
where individuals may be more likely to construe themselves as 
interdependent of others (see also Yuki, 2003).  
Indeed, a recent content analysis of existing scales of collectivism 
(Brewer & Chen, 2007) shows that within psychological research on cultural 
differences, collectives are predominantly operationalized as networks of 
interpersonal relations rather than as ingroups (as would be in line with 
SCT). This observation, together with the concept of relational identity 
described earlier, led Brewer and Chen to propose a new theoretical 
framework that distinguishes relational collectivism from group collectivism 
(see also Brewer & Roccas, 2001; Brewer & Yuki, 2007). This framework 
suggests that individualism, and relational versus group collectivism are 
associated with different self-construals, agency beliefs, and values. 
Furthermore, these different levels of social orientations are assumed to 
vary among cultures in the extent to which they are salient and have 
priority.  
Research seems to support the suggestion that collectives in 
collectivistic cultures are more relational than collectives in individualistic 
cultures. For example, for individuals in collectivistic cultures, in-group 
identity appears to be predicted by the knowledge of the relational 
structure, individual differences, and feelings of personal connectedness 
with in-group members, rather than by ingroup homogeneity (Yuki, 2003). 
Furthermore, it seems that individuals in collectivistic cultures achieve their 
motive for distinctiveness through their distinctive social position within a 
group, rather than from being a distinctive individual or a distinctive group 
(Becker et al., 2012; Vignoles, Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2000). Together, 
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these findings suggest that the framing of individuals and groups in terms 
of relations rather than in terms of independent individuals or social 
categories is an important difference between collectivistic and 
individualistic cultures. It seems that the traditional social identity approach 
and its assumed antagonism between the individual and the group as a 
category do not really fit this differential framing of individuals and groups 
in collectivistic cultures. In collectivistic cultures, the individual and the 
group seem to be connected through the role the individual fulfils in the 
broader network of relations.  
A superficial interpretation of these cultural differences could lead 
to the conclusion that by adopting a more “collectivistic” culture in the 
West, individuality and social solidarity might be reconciled. However, it 
should be noted that, although the individual and the group might not be 
antagonistic in collectivistic cultures, the focus on role expectancies and role 
hierarchies still provides clear expectations of how individuals should act. 
The possibilities for individual distinctiveness within the group created by 
such role expectancies do not seem to fit the Western definition of 
individuality as individuals being autonomous. Although adopting a 
collectivistic culture thus might not be the solution for reconciling 
individuality and social solidarity in the West, these cultural differences 
together with the notion of dynamic groups and relational identities do 
seem to suggest that intra-group dynamics might be important to bring the 
two closer together (cf. Kampmeier & Simon, 2001, for a cognitive 
solution). 
All in all, these different lines of research within both social and 
cultural psychology suggest that SCT cannot explain the complete story 
behind group formation: Sometimes the display of individuality within the 




society which appears to strengthen (rather than undermine) solidarity. The 
social identity tradition was developed against the, at the time, predominant 
assumption that all group processes (including intergroup phenomena such 
as ingroup favouritism and discrimination) could be fully explained as self-
interested instrumental and rational behaviour in networks of 
interdependent interpersonal relations (e.g., as argued by Rabbie, Schot & 
Visser, 1989). However, it seems that by claiming that interpersonal 
dynamics are unnecessary or insufficient for the process of (psychological) 
group formation (Turner, 1982, 1984), social identity researchers might 
have thrown the baby out with the bath water: Intra-group dynamics and 
interdependence between group members do seem to play a role.  
 
An Interactive Model of Identity Formation 
While self-categorization processes of psychological group 
formation seem to suggest an antagonism between being a distinctive 
individual and being a group member, it seems that there are more dynamic 
groups in which individuals’ distinctiveness does not necessarily hamper 
group membership. The idea that groups might be formed through both 
categorical and dynamic processes, and that individuality and group 
membership do not need to be in opposition, has recently received 
attention in the interactive model of identity formation (IMIF; Postmes, 
Haslam, & Swaab, 2005a). This model aims to explain individuality and 
social influence in small groups by distinguishing deductive (categorical) 
processes of social identity formation from inductive (dynamic) processes 
of social identity formation.  
In the IMIF, deductive processes of social identity formation refer to 
the categorical processes proposed by SCT to underlie psychological group 
formation. That is, in small groups, group members are assumed to deduce 
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a shared social identity from the wider context through intergroup 
comparison on the basis of what group members have in common at a 
superordinate group or category level that differentiates them from other 
groups. In contrast, the inductive processes of social identity formation refer 
to the more dynamic processes through which individuals might contribute 
to the formation of a shared small-group identity (Postmes et al., 2005a). 
From this perspective, who “we” are, is assumed to be not only determined 
by what makes “us” different from “them” but also by the individual 
members within the group (cf. Gaertner, Iuzzini, Witt, & Oriña, 2006). 
Here, intragroup interactions are assumed to inform the content of social 
identity, and group norms and conventions are expected to be induced 
from the expressions and behaviours of individuals within the group 
(Swaab, Postmes, Van Beest, & Spears, 2007). 
According to the IMIF, these inductive processes allow for 
individuality (or individual distinctiveness) to form the basis for the 
inference of social identity. This reasoning builds on Durkheim’s 
(1893/1984) notion of organic solidarity arising out of the differentiation 
between individuals within a group, and seems to imply that the more 
distinctive individuals are, the stronger the social identity that might 
inductively be formed. Thus, rather than the antagonism between 
individuality and social identity suggested through deductive processes, 
through inductive processes of social identity formation individuality might 
become an enforcer of social identity. This suggests that the inductive 
formation of social identity allows for reconciliation between the individual 
and the group. 
It should be noted that the inductive processes in the IMIF seem to 
provide an alternative possibility for reconciling individuality and group 




norms may prescribe individuality (Jetten et al., 2002), induction refers to a 
process through which individuals make an active contribution to the 
emergence of a shared identity (and accompanying social norms) in a context 
where no prior norms or expectations about individuality exist 
(individualistic group norms might, however, be a consequence of induction). 
Second, rather than creating a possibility to cognitively (or internally) reconcile 
individuality with social identity, induction also creates a possibility to 
externally reconcile individuality with shared social identity of group 
members. Third, rather than proposing a discontinuity between categorical 
and dynamic groups in the degree to which these inductive processes play a 
role, the IMIF suggests that both categorical (deductive) and dynamic 
(inductive) processes can play a role in all social groups. Indeed, Postmes et 
al. (2006) pointed out that small groups may operate as social categories, 
and that small-group dynamics can give rise to social identity. Fourth, 
different from the proposal that individuals can construe the self in terms 
of relational identity (in between personal and social identity); induction 
seems to suggest that group members can develop a shared social identity 
that incorporates the dynamics between personal identities or different 
individuals within the group. Thus, through inductive processes of social 
identity formation personal identity and social identity are assumed to go 
together. Finally, rather than social roles prescribing how individuals are 
expected to be distinctive, inductive processes of social identity formation 





Open questions in IMIF. The IMIF was proposed as a model for 
better understanding deductive and inductive processes of social influence 
in dynamic small groups but it also provides an interesting new perspective 
on the relation between the individual and the group. To the extent that the 
model can apply to all sorts of groups (ranging from small dynamic groups 
to large social categories), inductive processes might create opportunities 
for reconciling today’s increasing individualization with social solidarity. 
This would, in Durkheim’s words, suggest that solidarity can organically 
arise out of the differentiation of individuals, and that individuality and 
social identity do not need to be antagonistic. 
But it has to be said that up to now, we are unable to conclude 
whether these theoretical proposals have any validity. So far, the IMIF has 
received only minimal empirical testing. Since the model was proposed in 
2005, three papers (Brooke, Postmes, Jetten, & Dyson, 2009; Postmes, 
Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005b; Swaab, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) have 
explicitly compared inductive and deductive processes of social identity 
formation. Both empirically and theoretically, there are a number of 
unanswered questions and issues to resolve.  
First, and most important to this dissertation, it remains unclear 
from the IMIF how individual distinctiveness and social identity formation 
are related. While reasoning from Durkheim’s idea of organic solidarity that 
individual differences might strengthen the process of inductive social 
identity formation, Postmes et al. (2005b) state that, “It is important to 
stress that this does not necessarily mean that the formation of an inductive 
identity depends on the existence of dissimilarity within the group” (p. 749). 
But for the question of whether individuality can be reconciled with group 




are perceived to be different from each other can form a strong shared 
identity through inductive processes. 
A second issue is that the previously used manipulations of the 
process of inductive social identity formation are according to us suboptimal. 
Postmes et al. (2005b) manipulated induction in two ways that were 
originally intended as a manipulation of “common bond group” (see 
Postmes & Spears, 2000). In a first study, induction was manipulated as 
“personal bond groups” in which members have a mutual bond. 
Participants were told that they were put in a group with people who could 
well have been close personal friends. In a second study, induction was 
manipulated by letting groups carry out activities that are fun and caring and 
that accentuate interpersonal relations. Furthermore, Swaab et al. (2008) 
manipulated induction by letting group members in dyads disclose 
themselves to each other. Thus, in both these papers, the process of 
induction was manipulated by focusing on interpersonal relations. We 
believe that these manipulations do not optimally fit the theoretical 
operationalization of induction as the process through which individual 
group members contribute to the formation of social identity and do not 
clearly disentangle the process of inductive social identity formation from 
relational identity salience. The manipulations of induction used in Brooke 
et al.’s (2009) unpublished work do a better job in this regard. In a first 
study, induction was manipulated by telling experimental groups that 
“groups typically had above average shared identity and above average 
individuality”. Furthermore in a second study, induction was manipulated 
by asking groups of athletes to write about a video of the similarities and 
differences within their set in terms of athletic performance. Although these 
manipulations are clearly different from manipulating relational identity 
salience, they still not optimally fit the theoretical operationalization of 
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induction. In addition, these manipulations may be confounded with a 
manipulation of perceived group diversity.  
Third, as mentioned above, the IMIF was proposed to be a model 
for understanding social identity processes in small groups. No research has 
yet examined the extent to which inductive processes might also play a role 
in social identity formation in larger groups and social categories. Therefore, 
it remains an empirical question whether inductive processes of social 
identity formation can create opportunities for reconciling individuality and 
group membership in larger groups. 
A final issue concerns the question of what happens once social 
identity is formed. Postmes et al., (2005a) suggest that once social identity is 
established, either through deductive or inductive processes, “group 
members will be influenced to behave in a way that is consistent with the 
content of this identity and with group norms” (p. 10). However, given that 
individual differences may be integrated in social identity through an 
inductive process, it might well be that inductively formed social identities 
leave more room for individuality than deductively formed social identities. 
No research has yet examined whether deductively and inductively formed 
social identities might have different consequences. 
 
The interplay between individuality and social identity. In this 
dissertation, we will empirically explore the possibility of inductive 
processes in social identity formation and the implications this can have for 
the reconciliation between individuality and group membership. To do this, 
we will focus on several areas where we assume deductive and inductive 
processes to have distinct effects. 
First, whereas deductive processes suggest that perceiving oneself as 




deductive processes resulting in social identity, individual distinctiveness 
might be an underlying mechanism for inductive processes resulting in 
social identity. Second, whereas deductive processes suggest that 
heterogeneity of group members hampers the formation of a strong shared 
social identity; through inductive processes groups perceived to be 
heterogeneous may be able to form a strong shared social identity. Third, 
whereas deductive processes of social identity formation suggests that once 
social identity is formed, group members should depersonalize themselves 
in terms of shared group characteristics and behave in line with group 
norms, social identities that are inductively formed might leave more room 
for expressing individuality in ways that could be considered as deviant to 
group norms. Finally, whereas deductive processes of social identity 
formation suggest that intragroup dynamics are unnecessary or corrosive 
for shared social identity formation, inductive processes suggest a more 
important role for intragroup dynamics for the formation of shared social 
identity. 
Together, these differential hypotheses suggest that deductive 
processes of social identity formation alone might provide a too simplistic 
view on the relation between individual and group. To the extent that 
inductive processes can play a role in the formation of social identity in all 
groups, individuality and social identity might be mutually reinforcing. 
Taking both processes into account can therefore greatly enhance the ability 
of social identity to explain individuality and group functioning, and 
provides a more balanced perspective on the interplay between individual 




Overview of Empirical Chapters 
 
In four empirical chapters3, we aim to demonstrate that the 
induction of a shared social identity is possible, and to examine how 
induction differs from deduction. 
 
Chapter 2 
In Chapter 2, we explore to what extent inductive processes of 
social identity are perceived to exist in all groups (small interactive groups 
and large social categories alike), and to what extent perceived individual 
distinctiveness might be an underlying mechanism for inductive processes 
resulting in social identity. In particular, we test a model predicting that to 
the extent a group is perceived as inductively formed, individuals may 
perceive themselves as more distinctive, which will foster perceived 
“groupiness” (or entitativity), and in turn will enhance identification. Three 
survey studies test this model against alternative theoretical models in 
different group contexts. Study 2.1 focuses on self-relevant groups ranging 
from 4 to 15 members. Study 2.2 focuses on a much broader set of groups. 
We asked participants to think of different ‘types’ of groups in Lickel’s (e.g. 
Lickel et al., 2000) taxonomy. Finally, in Study 2.3 we test causality by using 
group size as an extraneous indicator of inductive social identity formation. 
 Chapter 2 provides a first empirical test of how inductive social 
identity formation may differ from deductive social identity formation. It 
provides insight in the usefulness of considering inductive processes of 
social identity formation over a broad range of groups and the extent to 
                                                
3 The empirical chapters of this dissertation (Chapters 2 to 5) were written as separate 
journal articles. As a result, these chapters may have some overlap with the introduction 




which it allows individual group members to internally reconcile their 
distinctiveness with group membership.  
 
Chapter 3 
Because Chapter 2 was based on results from survey research, this 
was concerned with individual perceptions of the relation between individual 
distinctiveness and group membership. This rather ignores the processes by 
which the individuality of oneself and of others is (or is not) reconciled 
within an actual group in which those others are just as present as the self. 
In other words, it does not allow for any conclusions about a possible 
reconciliation of individuality and shared social identity of group members in 
settings in which those others are not some abstraction but a material 
reality. 
 To overcome this, Chapter 3 explores whether members of small 
groups can inductively form a shared identity, and whether groups 
perceived to be heterogeneous may be able to form a stronger social 
identity through an inductive process than through a deductive process. 
Two studies test this experimentally. In Study 3.1, we manipulate the 
process of social identity formation (deductive vs. inductive) in 
experimentally created groups, and measure group members’ identification 
and perceived entitativity, as indicators of social identity. Study 3.2 tests the 
prediction that these different processes of social identity formation can 
provide different outcomes of perceived group diversity. To this end, in 
addition to the process of social identity formation, perceived diversity is 
also manipulated (homogenous vs. heterogeneous), and group cooperation 
is measured as an additional indicator of shared identity.  
 Chapter 3 thus provides insight in the extent to which individuality 
and group membership can be reconciled in actual collaborations (i.e., not 
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just cognitively, but interactively) by inducing a shared social identity where 
one did not exist before. The results dovetail with Chapter 2 in suggesting 




The results of chapters 2 and 3 do not preclude the possibility that 
individuality might also be an outcome of inductive social identity 
formation: in inductive social identity groups, individuality and social 
identity might be mutually reinforcing. Indeed, Chapter 4 explores the idea 
that in contrast to deductively formed social identities, inductively formed 
social identities leave more room for expressing individuality in ways that 
could be considered as “deviant” to group norms. Building on Chapter 3, 
two studies of bogus small groups manipulated social identity formation 
and diversity, and established a group norm about a particular issue. 
Participants are asked to generate arguments concerning an issue that they 
will discuss with the other group members. The degree to which the ideas 
generated are norm-consistent or norm-inconsistent is our index for the 
degree of individuality displayed. The two studies differ in the issue 
participants are asked to generate arguments about (Studies 4.1 and 4.2).  
 
Chapter 5 
Together, Chapters 2, 3, and 4 use a novel perspective on social 
identity formation to more closely examine the interplay between 
individuality and group membership. The studies provide insight in the 
differential relationship between individuality and social identity that is the 
consequence of deductive and inductive processes of social identity 




those inductive processes, intragroup dynamics play an important part, 
Chapter 2-4 do not in themselves examine the extent to which intragroup 
interaction is necessary for shared psychological group formation.  
Chapter 5 therefore takes another approach to the importance of 
understanding both deductive and inductive processes of social identity 
formation, by exploring the extent to which intragroup interaction (group-
doing) is necessary for the emergence of shared social identity. In this, we 
distinguish between a self-definition dimension of identification (referring 
to the extent to which individuals perceive themselves and other in-group 
members as a category) and a self-investment dimension of identification 
(referring to individuals’ psychological investment in the in-group, see 
Leach et al., 2008). By comparing three small group studies that varied in 
the possibility for intragroup interaction, we test the necessity of intragroup 
processes for the emergence of shared identification on these two 
dimensions. A multi-level approach explores to what extent intragroup 
interaction is necessary for shared self-definition and shared self-investment 
to emerge. 
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4 Chapter 2 is based on: Jans, L., Postmes, T., & Van der Zee, K. I. (2011). The induction 
of shared identity: The positive role of individual distinctiveness for groups. Personality and 









It is often taken for granted that those who stand out do not fit in. This is 
partly because many groups are founded on commonalities among group 
members and partly because groups pressurize members to conform and 
fall in line. However, in order to belong to a group, individuals do not 
always have to disguise that which makes them unique. For example in 
individualistic cultures, showing one’s individuality can be a form of cultural 
conformity (Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002). Moreover, displays of 
individuality can sometimes initiate the formation of (new) social groups. 
One extreme example of this is that the success of artistic groups depends 
on the degree to which members are idiosyncratic, deviant, and original. But 
more mundane groups, such as friendship groups, families, political parties, 
organizations, and many other groups, also tend to be dependent on the 
input of individual members. In this paper, we argue that if groups are 
formed by the contributions of individuals (that is, when social identities are 
formed inductively), they allow group members to feel more distinctive. 
These feelings of individual distinctiveness may in turn strengthen the 
degree to which members view the group as an entity and become 
identified with this group. We tested this prediction in a broad spectrum of 
social groups. 
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Homogeneity and Groupiness 
For a long time, it has been emphasized that similarity and 
homogeneity are the hallmarks of groups. In the entitativity literature, 
similarity is seen as one of the predictors of whether people perceive 
groupiness (Campbell, 1958). Also in conceptualizations of social 
identification, perceiving the group as homogeneous and perceiving oneself 
as a prototypical group member are seen as key attributes of group 
identification (Leach et al., 2008). Moreover, a sense of belongingness to 
some extent suppresses a sense of distinctiveness within a group (Brewer, 
1991; Codol, 1975). 
However, research suggests that the existence of within-group 
differences does not necessarily obstruct the sense of cohesion and unity 
that group members may feel. For example, norms and other group 
characteristics may determine the extent to which individuality or diversity 
is tolerated within the group (Hornsey & Jetten, 2004; Jetten, McAuliffe, 
Hornsey, & Hogg, 2006; Rink & Ellemers, 2007). In a related way, it has 
been argued that the lens through which one looks at a group determines 
whether similarity is a key characteristic of groupiness (Brewer, Hong, & Li, 
2004; Crump, Hamilton, Sherman, Lickel, & Thakkar, 2010; Hamilton, 
Sherman, & Spencer-Rodgers, 2004; Rutchick, Hamilton, & Sack, 2008). 
On the one hand, groups can be perceived as such because their members 
share certain properties. Here, static similarity is the source of groupiness. 
Alternatively, one can see a group as an agentic and dynamic agent in which 
individuals are interdependent in the pursuit of common goals. In the latter 
perspective, similarity of group members is not required in order to 
perceive the group as an entity. Thus, characteristics of the group and the 
way one perceives it determine whether differences are seen as obstructions 




In this paper, we take this reasoning a step further by arguing that 
feeling individually distinctive can also help individuals to perceive their 
group as an entity with which they identify. Instead of focusing on the 
group as a given entity, in which differences are either a problem or not, we 
focus on the process of forming a group identity. More specifically, we focus 
on the influence individuals have on the (trans) formation of a group 
identity (Postmes & Jetten, 2006). We argue that in those cases where 
contributions of individual group members have a strong influence in 
defining the group’s direction, group members are likely to perceive 
themselves as more distinctive. Indeed, this distinctiveness broadens the 
basis upon which the group is founded and thus should help them to 
perceive the group as an entity, which may elicit their identification as group 
members. 
 
The Bottom-up Induction of Shared Identities 
Traditionally, social identity formation is seen as a top-down 
process in which a social identity is deduced from commonalities at a 
superordinate group or category level. In that case, a social identity and a 
personal identity can easily become opposing forces because members are 
to some extent depersonalized due to the highlighting of commonalities 
(Turner, 1982). In other words, when social identities are deduced from 
shared group attributes, within-group differences are suppressed. However, 
more recently it has been argued that social identities can also be induced 
from individual qualities within the group (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 
2005a; cf. Turner, 1982), for example because of the organic emergence of a 
sense of solidarity (cf. Durkheim, 1984). Here, intragroup interactions 
inform the content of social identity, and group norms and conventions are 
inferred from individual expressions within the group. This process may 
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also occur when subgroups influence the formation of superordinate 
identities, as suggested by the ASPIRe model (Haslam, Eggins, & Reynolds, 
2003). 
Although deductive and inductive processes can both play a role in 
the (trans) formation of a social identity, in this paper we specifically focus 
on this less-studied inductive route. We address the question of how, via 
this inductive route, individual distinctiveness can help individuals to 
perceive themselves as a group with which they identify. 
When social identities are formed inductively, the actions of 
individuals are the impetus for the experience of unity and the inference of 
social identity contents. Prior research has suggested that identification with 
a more inductively formed group can be as high as identification with a 
more deductively formed group (Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005b; 
Swaab, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). However, in order to achieve social 
identification with an inductively formed group, there first needs to be a 
perception that the aggregate of distinct individuals within it forms a social 
entity. Hence, the more this group is perceived as an entity, the more 
strongly its group members can begin to identify with it (cf. Castano, 2004). 
How then does an aggregate of individuals come to perceive itself as a 
group through an inductive route? 
The perception that a set of people form a meaningful entity is 
referred to as entitativity (Campbell 1958). It has been argued and shown 
that similarity is not the only prerequisite for groups to have entitativity 
(Brewer et al., 2004; Crump et al., 2010; Hamilton et al., 2004; Ip, Chiu, & 
Wan, 2006; Rutchick et al., 2008). Entitativity may also be reached via 
interaction, common goals, or common outcomes (Gaertner, Iuzzini, Witt, 




Integrating earlier work on induction of social identities with work 
on entitativity, the present research tests the prediction that feelings of 
individual distinctiveness could mediate the relation between inductive 
social identity formation and entitativity (Figure 2.1). In an inductive 
process, groups are influenced by group members’ contributions as 
individuals. In such cases, a greater diversity of contributions would 
strengthen the group as a whole, as long as the diversity of inputs does not 
create conflicts within the group. Therefore, instead of disguising that 
which makes an individual unique, the inductive route of social identity 
formation requires that individuals actually highlight their distinctiveness in 
order to make a contribution to the group as a whole. 
There are several reasons why individual distinctiveness can 
enhance entitativity. In small groups, diversity strengthens the group’s 
capacity if a group can benefit from a broader spectrum of individual 
contributions in the fulfilment of particular tasks (cf. Swann, Polzer, Seyle, 
& Ko, 2004). Moreover, it is likely that group members may consider the 
collective to be more strong and adaptive to the extent that it is responsive 
to individuals’ input and desires for change. As suggested by the ASPIRe 
model (Haslam et al., 2003), giving group members voice and enabling 
them to establish a distinct position in the group can help them feel 
acknowledged and appreciated in their own identity. Such processes may 
also operate in larger collectives. This may be illustrated with an example. In 
groups where deductive processes play a large role, such as the military, 
individual distinctiveness is discouraged and similarities are the foundation 
of perceived unity. In such groups, diversity undermines the unity of action. 
In groups where inductive processes play a larger role, such as the science 
community, individual distinctiveness is encouraged: here the greater 
experience of independence and freedom is testament to the efficacy of the 
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community. The experience of individual distinctiveness can thereby 
strengthen the awareness of the unity of the group. Therefore, we expect 
that through an inductive process individuals become aware of their 
distinctiveness and this awareness of being distinctive helps one perceive 
the group more as an entity, and not less. This perception of entitativity in 




In three studies, we surveyed a wide range of different pre-existing 
social groups, using different methods of eliciting them from (or presenting 
them to) participants. We tested the model depicted in Figure 2.1 and 
compared this model with alternative hypotheses. This model can be 
inferred from prior research, which has gathered some evidence for an 
inductive path to social identity formation in newly formed small interactive 
groups in an experimental setting. The approach of the present studies 
would help us to chart the underlying processes in inductive social identity 
(trans) formation in more detail and across a much broader spectrum of 
groups than has hitherto been considered. One key alternative model to test 
is based on the prediction that feeling individually distinctive is an outcome 
of group entitativity and identification, rather than a mediator (e.g., Jetten et 
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Predictions are tested in different contexts. Study 2.1 focuses on 
self-relevant groups ranging from 4 to 15 members that were named by 
participants. We measured the extent to which inductive processes 
influenced the group, the extent to which individuals felt distinctive within 
these groups, perceived these groups as an entity, and identified with these 
groups. In a second study, we aimed to replicate this model with a much 
broader set of groups. We asked participants to think of different categories 
of groups, using Lickel et al.’s (2000) taxonomy of group types. We tested 
whether, across different group types, our model could also be confirmed. 
Finally in Study 2.3, we demonstrate causality by using group size as an 





To our best knowledge, no prior research has developed scales to 
measure how groups are formed and transformed. We therefore designed 
an index of inductive social identity formation and conducted a pilot to 
assess the new scale’s psychometric properties and divergent validity. 
Divergent validity was assessed by comparing the new index of inductive 
social identity formation with a self-verification scale. Certain outcomes of 
self-verification are similar to the outcomes of inductive social identity 
formation: Self-verification (the extent to which the experiences of 
individuals in groups confirm their self-views) has been shown to be related 
to identification (e.g., Swann, Milton, & Polzer, 2000) and has been 
proposed to help groups find value in diversity (Swann et al., 2004). 
Although the two constructs may have similar consequences, they are 




individuals, but inductive social identity formation concerns the influence 
and contribution of individuals to the group. We tested the prediction that 
items from both scales would load on to two different factors in newly 
formed small groups. 
 
Method, Results, and Discussion 
First year students (107 women, 17 men, 1 unknown, Mage = 19.19) 
participated in exchange for course credits. They were randomly allocated 
to groups of five in an online forum, where they chatted about their first 
experiences at University. After a week, participants filled in a 4-item index 
of inductive social identity formation (M = 4.74, SD = 0.73). In line with 
the definition of inductive social identity formation, items assessed the 
influence of individual members (or subgroups) on the (trans) formation of 
the group: “This group’s identity is formed by members themselves”, 
“Members (subgroups) of this group can steer the course of this group”, 
“Members (subgroups) of this group determine the direction of the group 
themselves”, and “In this group there can be discussion about the group’s 
identity”. Self-verification was assessed with the 3-item scale developed by 
Wiesenfeld, Swann, Brockner, and Bartel (2007; α = .67, M = 3.83, SD = 
0.77). An example item is: "This group sees me as I see myself”. All items 
were answered on 7-point scales (1 = fully disagree, 7 = fully agree). 
A confirmatory factor analysis (in EQS 6.1) tested the proposed 
two-factor measurement model. The model had each set of items load on 
to one latent variable and allowed covariations between latent variables but 
not between any errors. The latent variables were weakly correlated (r = 
.10). Items loaded on the expected latent variable, and the model yielded 
good fit: χ2(13) = 11.74, p = .671, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA < .001. The fit of 
the one-factor model was significantly poorer, χ2(14) = 71.73, p < .001, CFI 
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= 0.66, RMSEA = .183. The scale reliability of the index of inductive social 
identity formation was sound (α = .72), with all item-total correlations > 
.32. We conclude that the psychometric properties of the index of inductive 





Study 2.1 focused on self-relevant groups ranging from 4 to 15 
members. In order to ensure self-relevance, we asked participants to name 
groups they were affiliated with. We measured the extent to which group 
identities were induced, the extent to which individuals felt distinctive 




Participants. First year students (89 women and 25 men, Mage = 
20) participated in the study in exchange for course credits. 
 
Procedure. Participants named and shortly described five groups 
(between 4 and 15 members) of which they were a member. For each of 
these groups they completed the index of inductive social identity 
formation. To guarantee a large spread on the index, the computer 
subsequently selected the group that had either the highest or lowest score. 
About this group participants then answered a series of questions on 
individual distinctiveness, entitativity, and identification on 7-point scales (1 
= fully disagree, 7 = fully agree, unless otherwise specified). The correlations 




Table 2.1. Correlations between the main variables in Study 2.1 
 
 Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Inductive Social Identity Formation   -       
2. Individual Distinctiveness  .34**   -      
3. Entitativity  .47**  .35**   -     
4. Identification  .57**  .35**  .72**   -    
5. Age -.16 -.20*  .06 -.02   -   
6. Sex  .05  .00  .05  .07 -.07   -  
7. Group Size -.34** -.10 -.17 -.25**  .04 -.12 - 
Note. * p < .05, two-tailed. ** p < .01, two-tailed. 
 
Instruments. The index of inductive social identity formation measured 
the influence of individual members on the group identity (α = .89, M = 
4.84, SD = 1.48). Individual distinctiveness was measured with the item, “To 
what extent do you feel unique in this group?” (1 = not at all, 7 = completely, 
M = 5.45, SD = 1.25). Entitativity was measured with four items (Brooke, 
Postmes, Jetten, & Dyson, 2009). An example item is: “Members of this 
group are as one” (α = .90, M = 4.90, SD = 1.36). 
Finally, identification was measured with the identification scale by 
Leach et al. (2008). This scale distinguishes between more organic aspects 
of identity (the self-investment dimension) and more mechanical aspects of 
identity (the self-definition dimension). In line with this paper’s interest in 
the more organic process of inductive social identity formation, we used 
items from the self-investment dimension only, e.g., “I feel a bond with this 
group”, “It is pleasant to be in this group”, and “I often think about the 
fact that I am a member of this group” (10 items, α = .96, M = 5.01, SD = 
1.36). 
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Results 
The groups that were most often mentioned were workgroups, 
friends, sport teams, and family. Of these, especially groups of friends 
scored high on the index of inductive social identity formation. 
Workgroups generally scored low on the index of inductive social identity 
formation. 
Inductive social identity formation was expected to be related to 
entitativity via individual distinctiveness. We tested our prediction with a 
series of multiple regression analyses. In all analyses, we controlled for 
group size, gender, and age. As expected, inductive social identity formation 
strongly predicted individual distinctiveness, β = .32, t(109) = 3.35, p < 
.001, and entitativity, β = .49, t(109) = 5.43, p < .001. The more the group 
was seen as influenced by inductive processes, the more participants felt 
distinctive within the group, and perceived their group as an entity. 
As a second step, individual distinctiveness was added to inductive 
social identity formation as predictor of entitativity. In line with our 
hypothesis, individual distinctiveness positively predicted entitativity, β = 
.25, t(108) = 2.83, p = .006. The effect of inductive social identity formation 
decreased, β = .41, t(108) = 4.47, p < .001. We tested for mediation by 
running a bootstrapping analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Results showed 
that the indirect effect was significant (bias corrected and accelerated 
confidence interval .02, .17). The model explained 29% of the variance in 
entitativity. These results support our hypothesis that inductive social 
identity formation is related to a feeling of entitativity and that this effect is 
partially mediated by individual distinctiveness. 
In a final step, we used EQS 6.1 to test if inductive social identity 
formation was related to entitativity via individual distinctiveness and if 




entitativity, again controlling for group size, gender, and age (see Figure 
2.2). Parameters were estimated using a maximum likelihood method. The 
model yielded good fit, χ2(1) = .58, p = .444, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA < .001 
(see Kline, 1998). Wald and LaGrange Multiplier tests suggested that no 
paths could be added or removed to improve model fit. All parameters 
were significantly different from zero. Alternative models, including one in 
which individual distinctiveness was predicted by identification and 
entitativity, showed worse fit5. This provides evidence for the idea that 
individuality within a group can result in a strong sense of unity partly 
because individuals within the group feel distinctive. Moreover, feeling 
distinctive within a group can also indirectly result in identification. 
 
                                                
5 In order not to disrupt the flow of the paper, additional analyses are described in the 
footnotes. All alternative models tested, fitted the data less well. One model tested the 
prediction that individual distinctiveness is the consequence of feeling part of a group that 
promotes individualism and diversity (Jetten et al., 2002). In this model, inductive social 
identity formation predicts individual distinctiveness via entitativity and identification (also 
controlling for group size, gender, and age). Model fit was poorer than our theoretical 
model, χ2(1) = 2.10, p =.147, CFI = .99, RMSEA =.099. This poorer model fit also 
suggests that feelings of individual distinctiveness do not merely arise as a function of a 
contrast between the individual and the more entitative groups (e.g., it does not appear to 
be the case that the more entitative the group was perceived, the more distinctive the 
individual member feels). Alternative model 2 tested the prediction that identification 
would predict entitativity rather than the other way around as in our theoretical model (cf. 
McGarty, 2002). This model also fitted the data less well, χ2(1) = 3.14, p =.077, CFI = .99, 
RMSEA =.138. 
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The results support our predictions. Inductive social identity 
formation was partly related to entitativity via individual distinctiveness, 
which in turn influenced identification. When participants had the feeling 
that individual members could influence the group’s identity, they 
themselves felt more distinctive within the group. Moreover, their perceived 
distinctiveness helped them to perceive the group as an entity, which in turn 
helped them to identify with the group. Inductive processes of social 
identity formation seemed be lowest in groups that were directed from 
above, such as work groups or committees. 
Our analyses indicate that inductive social identity formation also 
directly influenced entitativity and identification. This pattern of partial 
mediation makes theoretical sense: distinctiveness is one aspect of why 
inductive social identity formation can lead to a sense of entitativity and 
identification. Processes of interaction and interdependence (Gaertner et al., 
2006, Lickel et al., 2000; also Campbell, 1958) may all play a role here. 
Nevertheless, the results also show that within this package of factors, a 
sense of individual distinctiveness is not harmful to producing a sense of 
group unity but can actually help inductive social identity formation. These 
results therefore support the idea that the experience of distinctive 
individuality is an important aspect of the formation of a social identity 
through an inductive route. 
The theoretical model was compared with alternative models that 
could explain the correlations. One model we tested was that feeling 
distinctive might be an outcome of feeling part of a group in which 
individuality is the norm (see Jetten et al., 2002). The alternative models 
yielded worse fit than the predicted model. Thus, although this was a cross-
sectional study, which limits the ability to draw causal inferences, we find 
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the predicted relation between individual distinctiveness, entitativity and 
identification. This implies that in small groups at least, distinctiveness does 
not impede the emergence of a sense of unity but may contribute to it. 
A question remains whether this process can also operate in a larger 
variety of group types than in the small groups (such as family and friends) 
studied here. To examine this was the prime purpose of Study 2.2. 
Furthermore in Study 2.1 groups were self-selected; Study 2.2 asked 
questions about specific groups selected to cover a broad range of social 
identities. Finally, the first study used a single item to measure individual 




In our second study, we sought to support the model with a much 
broader set of groups, including large groups and abstract social categories. 
We thus selected different categories of groups for participants to reflect 
on, choosing different relevant examples from Lickel et al.’s (2000) 
distinction between intimacy groups, task groups, social categories, and 
loose associations. Participants thus thought about their family and relatives 
(intimacy), a workgroup (task group), psychology students, students, the 
Dutch, or their gender group (all social categories) and their neighbours 
(loose associations). We measured the extent to which group identities were 
perceived to be induced, the extent to which individuals felt distinctive 






Participants and design. First year students (173 women and 43 
men) participated in the study in exchange for course credits. They 
answered questions about a specific group. This group varied between-
subjects: Family (N = 27), relatives (N = 20), workgroup (N = 23), 
neighbours (N = 23), Psychology students (N = 39), students (N = 21), the 
Dutch (N = 33) or gender (N = 29). One participant was deleted because 
there was no variance in her answers. 
 
Instruments. Scales were identical to Study 2.1 unless noted (Table 
2.2). Individual distinctiveness was measured with the item used in Study 
2.1 and two additional items “To what extent do you think you are unique 
in comparison to the other group members?”, and “To what extent are you 
different enough from the other group members?” (3 items; α = .83, M = 
5.00, SD = 1.05). 
 
Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics of the main variables and their correlations in Study 2.2 
 
 Measure Min. Max. M SD α 1 2 3 4 
1. Inductive Social Identity 
Formation 2.00 7.00 4.89 0.88 .70  -    
2. Individual 
Distinctiveness 1.00 7.00 5.00 1.05 .83 .40**  -   
3. Entitativity 1.00 7.00 4.15 1.25 .87 .35** .28**  -  
4. Identification 1.00 7.00 4.59 1.22 .94 .40** .23** .66** - 
Note. * p < .05, two-tailed. ** p < .01, two-tailed. 
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Results 
Inductive social identity formation was expected to be related to 
entitativity via individual distinctiveness. We tested our predictions with a 
series of multiple regression analyses. As expected, inductive social identity 
formation positively predicted individual distinctiveness, β = .40, t(213) = 
6.35, p < .001, and entitativity, β = .35, t(213) = 5.43, p < .001. In the next 
step, both predictors of entitativity were included in the model. As 
predicted, individual distinctiveness was positively related to entitativity, β = 
.16, t(212) = 2.37, p = .018, and the positive effect of inductive social 
identity formation on entitativity decreased, β = .28, t(212) = 4.08, p < .001. 
We ran bootstrapping analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) to test 
mediation of individual distinctiveness in the link between inductive social 
identity formation and entitativity. Results showed that the indirect effect 
was significant (bias corrected and accelerated confidence interval .02, .19). 
The model explained 14% of the variance in entitativity. 
In line with Lickel et al. (2000), entitativity differed across types of 
groups, F(7, 207) = 5.61, p < .001. Entitativity was relatively high in 
intimacy groups (family and relatives). It was low in the work group, the 
loose association of neighbours, and most of the other social categories. 
Adding group type as predictor explained an extra 12%, Fchange(7, 205) = 
4.98, p < .001. However, this did not remove the effects of inductive social 
identity formation and individual distinctiveness. This result supports our 
hypothesis that inductive social identity formation is related to a feeling of 
entitativity via individual distinctiveness, and this effect appears to be 
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In a final step, we used EQS 6.1 to test if inductive social identity 
formation was related to entitativity via individual distinctiveness and if 
inductive social identity formation was related to identification via 
entitativity (see Figure 2.3). Parameters were estimated using a maximum 
likelihood method. The chi-square statistic was not significant, χ2(1) = .07, p 
= .792, and other fit indices indicated a good fit as well, CFI = 1.00, 
RMSEA < .001. Moreover, Wald and LaGrange Multiplier tests suggested 
that no paths could be added or removed, to improve the model fit. All 
parameters were significantly different from zero. Again, alternative models 
yielded worse fit6. This provides additional evidence for the idea that the 
inductive formation of a group identity can result in a strong sense of unity 
partly because individuals within the group feel distinctive. Moreover, 




The results provide support for our model across a much larger 
variety of groups. When participants perceived the group identity to be 
formed out of individual members’ contributions, they felt more distinctive 
within the group. This distinctiveness helped them to perceive the group as 
an entity, which in turn resulted in stronger identification. 
In this study, we broadened and structured the groups participants 
thought about. For one, instead of generating groups themselves, 
participants were instructed to think about a particular group. Moreover, 
                                                
6 The alternative models tested, fitted the data less well. Alternative model 1: Inductive 
social identity formation is related to individual distinctiveness via entitativity and 
identification, χ2(1) = 24.67, p < .001, CFI = .88, RMSEA =.333. Alternative model 2: 
Inductive social identity formation is related to identification via individual distinctiveness, 
and inductive social identity formation is related to entitativity via identification, χ2(1) = 




participants had to think of different types of groups (cf. Lickel et al., 2000). 
Lickel et al. showed that group type affects perceptions of entitativity. 
However, even when controlling for any variations in entitativity due to 
group type, the predicted model was supported. 
Although we tested alternative models, the cross-sectional nature of 
the data prevents us from drawing strong conclusions about causality. In 
Study 2.3, we therefore sought to introduce specific between-group 
variation in levels of inductive social identity formation in order to 
introduce an extraneous variable into our models. Specifically, we 
systematically varied group size, expecting that in small groups the process 
of inductive social identity formation will be stronger than in larger groups. 
In smaller groups, it is easier to imagine how individuals can influence the 
identity of the group because the individual is more visible. There is less 
“distance” between the individual and the group as a whole because the 
group consists of fewer individuals. Therefore, we used group size as an 




As in Study 2.1, participants were asked to name groups. In order to 
systematically vary the level of inductive social identity formation, 
participants were instructed to think of groups that varied in size from small 
to large. We expected that inductive social identity formation would be 
higher in smaller groups and tested the same model as in the previous 
studies using group size as independent variable. 
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Method 
In total, 181 students participated in the third study. During the 
study, all participants named three small (4 to 15 members), three medium 
(30 to 50 members), and three large sized groups (more than 200 members). 
Then, depending on group size condition (between subjects), they answered 
questions about the first-mentioned and third-mentioned groups (within 
subjects) of a specific size. We chose the first and third mentioned group to 
assure that there would be variation in self-relevance of the groups. 
Moreover, the repeated measures structure allowed for more power. Data 
of some participants were not useful because they did not name a group, or 
because they listed groups of an incorrect size. Of the remaining 174 
participants (43 men, Mage = 19.51), 165 fully filled in questions about the 
first group and 161 fully filled in questions about the third group. In total, 
we had 118 observations for small sized groups, 92 for medium sized 
groups, and 116 for large sized groups. The operationalization of variables 
was identical to Study 2.1 (Table 2.3). Because of the extraneous 
manipulation of inductive social identity formation, we used the index of 
inductive social identity formation as a manipulation check. 
 
Results 
Because all variables were measured in relation to two groups, the 
data structure was nested. Groups (Level 1) were nested within individuals 
(Level 2) with an intraclass correlation of .23. We compared the one-level 
intercept-only model with the two-level model on entitativity, using the 
mixed models procedure (in SPSS). The difference in deviance between the 
two models was significant, χ2(1) = 8.10, p = .004. It was decided to use a 
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Manipulation check. In the small sized group condition, 
participants often named workgroups, friends, sport teams, and family. In 
the medium sized group condition they mentioned student associations 
(e.g., fraternities, sororities), classes, colleagues, and relatives. The Dutch 
and students were often named in the large sized group condition. Group 
size was expected to be a negative indicator of inductive social identity 
formation. We checked the effectiveness of the manipulation with 
orthogonal linear and quadratic contrasts (Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 
2000), controlling for group (first or third group), gender and age. As 
expected, the relation between group size and inductive social identity 
formation was linear, b = -.34, t(162) = -4.41, p < .001, effect size r = .33, 
and not quadratic, p = .461. The larger the group, the less individuals were 
perceived to influence the group. Thus, the group size manipulation 
successfully influenced levels of inductive social identity formation. 
 
Model tests. Next, we tested the hypothesis that group size was 
negatively related to entitativity via individual distinctiveness. In all mixed 
models, we controlled for group, gender, and age. In a first step, we 
regressed individual distinctiveness onto the contrasts. The linear contrast 
was significant, b = -.40, t(163) = -4.12, p < .001, effect size r = .31, but the 
quadratic contrast was not, p = .763. The regression for entitativity showed 
the same pattern: linear contrast, b = -.50, t(157) = -5.71, p < .001, r = .41; 
quadratic contrast, p = .493. As expected, the larger the group, the less 
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In a second step, individual distinctiveness was added to the model 
of entitativity. In line with our hypothesis, the negative linear relation 
between group size and entitativity became less strong, b = -.41, t(164) = 
4.61, p < .001, r = .34. Individual distinctiveness positively predicted 
entitativity, b = .22, t(324) = 4.26, p < .001, r = .23, and mediated the 
negative linear relation between group size and entitativity. Testing for 
mediation using the method recommended by Krull and MacKinnon 
(1999), a Sobel test indicated that the indirect effect was significant, b = -
.09, Z = -2.96, p = .003. 
In a final step, we used Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2007) to test our 
model with a multilevel structural equation modeling (mSEM) approach. 
We tested if group size was related to entitativity via individual 
distinctiveness and if group size was related to identification via entitativity 
(see Figure 2.4). The mSEM controls for the dependency of the 
observations within individuals. Moreover, we controlled for the effect of 
which group was judged (first or third group). Parameters were estimated 
using a maximum likelihood method. The model yielded good fit, χ2(1) = 
.08, p = .782, CFI = 1.00 RMSEA < .001. All parameter estimates were 
significantly different from zero. All three linear contrasts were significant, 
and all quadratic contrasts were non-significant, with one exception. 
Although identification was strongly predicted by the linear contrast, b = -
.29, z = -3.78, p <.001, effect size r = .29, r2 = .08, unexpectedly there was a 
weaker effect for the quadratic contrast to be significant as well, b = .14, z 
= 2.97, p =.003, effect size r = .23, r2 = .05. However, because this effect 




describes the data and that the prediction was upheld (see Rosenthal, 1991). 
As in the previous two studies, all alternative models yielded worse fit7. 
 
Discussion 
The results of Study 2.3 support our model with group size as an 
extraneous variable. As expected, inductive social identity formation could 
be manipulated by group size. In small groups, inductive social identity 
formation was perceived to be stronger than in larger groups. Within those 
smaller groups participants also felt more distinctive. In turn, this perceived 
distinctiveness positively predicted the degree to which participants 
perceived the group as an entity, which in turn resulted in stronger 
identification with the group. 
In line with Brewer (1991; Brewer & Harasty, 1996), this study thus 
shows that identification and entitativity are higher for small groups than 
for larger groups (but see McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, & Grace, 1995, 
for different results). However, instead of focusing on the role of 
intergroup distinctiveness as an underlying cause of this effect, we focused 
on the role of individual distinctiveness. We found that individual 
distinctiveness was a partial mediator in the relation between group size and 
entitativity because group size affected the perception of inductive social 
identity formation. We could also replicate the original model with 
inductive social identity formation as predictor, controlling for the between- 
                                                
7 The alternative models tested, fitted the data less well. Alternative model 1: Group size is 
related to individual distinctiveness via entitativity and identification, controlling for group, 
χ2(4) = 13.16, p = .011, CFI = .96, RMSEA =.084. Alternative model 2: Group size is 
related to identification via individual distinctiveness, and group size is related to 
entitativity via identification, controlling for group, χ2(1) = 14.03, p < .001, CFI = .94, 
RMSEA = .200. 
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group variance due to group size8. This means predictions are upheld both 
within and between groups. Thus, despite the lower levels of inductive 
social identity formation in larger groups, variations in levels of perceived 
inductive social identity formation also have the predicted effects in larger 
groups. 
Although inductive social identity formation was not directly 
manipulated, the use of group size as extraneous variable provided 
additional support for the causality that the theoretical model assumes. 
Moreover, our model fitted the data better than alternative models that 
could explain the correlations. This implies that distinctiveness does not 




With this paper, we aimed to integrate the work on inductive 
processes of social identity formation (Postmes et al., 2005a/b) with work 
on entitativity (Brewer et al., 2004; Campbell, 1958; Lickel et al., 2000). In 
three studies, we tested the prediction that feelings of individual 
distinctiveness could mediate the relation between inductive social identity 
                                                
8 We used Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2007) to test the initial hypothesis that inductive 
social identity formation is related to entitativity via individual distinctiveness and that 
inductive social identity formation is related to identification via entitativity (see Figure 
2.5). In the structural equation model, we controlled for the dependency of the 
observations within individuals and the effects of group size and which group was judged. 
Parameters were estimated using a maximum likelihood method. The model yielded good 
fit, χ2(1) = .54, p = .464, CFI = 1.00 RMSEA < .001. All parameter estimates were 
significantly different from zero. Again, alternative models yielded worse fit. Alternative 
model 1: Inductive social identity formation is related to individual distinctiveness via 
entitativity and identification, χ2(1) = 2.69, p = .101, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .072. 
Alternative model 2: Inductive social identity formation is related to identification via 
individual distinctiveness, and inductive social identity formation is related to entitativity 
via identification, χ2(1) = 19.71, p = .003, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .155. These results again 
support our prediction that inductive social identity formation is related to entitativity via 
individual distinctiveness. Moreover, this pattern is upheld across a wide variety of groups. 
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formation and entitativity, which in turn could result in identification 
(Figure 2.1). The studies provided consistent support for the integrative 
theoretical model proposed. In the first study, we provided support for the 
model in self-selected small groups. Study 2.2 provided additional support 
with a much broader set of groups that were not self-selected and with 
extra items measuring individual distinctiveness. Finally, Study 2.3 provided 
support for causality in the model by using group size to vary the level of 
inductive social identity formation systematically. 
Until now, research on the induction of shared social identity has 
only considered zero-history small interactive groups within an 
experimental setting (Jans, Postmes, & Van der Zee, 2012; Postmes et al., 
2005b; Swaab et al., 2008). The approach used in the present allowed us to 
examine a broad spectrum of everyday groups in order to provide a deeper 
insight into the underlying processes of inductive social identity formation 
The results showed that processes of inductive social identity 
formation also influence groups outside the lab and groups of various sizes. 
As expected, in larger groups it becomes more difficult to perceive the 
individual contributions to the group identity because the distance between 
the individual and the group as a whole becomes larger. But even when 
controlling for group size, within groups inductive social identity formation 
still has an effect on the individual’s perceived distinctiveness, entitativity, 
and identification. However, in line with the ASPIRe model (Haslam et al., 
2003); it might be that in larger groups individuals influence the formation 
of a social identity more indirectly via their subgroups. In future research, it 
would be interesting to test whether in large groups the effect of inductive 
social identity formation on entitativity is mediated by subgroup 




In all three studies, the correlation of individual distinctiveness 
(single item or multiple items) with entitativity and identification was 
positive. This provides support for the idea that within-group differences 
do not have to obstruct a sense of unity and group cohesion (see also 
Hornsey & Jetten, 2004; Jetten et al., 2006; Packer, 2008; Rink & Ellemers, 
2007). However, instead of individual distinctiveness being a consequence 
of identification with groups whose norms encourage individualism and 
diversity, the present findings suggest that individual distinctiveness can be 
an antecedent of perceived entitativity and in turn identification. It seems 
that feelings of individual distinctiveness may strengthen one’s perception 
of group unity and one’s attachment to the group. It has often been 
proposed that being distinctive within a group would hamper group 
belongingness (e.g., Codol, 1975). These findings go against this pervasive 
idea that social cohesion and diversity are somehow antagonistic. 
On the other hand, the finding of a positive relation between 
individual distinctiveness and identification is entirely consistent with the 
rationale behind inductive social identity formation. Here, unique 
expressions of individual members can be the foundation of a social 
identity (Postmes et al., 2005b). Because personal identities can provide the 
input out of which a social identity is formed, the induction of a social 
identity means that personal and social levels of identity need not be 
antagonistic (Postmes et al., 2005a). 
In the entitativity literature, the necessity of similarity for perceiving 
groupiness has been questioned as well (Crump et al., 2010). Similarity is 
seen as just one of the possible predictors of entitativity (Campbell, 1958; 
Lickel et al., 2000). The lens through which one looks at a social aggregate 
determines whether perceiving similarity is key to perceiving groupiness 
(Brewer et al., 2004; Rutchick et al., 2008). Our results are in line with a 
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perspective on groups as dynamic agents, in which individuals are 
interdependent in the pursuit of common goals and intentions. Here, 
similarities among group members are not diagnostic for entitativity. 
Taking this argument a step further, we argued and found that 
individual distinctiveness was diagnostic for entitativity, which in turn led to 
identification (see also Castano, 2004). This implies that homogeneity does 
not have to be a prerequisite for the formation of a shared identity. The 
idea that homogeneity and identity are related is strongly imbedded in the 
literature; for example questionnaires of group identification may even 
include measures of in-group homogeneity and self-stereotyping (e.g., 
Leach et al., 2008). Because, in our reasoning, in-group homogeneity and 
self-stereotyping are less integral aspects of identification with groups that 
developed their shared identity organically through induction, we focused 
on the self-investment dimension of identification. 
Our results provided support for a partial mediation of individual 
distinctiveness in the relation between inductive social identity formation 
and entitativity. The reason that there was no full mediation in any of the 
studies is that numerous other processes and factors besides individual 
distinctiveness may explain why inductive social identity formation can lead 
to entitativity. Among these are known predictors of entitativity and shared 
identity such as interaction and interdependence (Gaertner et al., 2006; 
Lickel et al., 2000; also Campbell, 1958) as well as the formation of a shared 
social identity content such as norms and self-stereotypes (e.g., Swaab et al., 
2008; Smith & Postmes, 2011a) or the formation of out-group stereotypes 
(Smith & Postmes, 2011b). In the present research, we could not easily 
consider all these other within-group aspects because they vary considerably 
from group to group and are hard to operationalize consistently as a result. 




factors, the presence of individuality within the group may, at least in some 
group contexts, make a consistent positive contribution to the 
psychological emergence of a sense of unity across a wide variety of groups 
and settings. 
The aim of this paper was to provide a first test of the possible 
mediating role that individual distinctiveness plays in inductive social 
identity formation. Because these hypotheses were new and to our best 
knowledge no scales of inductive social identity formation existed, we had 
to develop new scales. The results attest to the utility of this newly 
developed index but nevertheless it would be worthwhile if future research 
provides further evidence of construct validity of the index of inductive 
social identity formation, for example by directly manipulating the degree of 
inductive social identity formation experimentally. 
In future research, it would also be important to consider how these 
inductive processes of forming a social identity from the bottom up interact 
with the more traditional top-down processes of deducing a shared identity 
from (for example) intergroup comparisons. There is nothing to prevent 
processes of inductive and deductive social identity formation from co-
occurring and in most natural cases they probably will. When group 
members adopt a deductive route to social identity, they infer things about 
individual group members from commonalities at a superordinate level. 
Here, theory would lead us to expect that feeling similar is the underlying 
process for perceiving entitativity due to the highlighting of commonalities 
(Turner, 1982). But groups are multifaceted and complex entities. The 
existence of certain uniform characteristics (an essence, perhaps) that define 
group boundaries and thereby form the foundation for a common 
categorization as in-group, may well coincide with the existence of within-
group diversity and pluralism on other dimensions that contributes to the 
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shared induction of norms and practices. Such co-occurrence of deductive 
and inductive processes, even in abstract social categories, may well be key 
to keeping the group viable and sustaining its ability to operate as an entity. 
Group leaders might play a key role in creating the context within which 
these processes may co-occur (see Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011) 
In sum, our results show that inductive processes are important for 
perceiving groupiness and identification. The process of inducing a shared 
identity from the bottom up (that is, through individual contributions of 
group members and subgroups) helps individuals to feel that they occupy a 
more distinctive position within the group. In a sense, this demonstrates 
that personality is a feature that emerges at least in part through the group 
(cf. Durkheim, 1984; Postmes & Jetten, 2006). However, embedding these 
perceptions of distinctiveness within an inductively formed group has 
powerful and potentially beneficial consequences. Instead of the traditional 
misfit assumption that individuals who “stick out” are unlikely to “fit in”, 
this research shows that there are cases in which feeling distinctive within 
the group actually contributes positively to experiencing a sense of oneness 
with the group—both in terms of unity and strong group identification. 
Thus, being able to see how individuals contribute to a group identity 
provides scope for within-group diversity. In such cases, the more diverse a 
group is, the stronger the collective might be. 
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The assumption that heterogeneity undermines social cohesion and 
communion is widespread in social psychology and beyond (e.g., Putnam, 
2000). For example, it is often assumed that shared similarities are the 
foundations of social categorization and identification (Turner, 1985). 
Individuals identify with groups on the basis of shared characteristics such 
as skin color or attitudes. Minimal group research has shown that mere 
categorization of individuals into one social group on the basis of some 
arbitrary similarity, is sufficient to make individuals see their similar others 
as “in-group” and different others as out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
This implies that the more within-group similarities there are, the stronger 
the social identity would be (Tajfel, 1978b). Thus, for heterogeneous groups 
it may be quite difficult to form a shared social identity. Indeed, research 
has shown that within-team differences tend to erode team identification 
(e.g. Luijters, Van der Zee, & Otten, 2008). More generally, diversity within 
teams has consistently been found to have negative effects on affective 
outcomes (see Milliken & Martins, 1996, for a review).  
However, more recent research suggests that the outcomes of 
diversity in teams are more mixed and can be positive (Jackson, Joshi, & 
Erhardt, 2003). Sociological research suggests that, counter to Putnam’s 
suggestions, diversity can actually foster social cohesion and communion, 
too (Savelkoul, Gesthuizen, & Scheepers, 2011). Indeed, in the present 
paper we propose that heterogeneity does not necessarily undermine the 
formation of a shared social identity because similarity is not the only 
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foundation upon which social identities can be built. In fact, we propose 
that shared differences can be a profound basis on which individuals can 
form a social identity. Unique and distinct contributions by group members 
(i.e., expressions of individuality) may contribute to the emergence of 
solidarity (Durkheim, 1984) and social identity (Jans, Postmes, van der Zee, 
2011; Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005a; Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 
2005b). We therefore propose that in groups characterized by within-group 
differences, a strong social identity can be formed on the basis of a process 
in which those differences are shared (inductive social identity formation). 
Thus, although within-group differences may at times undermine the 
emergence of a social identity (cf. Tajfel, 1978b), paradoxically, in the right 
circumstances these same differences may serve as foundation for the 
emergence of new social identities. This idea is examined in two studies that 
seek to demonstrate that while members of homogenous groups can form a 
strong social identity by a process of sharing similarities, members of 
heterogeneous groups can form as strong a social identity by a process of 
sharing individual differences, or individuality. 
 
Forming Social Identities 
In theory, the formation of social identities may be influenced 
through two distinct paths (Postmes et al., 2005a). On the one hand, 
superordinate categories may influence a social identity through a deductive 
route. Through a top-down process, group members form a social identity on 
the basis of shared characteristics that differentiate their in-group from 
other groups, as is the case in minimal group research (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). A soccer team for example can have a shared social identity 
symbolized by team colours and an outfit which are distinct from those of 




different from the in-group, a social identity can be deduced. This is 
described in self-categorization theory as a process of “depersonalization” 
of self and other in-group members in terms of a social identity—a form of 
perceptual homogenization (Turner, 1985). Whilst homogeneity fosters this 
process and thus aids the deduction of shared identity, in-group 
heterogeneity undermines it.  
However, social identity formation may not only be formed through 
a deductive path. At the same time, inductive processes may influence the 
formation of a social identity. That is, social identities may also be shaped 
by individual contributions of group members. In this bottom-up process, the 
shared identity of the group may be induced on the basis of individual 
expressions by group members. Thereby, within-group differences may be 
integrated into the shared cognitive representation of the group (Swaab, 
Postmes, Van Beest, & Spears, 2007). This alternative pathway to identity 
formation may be strengthened to the extent that each individual group 
member contributes to it. The example of the soccer team also fits here. If 
we gave two teams the same shirts, and compared them with the same out-
group, the content of the shared identity would still be different for the two 
groups, because the individuals that make up the team are different. That is, 
who we are is not just determined by who “they” are, but also by who 
“we”, as separate individuals, are (cf. Gaertner, Iuzzini, Witt, & Oriña, 
2006). Thus, it is clear that there are different routes to form strong social 
identities. Yet, surprisingly little research has investigated the inductive 
route to social identity formation, and no research has examined its 
implications for social identity formation in heterogeneous groups.  
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Forming Social Identities in Heterogeneous Groups 
The idea of an inductive route to the formation of social identity 
has received some empirical support. Research has documented deductive 
and inductive processes in social influence (Postmes, et al., 2005b) and 
shown that these processes foster pro-social intentions and positive 
negotiation outcomes (Swaab, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Research also 
suggests that measured levels of perceived inductive social identity 
formation may affect entitativity and social identification (Jans et al., 2011). 
But crucially, this prior research has not demonstrated experimentally that 
these processes affect social identification. Moreover, the suggestion above 
that heterogeneity can be the foundation for a strong social identity, 
provided that it is induced, has to our knowledge never been examined.  
Indirect evidence for our proposition comes from research that has 
shown that groups who are given group norms of independence and 
individualism, or social values of diversity, can also increase groups’ 
valuation of heterogeneity (e.g., Homan, Van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & 
De Dreu, 2007; Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002; Postmes, Spears, & 
Cihangir, 2001). This research shows that when experimenters or other 
authorities activate or instil norms that diversity and heterogeneity ought to 
be valued positively, the group or organizational members do indeed start 
valuing diversity more. Further research has shown that also when a group 
expects heterogeneity, then diversity is valued more highly (Rink & Ellemers, 
2007). In our view, the induction of shared identity in heterogeneous 
groups is qualitatively different, however. Induction is a process wherein an 
individual makes an active contribution to the emergence of a shared 
identity, simply because they have an opportunity (or “voice”). No prior 
norms or expectations about the heterogeneity need to be provided in this 




having this ability to have influence. Thus, induction is not just the “fit” of 
group composition to shared social norms (cf. Rink & Ellemers, 2007).  
In sum, this research tests the prediction that inductive processes 
can lead to the formation of a social identity. We test this prediction by 
measuring social identification directly, as well as measuring two closely 
related variables: the perceived entitativity (the perceptual groupiness of a 
social aggregate, Campbell, 1958), and (in Study 3.2) a behavioural measure 
of cooperation. These measures represent three important aspects of social 
identity, namely members’ cognitive perception of the group as a categorical 
entity (entitativity), their affective relation to this entity (identification), and 
their willingness to act in concert with it (cooperation). In addition, this 
paper tests the prediction that while heterogeneity might be a problem in 
the process of deductively forming a social identity, heterogeneous groups 
can form a strong social identity inductively. To this end, we manipulate 




In Study 3.1, social identity formation was manipulated by the way 
in which a shared representation of the group, in the form of a team shirt, is 
created. To find support for the formation of a social identity, we measured 
social identification and entitativity.  
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Method 
Participants and design. Students (115 women and 41 men, Mage= 
20.26) were randomly allocated to one of two conditions of social identity 
formation: deduction vs. induction. In total, 39 groups of 4 participants 
were formed. One participant was removed, because he participated twice. 
 
Procedure. Participants were invited to the lab in groups of four10. 
As a manipulation of social identity formation, groups had to make team shirts. 
The intention for the manipulation was to vary the amount of visible 
individual contribution to a team t-shirt, while keeping everything else 
constant. Participants were seated around a table, and each participant was 
handed a white T-shirt with four blocks printed on it. In the deduction 
condition, the group was shown a design for a team shirt. In line with the 
process of identity deduction, participants were told that this design was 
distinctive for their group. They were instructed to copy this design onto 
their T-shirts with colour markers. In the induction condition, each group 
member was asked to individually design and draw one part of the team 
shirt. First, all group members drew their individual design on the first 
quarter of a t-shirt. Then, they copied this individual design onto the other 
T-shirts. In this way, each individual member made a direct and unique 
contribution to the development of a shared representation of the whole 
group. Thus, except for the extent to which individuals had the opportunity 
to make a unique contribution to the team-shirt, the two conditions were 
kept completely similar. In both conditions, the drawing task took ten 
                                                
10 This study also attempted to manipulate diversity of the group but this was unsuccessful 
according to the manipulation check and other dependent variables: all effects involving 
diversity were non-significant. The diversity manipulation sought to distinguish between 
employed and non-employed students but it turned out that most of the non-employed 
students had either been employed shortly before, were looking for employment, or both. 




minutes to complete, and all group members spent the full ten minutes 
drawing their t-shirts. During the task participants were allowed to talk, but 
not about their drawings11. After the paint on the t-shirts had dried, 
participants were asked to put their team-shirts on. They were told that the 
team shirt was necessary for a task in the second part of the experiment. 
Then, participants put on their shirts and filled out a questionnaire. At the 
end of the experiment, groups were photographed. Unfortunately, the 
camera was not available at all times. In total, there were 13 group pictures 
of the deduction and 12 group pictures of the induction condition. 
 
Dependent variables. The questionnaire consisted of statements 
with 7-point scales (1 = fully disagree; 7 = fully agree). Identification was 
measured with the solidarity and satisfaction subscales of Leach et al. (2008; 
7 items, α = .93, e.g., “I felt connected to this group” and “It gave me a 
good feeling to be a member of this group”). Four items measured 
entitativity (Jans et al., 2011), e.g.: “Members of this group are as one” (α = 
.88). The manipulation check of social identity formation consisted of the 
item “The group identity was formed by members themselves.”  
To test if the induction condition only manipulated the extent to 
which group members could make a distinct contribution and not the 
amount of effort invested in the task, two independent coders rated the 
drawings on the team shirts. They were asked to rate the amount of effort 
each member put into the team shirt (r = .53, p = .000) on a 5-point scale (1 
= very little; 5 = very much). 
                                                
11 Although we did not record the interactions and so cannot do a formal content analysis, 
there was actually very little interaction during the task: participants spent most of their 
time drawing in silence. Moreover, a recent unpublished study provides a replication of 
these results using a manipulation of induction/deduction during which participants could 
not interact (Jans, Postmes, van der Zee, & Seewald, 2013; Study 4.2), with similar effects 
on identification. 
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Results 
The hypotheses were tested in a multilevel analysis (HLM; 
Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), in which we looked at the effects of social 
identity formation at the group level (Level 2) on variables measured at the 
individual level (Level 1)12. Intraclass correlations (ICC’s) were relatively 
high for groups of such a small sample size (see Bliese, 2000), and given the 
time participants spent on the drawing task. Thus, a large proportion of the 
total variance in individual’s identification and entitativity was attributable 
to their shared group membership (see Table 3.1). 
 
Table 3.1. Social identity formation effect on entitativity and identification, intra-class 






Identity Formation Deduction Induction 
ICC γ t(37) R2 χ2(1) M SD M SD 
Identification .33 .67 (.20) 3.32* .33 10.40* 4.60 0.57 5.28 0.69 
Entitativity .32 .62 (.23) 2.72* .22   7.64* 4.78 0.71 5.41 0.73 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < .01.  
 
Manipulation checks. As expected, the manipulation of social 
identity formation had a marginal significant effect on the formation check, 
γ = .44, t(37) = 1.88, p = .068. This main effect resulted in a significant 
improvement in the goodness of fit compared to a null model, χ(1) = 4.26, 
p = .038, suggesting that social identity formation condition accounted for a 
considerable amount of variance. Participants in the induction condition 
felt more strongly that members themselves formed the group identity 
(Mgroup = 5.28, SDgroup = 0.81), than participants in the deduction condition 
                                                





(Mgroup = 4.82, SDgroup = 0.67). Moreover, the manipulation had no effect on 
the perceived effort group members put in creating the team-shirt, γ = .12, 
t(23) = 0.59, p = .560.  
 
Identification and entitativity. Social identity formation had 
significant effects on the outcomes. Participants in the induction condition 
identified more strongly with their group and experienced higher entitativity 
than participants in the deduction condition (see Table 3.1).  
 
Discussion 
Study 3.1 provides support that groups can form a shared social 
identity inductively. Induction resulted in a stronger sense of social identity 
than deductive processes did, as was reflected in higher identification and 
entitativity. These results extend previous research (Postmes, et al., 2005b; 
Swaab et al., 2008) by showing directly that induction increases levels of 
cognitive and affective identification. Moreover, the results support work of 
Gaertner et al. (2006), suggesting that intra-group processes can be the 
source of entitativity and positive group regard. The finding that induction 
even results in higher levels of identification and entitativity than deduction, 
seems to suggest that within these ad hoc groups, members assume more 
within-group differences than similarities. Although, this provides support 
for the suggestion that shared identities can be formed out of distinct 
contributions by group members, it does not directly test the prediction that 
inductive processes of social identity formation would be a good method to 
unite groups that are heterogeneous.  




In order to seek support for our proposal that heterogeneity within 
groups can foster unity, we replicated Study 3.1 with a high-impact 
manipulation of diversity. We chose to manipulate diversity by providing 
false feedback on within-group differences in personality. Moreover, we 
included cooperation as an extra dependent variable, to show that social 
identity formation leads to actual group-serving behaviour.  
 
Method 
Participants and design. Students (74 women, 19 men; Mage= 
21.44) were randomly assigned to groups of three in a 2 (Diversity: 
Homogenous vs. Heterogeneous) x 2 (Social Identity Formation: Induction 
vs. Deduction) design.  
 
Procedure. Diversity was manipulated by providing false feedback 
on a personality questionnaire (Hendriks, Hofstee, & De Raad, 1999). The 
personality questionnaire was taken before participants were invited in 
groups to the lab. Participants in the homogeneous condition were told that 
group members had very similar personalities. Participants in the 
heterogeneous condition were told that group members had very different 
personalities. Then, social identity formation was manipulated as in Study 3.1. 
This time the T-shirts had three blocks printed on them, because there were 
three members in each group. After the groups completed their team shirts 
in ten minutes, participants filled in questionnaires. 
 
Dependent variables. The manipulation check for social identity 




Study 3.1. As a diversity manipulation check, participants responded to the 
item: “I am similar to the average group member”. Actual cooperation was 
measured through a public goods game in which participants had to decide 
whether or not to share a hypothetical amount of twenty euros. Shared 
money would be doubled and equally divided among group members. 
Thus, individual pay-off was higher in case of not sharing, while group pay-
off was higher in case of sharing.  
 
Results and Discussion 
The hypotheses were tested in a multilevel analysis (HLM; 
Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), in which we looked at the effects of social 
identity formation at the group level (Level 2) on variables, measured at the 
individual level (Level 1). The ICC’s for identification and entitativity were 
.15 and .28, respectively. 
 
Manipulation checks. The manipulations were successful. 
Diversity had a significant effect on the diversity check, γ = -2.03, t(29) = -
9.25, p < .001. Members of homogenous groups felt more similar to the 
average group member (Mgroup = 4.88, SDgroup = 0.56), than members of 
heterogeneous groups (Mgroup = 2.84, SDgroup = 0.67). Adding diversity to the 
empty model improved the goodness of fit significantly, χ(1) = 41.82, p < 
.001. 
Social identity formation had a significant effect on the formation 
check, γ = .82 t(29) = 3.84, p < .001. Participants in the induction condition 
felt more that members formed the group identity themselves (Mgroup = 
5.10, SDgroup = 0.54), more than participants in the deduction condition 
(Mgroup = 4.29, SDgroup = 0.64), model fit improvement χ(1) = 12.88, p < 
.001. All other effects were not significant.  
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Identification. Main effects of diversity and social identity 
formation on identification were not significant, |t |‘s< .47. As expected, 
we found a significant interaction effect of diversity and social identity 
formation on identification, γ = .55, t(27) = 2.51, p = .019, model fit 
improvement χ(1) = 6.48, p = .011 (see Figure 3.1). Members of 
heterogeneous groups identified significantly more with their group when 
the group identity was induced rather than deduced, γ = .65, t(27) = 2.07, p 
= .048. For members of homogenous groups, if anything there was a trend 
in the opposite direction, γ = -.45, t(27) = -1.47, p = .153. Moreover, in line 
with the predictions from social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978b), 
identification was marginally significantly higher for homogeneous than for 
heterogeneous groups when the social identity was deductively formed, γ = 
-.63, t(27) = -2.01, p = .054.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Interaction effect of diversity and social identity formation on average 


















Entitativity. No significant effects were found on entitativity. 
However, the interaction of diversity and social identity formation, γ = .48, 
t(27) = 1.57, p = .127, showed the same pattern of results, and model fit 
improvement was marginal, χ(1) = 3.73, p = .053. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Interaction effect of diversity and social identity formation on percentage of 
cooperation. 
 
Cooperation.  Participants could cooperate by sharing money 
with the group. Overall, 83.9 % decided to share. We tested the effects of 
condition on cooperation with a logistic multilevel analysis (1 = sharing), 
with Laplace approximation (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The effects of 
diversity and social identity formation were not significant, t ’s < .55, but 
the interaction was significant, γ = 1.76, t(27) = 2.16, p = .040 (see Figure 
3.2), model fit improvement χ(1) = 7.63, p = .006. Members of 
heterogeneous groups cooperated marginally more with their group when 
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= 1.94, p = .062. For members of homogenous groups, if anything the 
trend was in the opposite direction, γ = -1.30, t(27) = -1.08, p = .290.  
Thus, the results from Study 3.2 provided support for our 
hypothesis. Diversity does not hinder inductive social identity formation. 
Heterogeneous groups could form as strong a social identity inductively, as 
homogeneous groups could deductively, as evidenced by higher 




Two studies support the idea that a social identity can be formed on 
the basis of within-group diversity but only if it was formed inductively. In 
Study 3.1, inductive social identity formation resulted in stronger 
identification and entitativity than deductive social identity formation. Study 
3.2 replicated these effects in heterogeneous groups, but further showed 
that deduction resulted in a stronger social identity in homogeneous groups 
compared with heterogeneous groups (e.g., as predicted by self-
categorization theory; Turner, 1985). Interesting to note is that in Study 3.2, 
levels of identification were approximately equally strong in heterogeneous 
groups who had induced a shared identity, as in homogeneous groups that 
deduced one. This suggests in line with Postmes et al. (2005a) that different 
processes of social identity formation can produce ostensibly similar 
outcomes (i.e., comparable levels of entitativity and identification). Results 
of Study 3.2 also showed behavioural evidence for this same pattern: levels 
of cooperation paralleled those of identification. High social identification 
corresponded with a greater willingness to act in concert with the group.  
The findings for deductive social identity formation fit the standard 




cohesion. This is also consistent with traditional social identity and self-
categorization theory assumptions that similarity is the foundation of social 
identity (Tajfel, 1978b). However, we showed that heterogeneous groups 
can also create a strong social identity. This finding fits more recent 
propositions that diversity is not necessarily an obstacle but a potential 
opportunity for unity (cf. Hornsey & Jetten, 2004; Packer, 2008; Rink & 
Ellemers, 2007). Heterogeneous groups can function as well as 
homogeneous groups, as long as they can use their diversity. For example, 
research has found that group norms of independence and individualism, or 
social values of diversity increase appreciation of heterogeneity within 
groups (Homan et al., 2007; Jetten et al., 2002; Jetten, McAuliffe, Hornsey, 
& Hogg, 2006). Moving beyond this work, our studies show that social 
identity emerges in heterogeneous groups where no prior norms or values 
of diversity had been activated or imposed. In an inductive process, 
members can express who they are as an individual and contribute their 
individuality to the group, without hampering social identity formation.  
Interestingly, our results also provide a hint that in truly 
homogeneous groups, deduction might result in a stronger social identity 
than induction. It seems that in order to form a strong social identity 
inductively, some within-group differences are beneficial. That is, the more 
heterogeneous the group, the larger each individual contribution to the 
group could be. Therefore, induction may lay the foundation upon which 
diversity becomes a social strength, rather than a weakness. Since the 
processes of inductive and deductive social identity formation are likely to 
co-occur in natural groups; both homogeneity and heterogeneity can foster 
the formation of a strong social identity. The shared similarities may help to 
define group boundaries and thereby form the foundation for a common 
categorization as in-group, while the within-group differences on other 
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dimensions contribute to the shared induction of norms and practices. Such 
co-occurrence of deductive and inductive processes, may well be key to 
keeping the group viable and sustaining its ability to operate as an entity.  
Thus, whether diversity is associated with negative or positive 
outcomes may be due to which process of social identity formation has the 
upper hand. For example, in times of intergroup competition or conflict, 
deductive processes might be the dominant route through which a social 
identity is formed. Future research should investigate the conditions under 
which deductive or inductive processes are likely to take the upper hand. 
Moreover, future research should also explore in greater depth the different 
aspects of the inductive process, carefully disentangling the influence of, for 
example, inducing a shared identity in the process of making a unique 
contribution to the group’s implicit goals or symbols (as in the present 
study), or inducing it from the explicit negotiation of a shared sense of 
identity, or inducing it from within-group interactions or the observation of 
in-group members’ behaviours. 
In sum, this paper suggests that social identity is not just a product 
of homogeneity. Strong social identities can emerge and thrive even in 
heterogeneous groups. Therefore, the prevailing assumption that 
heterogeneity undermines social cohesion and community should be 
reconsidered. Our findings suggest that we can greatly enhance the utility of 
the social identity concept for groups and group functioning if we shift our 
focus from studying existing social identities to the process by which new 
ones emerge. 
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The paradox has often been observed: individualisation is a product of 
“strong” (highly developed, complex, well-organized, highly networked, 
etc.) societies. The ability to think and act for oneself requires a social 
context in which this kind of behaviour is tolerated. It follows that 
individuals do not conform blindly to group norms in all social settings nor 
in all groups. The present paper examines one particular aspect of this: it 
zooms in on the way in which social identities may be formed in such a way 
that individual group members feel free to express their distinctiveness.  
Self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985) has traditionally focused 
on the formation of social identity as a top-down process in which social 
identities are deduced from commonalities among group members that 
differentiate the in-group from particular out-groups. More recently, the 
interactive model of identity formation (IMIF; Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 
2005a) has examined “inductive” pathways to social identity formation, 
where expressions of individuality within a group are incorporated into the 
group’s social identity from the bottom-up.  
Recent research demonstrates that these two pathways operate 
differently in groups that are perceived to be heterogeneous or 
homogeneous. Homogeneity is a boost to deductive social identity 
formation. In contrast, heterogeneous groups can form a stronger shared 
identity inductively than deductively (Jans, Postmes, & Van der Zee, 2012). 
Indeed, research suggests that inductive social identity formation is 
somewhat stronger where other group members are perceived to be 
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different to (or at least distinct from) the self (Jans, Postmes, & van der 
Zee, 2011; see also Postmes, Spears, & Novak, 2005b).  
The present research will explore the consequences of inductive 
social identities, once formed, for the subsequent behaviour of individual 
group members. Initial research suggests that processes of deduction and 
induction can have similar consequences for social identity formation: both 
pathways result in approximately similar degrees of identification, 
entitativity, cooperation, and social influence (Jans et al., 2012; Swaab, 
Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Postmes et al., 2005b). In the current paper, 
however, we focus on areas where there may be different behavioural 
consequences. In particular, homogenous groups can form a stronger social 
identity deductively than inductively. We expect that as a result, group 
members will express themselves in normative ways (Turner, 1991). In 
contrast, heterogeneous groups can form a stronger social identity 
inductively than deductively. As a result, we expect that within perceived 
heterogeneous groups that inductively form a shared identity, group 
members may continue to express themselves in idiosyncratic ways that 
could be considered as “deviant”. That is, group members’ expressions 
might be less bound by group norms. 
 
Social identity and Norm conformity 
The idea that people tend to conform to norms is prevalent 
throughout the social sciences, and is within modern social psychology, 
(among others) incorporated into the social identity approach. Group 
norms inform us which clothes we should wear, which opinions we can 
express, and whether we use a car or hop on a bike.  
According to self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985), shared social 




group members that differentiate in-group members from members of 
other groups (Turner, 1985). When social identity becomes salient, group 
members are assumed to define themselves in group terms and internalize 
group norms. As a consequence, individuals are inclined to conform to 
group norms to express their social identity (Turner, 1991; Hogg & Turner, 
1987). Indeed, norms can be understood in terms of a prototype that 
describes what group members should do or ideally would do in a given 
situation (Terry & Hogg, 1996; Turner, 1991; Turner, Wetherell, & Hogg, 
1989). Following this reasoning, deviation from a group norm is seen as a 
sign of dissent and is evaluated negatively by other group members 
(Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). 
For the present paper, it is important to point out that social 
identity and associated norms are more likely to be deduced the smaller the 
within-group differences are in comparison to the between-group 
differences (the principle of meta-contrast; Turner, 1985; Turner & Oakes, 
1986). Indeed, perceived similarity between group members fosters this 
deductive process of social identity formation (Jans et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the extent to which a shared identity can emerge and becomes 
salient should subsequently encourage norm-consistent behaviour. Thus, 
within groups perceived to be homogenous, deductive processes should 
result in the formation of a strong shared identity, and predict norm-
conforming behaviour in subsequent tasks.  
 
Social identity and Norm Deviance 
However, recently it has been suggested that social identities may 
also be formed inductively (Postmes et al., 2005a; cf. Turner, 1982). That is, 
individual expressions of group members may contribute to the formation 
of a shared social identity. Here, intragroup interactions inform the content 
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of social identity, and group norms and conventions are inferred from 
within-group differences as much as similarities. Indeed, research suggests 
that some degree of perceived heterogeneity helps groups to form a strong 
social identity through induction, and that members of heterogeneous 
groups can form a stronger social identity inductively than deductively (Jans 
et al, 2012).  
The present research considers what leeway individuals within 
heterogeneous groups have to behave distinctively once such shared 
identities have inductively been established. When social identities are 
deduced, members should follow group norms (see above). But when social 
identities have been induced, the assumption that group members will 
always conform to the normative position of the group as an expression of 
their social identity, does not logically follow. Rather, since induced social 
identities are dynamically constructed in such a way that they accommodate 
within-group differences into the emergent shared identity, we assume that 
the formed identity is never completely “finished” and will thus remain 
more open to distinctive expressions. Hence, within heterogeneous groups, 
the process of induction should not lead to the formation of one fixed and 
static group norm of how to be but should enable group members to act 
more freely from normative constraints than would be possible if social 
identity was deductively formed out of homogeneity.  
 We are not the first to suggest that group members may not always 
conform to group norms (Jetten & Hornsey, 2011; Moscovici, 1976). 
Indeed, it has been suggested that in some cases, highly identified group 
members may be particularly invested in deviating from group norms 
(Hornsey, 2006; Morton, Postmes, & Jetten, 2007; Packer, 2008; 2011). 




mind, and in some cases deviating from group norms may be perceived as 
more beneficial for the group than conforming to group norms.  
For one, highly identified group members may deviate from group 
norms or criticize them, when they believe the group norms to be flawed, 
corrupt, immoral, and harmful for the group, in the hope of changing them 
(Hornsey, 2005/2006; Packer, 2008). Furthermore, Packer (2011) suggested, 
that even when individuals privately endorse a group norm, high identifiers 
may still publicly express opinions that go against the norm if they believe 
this deviance to be beneficial for the group (which he calls strategic non-
conformity, see also Morton et al., 2007), such as when deviance is believed 
to enhance the creativity or performance of the group (cf. De Dreu, 2002; 
De Dreu & West, 2001)14. A corollary of this is that low identifiers might 
often be more marginal group members–they may have more to lose (or 
less to gain) from dissenting.  
The present paper’s suggestion for why social identity can foster 
anti-normative behaviour is somewhat different. When perceived 
heterogeneous groups have inductively formed a shared identity out of 
heterogeneity, group members might simply continue expressing themselves 
in idiosyncratic (or deviant) ways. We do not believe this is necessarily the 
result of identification increasing members’ responsibility towards the 
group. Rather, we suggest that because social identity and group norms are 
induced, and therefore founded upon multiple different viewpoints, the 
group remains more open to distinctive expressions, as it does not 
challenge the unity of the group. 
                                                
14 Although dissent may foster creative and divergent thinking, individuals within groups 
often do not express dissent (see Nemeth & Nemeth-Brown, 2003). 
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Overview 
The aim of our research was to extent the work on social identity 
formation, testing whether identities that are formed inductively allow more 
scope for norm-inconsistent behaviour. In particular, we predict that 
homogeneous groups can form a stronger identity deductively than 
inductively, and that this should result in more norm-consistent behaviour. 
In contrast, we predict that heterogeneous groups can form a stronger 
identity inductively than deductively, and that this should result in more 
norm-inconsistent behaviour. 
We tested our predictions in two studies with a 2 (diversity: 
homogeneity vs. heterogeneity) x 2 (social identity formation: deductive vs. 
inductive) factorial design. The studies were designed in such a way that 
they reflected the manipulations used in Jans et al. (2012). To be able to 
control the experiment as much as possible and to keep the norms constant 
across conditions, we changed the paradigm used in previous research, by 
using bogus groups with bogus interaction, rather than real groups with real 
interaction. 
In line with previous research, we measured identification and 
entitativity as indicators of social identity. Furthermore, we used a new 
dependent variable to measure norm-inconsistent behaviour. In particular 
we measured the extent to which participants are willing to generate 
arguments that go against a pre-established group norm.  
In Study 4.1, German participants were asked to generate as many 
pro- and contra-arguments toward a university proposal for mandatory 
Dutch courses for all foreign students. Before argument generation 
participants were made to believe that German students in general and their 
experimental group in particular, held a clear norm that this proposal was a 




pro- and contra-arguments toward a new governmental law stating students 
who did not finish their university study within 6 years would be fined, 
irrespective of personal circumstances. Before argument generation 
participants were made to believe that Dutch students in general and their 





Participants and design. German psychology undergraduates at a 
Dutch University (N =52, 40 Man, Mage = 21.52) were randomly assigned to 
conditions in a 2 (Diversity: Homogeneous vs. Heterogeneous) x 2 (Social 
identity formation: Deduction vs. Induction)15 design. 
 
Procedure and independent variables. Participants were 
informed that the experiment consisted of a small online group debate 
together with three other German students. They were seated behind a 
computer and were made to believe that they were communicating with the 
                                                
15 This study also included a personal identity condition, in which participants had an 
individual coat of arms and name. These results are not included in the paper because we 
did not have specific hypotheses about this condition. Also when we included the personal 
identity conditions, there were no significant effects on identification and entitativity, F’s < 
0.88. Furthermore, the trend of social identity formation on norm-consistent arguments 
became significant when the personal identities were included, F(2,65) = 5.77, p = .005, χ2 
=.15. Participants in the personal identity generated significantly less norm-consistent 
arguments, compared to the other two conditions, Helmert contrast = -2.29, p =.007. 
Finally, on norm-inconsistent arguments, the interaction effect of diversity and social 
identity formation remained also significant, F(2,65) = 3.39, p = .040, η2 =.09. However, 
simple main effects of identity formation were not significant within either condition of 
diversity (F’s < 2.01). Within the homogenous condition, the mean in the personal identity 
condition (M = 2.69) was very similar to the mean in the deduction condition. Within the 
heterogeneous condition, the mean in the personal identity condition (M = 2.25) was in 
between the means of the other two conditions. 
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other group members. In reality, there was no interaction. The entire study 
was in German. 
Diversity manipulation. Perceived diversity was manipulated by 
providing false feedback about personality (see also Jans et al., 2012). 
Participants completed the Five Factor Personality Inventory (FFPI; 
Hendriks, Hofstee, & De Raad, 1999, 30 items), and received bogus 
feedback about the personalities in the group. In the homogeneous condition, 
participants were told that all group members scored quite similar on the 
personality questionnaire and thus had similar personalities. In the 
heterogeneous condition, they were told that all group members scored quite 
differently on the personality questionnaire and thus had different 
personalities.  
Social identity formation manipulation. Next, social identity 
formation was manipulated by the creation of a group representation that 
consisted of a coat of arms with group name. This manipulation was 
adapted from Jans et al. (2012)’s manipulation of social identity formation 
in which real groups made a team logo. In the deduction condition, participants 
were told the computer generated a unique coat of arms and name for their 
group. In fact, every participant in the deduction condition was presented 
the same coat of arms and group name (i.e., unum turma).  
In the induction condition, participants were told each group member 
would contribute to the group name and coat of arms. Participants 
contributed the first syllable of their first name to the group name. The first 
syllables of the bogus group members were kept constant (“HaClaLi”), and 
the participant’s syllable was added to form the group name. Then, 
participants were supposedly randomly selected to choose one aspect of the 
coat of arms. The participants always had to choose the coat of arms’ 




selected the pattern and the colours (which were the same as those in the 
deduction condition).  
Participants in the inductive condition, thus, had an individual 
contribution to the group, while participants within the deductive condition 
could not make such a contribution. In both conditions, the coat of arms 
was presented for the duration of the study as background on the computer 
screen.  
Norm establishment. After manipulating diversity and social identity 
formation, we established an explicit group norm in order to assess divergence 
from that norm later on. Therefore, we selected a topic on which German 
students’ attitudes were clear and outspoken. Participants were told that 
they would be debating the necessity of learning the local language when 
studying abroad, and whether mandatory Dutch courses should be 
implemented. Most German students hold the opinion that foreign students 
should learn the language of the host university16. 
Also in the current sample, there was a commonly shared norm that 
it is necessary for foreign students to master the national language of the 
host university. On a scale from 1(absolutely not necessary) to 7 (absolutely 
necessary) the median score was 6 (skewness = -1.347). Only three 
participants scored below the midpoint of the scale. Additionally, there also 
seemed to be a commonly shared norm regarding the discussion topic; 
Mandatory Dutch courses were seen as something positive (Median = 5.50, 
on a 7-point likert scale; skewness = -1.276), with only five participants 
scoring below the midpoint. The two questions correlated positively (r = 
.681, p < .001).To control for prior attitudes on our measure of norm 
                                                
16 A pilot study (N = 46 German students) showed that most German students think that 
it is necessary for foreign students to master the national language of the host university. 
On a scale from 1(absolutely not necessary) to 4 (absolutely necessary) the average score was a 2.96 
(SD = .87), with 69.6 % of the participants scoring above the midpoint of the scale. 
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deviance, all participants who scored below the midpoint on either question 
(6 in total) were excluded from further analyses. 
Participants got to read a bogus article stating a plan of the 
university to make Dutch courses mandatory for all foreign first- and 
second-year students. Participants wrote two short paragraphs in two 
consecutive rounds to express their opinions about this idea towards the 
other group members. The pre-written statements of the other group 
members displayed an overall more positive attitude (e.g. “That sounds 
reasonable. Of course, you have to learn a new language. In the end, there 
are only advantages”). This was meant to establish an explicit group norm 
that mandatory Dutch courses should be considered positive.  
Argument generation. After the establishment of a group norm, 
participants were asked to generate as many pro- and contra-arguments 
regarding mandatory Dutch courses in ten minutes. The instructions stated 
that there would be a discussion about the generated arguments with the 
other group members afterwards. In fact, the experiment ended after they 
filled in several questionnaires.  
 
Dependent variables. All measures could be answered on a 7-
point Likert scale (1= absolutely not, to 7 = absolutely), unless otherwise 
specified. 
Normative outcomes. The number of norm-inconsistent arguments 
was used as a measure of norm deviance. Thereby, two independent coders 
counted the number of norm-consistent (r = .954, p < .001) and norm-
inconsistent arguments (r = .971, p < .001), separately. The number of 
norm-consistent and norm-inconsistent arguments had a marginally 





Manipulation checks. After, some task related questions17, we 
measured manipulation checks of diversity and social identity formation. As 
a manipulation check of diversity we asked participants to what extent the 
personalities of the group members were different and similar (r = -.597). 
The manipulation check for identity formation consisted of one item asking 
to what extent participants felt involved in making the coat of arms 
(induction check).  
Identification and Entitativity. In addition, as in Jans et al (2012), we 
measured identification and entitativity. Identification was measured with 
the satisfaction and solidarity components of the Leach et al. identification 
scale (2008),, e.g. “It is pleasant to be a member of this group” and “I feel a 
bond with this group” (α = .922). Entitativity was measured with items as I 




Manipulation checks. The mean of the diversity check in the 
heterogeneous condition was slightly higher (M = 4.00, SD = 0.99) than the 
mean in the homogeneous condition (M = 3.72, SD = 1.18). However, 
unexpectedly, there was no significant effect of diversity on the diversity 
check, F(1,42) = 0.69, p = .412, η2 =.016. All other effects were also non-
significant, F’s < 1.23. In all conditions the scores were around the 
midpoint of the scale. The same was true for the effects of the manipulation 
of social identity formation on the induction check. Participants within the 
                                                
17 The questionnaires in Study 4.1 and 4.2, also included some questions about the tasks 
participants had to do, and a measure of divergent thinking (Basadur & Finkbeiner, 1985). 
The alpha of the divergent thinking questionnaire was very low (α = .633; .613, 
respectively), therefore, the internal consistency was too low to draw conclusions from 
these scales. 
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inductive condition scored slightly higher on the induction check (M = 
3.57, SD = 1.90) than participants in the deductive condition (M = 2.96, SD 
=1.99) but the effect of social identity formation on the induction check 
was not significant, F(1, 42) = 1.03, neither were the other effects, F’s < 
0.73. It should be considered that in this study the manipulation checks 
were almost at the end of the study. The participants’ experience during the 
group discussions may have added “noise” and somewhat diluted the 
effects. Given that our manipulations of diversity and social identity 
formation were very similar to those used by Jans et al.(2012), we assume 
that we did manipulate what we intended. 
 
Normative outcomes. As the explicit group norm towards 
mandatory Dutch courses was positive, the number of arguments in favour 
of mandatory Dutch courses was considered as assessment of norm-
consistent behaviour, whereas the number of arguments against the courses 
was considered an assessment of norm-inconsistent behaviour. In line, with 
this explicit group norm, and participants private opinions, considerably 
more norm-consistent (M = 8.13, SD = 3.86) than norm-inconsistent 
arguments (M = 2.43, SD = 2.27) were generated, F(1,45) = 61.28, p < .001, 
η2 =.58.  
Norm-inconsistent behaviour. The distribution of the number of 
norm-inconsistent arguments was somewhat skewed (skewness = 1.03, SE 
= .35, Median = 2, Max = 10 ideas). Therefore, we conducted an ANOVA 
on the log-transformed number of norm-inconsistent arguments (+1). In 
this analysis, only the interaction between diversity and social identity 
formation was significant, F(1,42) = 5.82, p = .020, η2 =.12. Simple main 
effects showed that within the heterogeneous condition, participants came 




induced, instead of deduced, F(1,42) = 3.61, p = .064, η2 =.08. The pattern 
appeared to be reversed (but not significantly so) within the homogenous 
condition, F(1,42) = 2.29, p = .138, η2 =.05 (see Figure 4.1). This pattern of 
results is in line with the hypothesis that members of heterogeneous groups 
that inductively formed a social identity are willing to show their 
distinctiveness by going against group norms. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Interaction effect of diversity and social identity formation on norm-consistent 
arguments in Study 4.1 in means (not medians), with standard errors. 
 
Norm-consistent behaviour. Although, norm-consistent behaviour 
was not the variable of our interest, we also tested whether perceived 
diversity and social identity formation affected the number of norm-
consistent arguments generated. Diversity had a (marginal) effect on the 
number of norm-consistent arguments generated, F(1,42) = 3.06, p= .088, 
η2 =.07, and there also was a slight trend of social identity formation on this 
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specified by a significant interaction, F = 0.22. More norm-consistent ideas 
were generated in the homogenous group than in the heterogeneous group. 
Furthermore, slightly more norm-consistent ideas were generated in the 
deduction condition compared to the induction condition (See Figure 4.2). 
It thus appeared that participants in heterogeneous groups that inductively 
formed a social identity were the least likely to generate norm-consistent 
arguments, whereas participants within the homogeneous groups that 




Figure 4.2. Interaction effect of diversity and social identity formation on norm-consistent 
arguments in Study 4.1, with standard errors. 
 
Identification and Entitativity. There were no effects of diversity 
and social identity formation or their interaction on identification, F’s < 
1.08. The effects on entitativity were also not significant, F’s < 1.10. 
Identification and entitativity were measured at the end of the experiment, 




























Results of Study 4.1 were largely in line with our hypotheses. As 
expected, participants in groups that were perceived to be heterogeneous 
that inductively formed a social identity generated more arguments against 
the group norm than when social identity was deductively formed. They 
also appeared to be the least likely to generate arguments consistent with 
group norms. This seems to suggest that the identity formed in 
heterogeneous groups through inductive processes is qualitatively different 
than would be suggested by self-categorization theory. While the latter 
suggests depersonalization and norm conformity, the first seems to allow 
group members to break free from such normative pressures.  
 Although the results for norm-inconsistent behaviour are in line with 
our expectation, we did not find effects on our manipulation checks and 
identification and entitativity. One possible reason for this is that these 
variables were measured at the end of the experiment, after idea generation. 
This might have diluted the effects of the manipulations. Study 4.2 was 




Study 4.2 aimed to replicate the results of Study 4.1, as well as 
previously reported effects on identification and entitativity (Jans et al., 
2012). To this end we adapted the design. In Study 4.2, we measured the 
manipulation checks immediately after the manipulations and measured 
identification and entitativity twice (once immediately after the 
manipulations checks, and a second time after idea generation). Second, to 
make the bogus group situation more realistic, we tried to make the 
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manipulation of social identity formation and diversity stronger. Third, we 
used another sample: Dutch rather than German students.  
 
Method 
Participants and design. Seventy-nine Dutch psychology 
undergraduates (12 Man, Mage = 18.95, SDage = 1.25) were randomly 
assigned to conditions of a 2 (Diversity: Homogeneous vs. Heterogeneous) 
x 2 (Social identity formation: Deduction vs. Induction) factorial design. 
Four participants were non-Dutch and therefore deleted from analyses. 
 
Procedure and independent variables. Participants were 
informed that the experiment consisted of a small online group debate 
together with three other students. They were seated behind a computer 
and were made to believe that they were communicating with the other 
group members. In reality, there was no interaction. The procedure of the 
study was quite similar to Study 4.1, except for the fact that the entire 
experiment was in Dutch.  
Diversity manipulation. Perceived diversity was again manipulated 
by providing the same false feedback about personality as in Study 4.1. To 
strengthen this manipulation and to make the bogus group setting more 
realistic, participants were also presented with a graphical display of the 
disposition of personalities within a “personality rose” (without labels). 
Within the homogenous condition all group members were depicted in the same 
quarter of the rose. Within the heterogeneous condition all group members were 
depicted in a different quarter of the rose. This time, directly after the 
manipulation, we asked manipulation check questions: two items measuring 
to what extent participants thought personalities of group members were 




Social identity formation manipulation. The manipulation of social 
identity formation was very similar to the manipulation in Study 4.1. This 
time, we strengthened the manipulation and the reality of the group, by 
letting participants compare their coat of arms with a coat of arms that 
supposedly belonged to the previous group.  
The manipulation was followed directly by a manipulation check, 
measuring the extent to which the unique coat of arms was generated by the 
computer (deduction check) and the extent to which participants made an 
individual contribution to the coat of arms (induction check). These items 
did not correlate and were used as separate checks, r = -.097, p < .401). 
Furthermore, identification and entitativity were measured (see dependent 
variables).  
Norm establishment. After participants filled in the questionnaire, 
we established an explicit group norm in order to assess divergence from that 
norm later on. Therefore, we selected a topic on which Dutch students’ 
attitudes were clear and outspoken: In September 2012, the Dutch 
government implemented a new law that students who studied longer than 
6 years at university would be fined. This measure was strongly opposed by 
student groups: students thought that it was unjust for the policy to ignore 
personal circumstances which could cause delays18. 
Participants were asked their personal opinion about this topic. 
Except for two participants, all agreed with the statement “When giving the 
fine personal circumstances of a student should be taken into account” (M 
                                                
18 A pilot study (N = 23) measuring agreement with two statements (1 = absolutely disagree; 
6= absolutely agree) confirmed that most students were against a fine for all students with a 
year study delay. On average participants disagreed with the statement “All students who 
have more than one year graduation delay should pay a fine”, with 69.6 percent scoring 
below the midpoint of the scale. Even stronger, all participants agreed with the statement 
“When giving the fine personal circumstances of a student should be taken into account” 
(M = 5.78 , SD = 0.42, Min. = 5.00). Because there was more consensus about the last 
statement, we used this statement as our explicit group norm. 
SOCIAL IDENTITY FORMATION AND THE DISPLAY OF INDIVIDUAL DISTINCTIVENESS 
 111 
= 3.76, SD = 0.54, 1 = absolutely disagree; 4= absolutely agree). In order to 
assess divergence from the norm later on, we excluded the two participants 
who personally disagreed with the statement from our analyses.  
Consensus was highlighted by telling participants that 92% of all 
students disagreed with the fine. Furthermore, participants were made to 
believe that also within their discussion group, there was consensus on the 
topic. Then, participants were asked to communicate their opinion to the 
other group members in two consecutive rounds. The pre-written 
statements of the other group members displayed a strongly negative 
attitude towards the fine (e.g. “this rule is ridiculous”). Together, this 
established an explicit group norm that personal circumstances of students 
should be taken into account when giving a fee.  
Argument generation. After the establishment of an explicit group 
norm, participants were asked to generate as many pro- and contra-
arguments in three minutes regarding the implementation to have all 
students pay the same fine, no matter personal circumstances. They were 
told these arguments would be presented to the other group members, in 
order to discuss them together. 
Next, participants were asked to think about the possible functions 
of a brick in 1.5 minutes (adapted from Guilford, 1967; Lamm & 
Trommsdorff, 1973), and to fill in a second questionnaire, before the group 
discussion would start. In fact, after they filled in the questionnaires the 
experiment ended.  
Dependent variables. Again, all measures could be answered on a 
7-point Likert scale (1= absolutely not, to 7 = absolutely), unless otherwise 
specified. 
Identification and Entitativity. We used the same measures of 




measured at two time points. The first measure was taken directly after the 
manipulation (αIdentification = .932, and αentitativity = .866), and the second 
measure was taken after the idea generation task (αIdentification = .938 and 
αEntitativity = .882). 
Normative outcomes. The number of norm-inconsistent arguments 
was used as a measure of norm deviance. Thereby, two independent coders 
counted the number of norm-consistent (r = .974, p < .001) and 
inconsistent arguments (r = .928, p < .001), separately. The number of 
norm-consistent and norm-inconsistent arguments did not correlate (r = -
.011, p = .921). 
 
Results 
Manipulation checks. In Study 4.2, the manipulations seemed to 
work. Diversity had a significant effect on the diversity check, F(1,75) = 
144.53, p < .001, η2 = .66. As expected, participants reported the 
personalities in the group to differ more from each other in the 
heterogeneous condition (M = 5.78, SD = 1.16), than in the homogeneous 
condition (M = 2.28, SD = 1.39).  
Moreover, a MANOVA with social identity formation and diversity 
as predictors, showed that social identity formation had a significant effect 
on the induction check, F(1,73) = 19.25, p < .001, η2 = .21, and a marginally 
significant effect on the deduction check, F(1,73) = 3.93, p = .051, η2 = .05, 
in the expected directions. Participants in the induction condition scored 
higher on the induction check (M = 5.17, SD = 1.43) and lower on the 
deduction check (M = 5.15, SD = 1.35), than participants in the deduction 
condition (M = 3.61, SD = 1.66, and M = 5.78, SD = 1.44, respectively). 
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All other effects on the induction and deduction check were not significant 
(F’s < 0.35).  
 
Identification. Because identification was measured before and 
after idea generation, we carried out GLM analyses adding time as within-
subject factor. We found a marginally significant effect of diversity on 
identification, F(1,73) = 2.92, p = .092, η2 = .04, which was qualified by a 
significant interaction with social identity formation, F(1,73) = 10.13, p = 
.002, η2 = .12. As expected, members of heterogeneous groups identified 
somewhat more with their group when the group identity was induced 
rather than deduced, F(1,73) = 3.49, p = .066, η2 = .05. For members of 
homogenous groups, the effect was in the opposite direction, F(1,73) = 
6.89, p = .011, η2 = .09 (see Figure 4.3). 
Time of measurement also had a significant effect on identification, 
F(1,73) = 10.25, p = .002, η2 = .12, and this was further qualified by a 
significant interaction with diversity, F(1,73) = 6.01, p = .017, η2 = .08. 
Identification significantly increased between the two time points for 
heterogeneous groups, ΔM = 0.35, p < .001, but not for homogenous 





Figure 4.3. Interaction effect of time (T), diversity, and social identity formation on 
average identification in Study 4.2, with standard errors. 
 
Entitativity. The results for entitativity were similar as those found 
for identification. Diversity had a significant effect on entitativity, F(1,73) = 
5.50, p = .022, η2 = .07, and there was a significant interaction between 
diversity and social identity formation, F(1,73) = 12.68, p < .001, η2 = .15, 
on entitativity. As expected, members of heterogeneous groups perceived 
the group somewhat more as an entity when the group identity was induced 
rather than deduced, F(1,73) = 2.91, p = .092, η2 = .04. For members of 
homogenous groups, the effect was in the opposite direction, F(1,73) = 
10.99, p <.001, η2 = .13 (see Figure 4.4). They  perceived the group more as 
an entity in the deduction condition than in the induction condition. 
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Figure 4.4. Interaction effect of time (T), diversity, and social identity formation on 
average entitativity in Study 4.2, with standard errors. 
 
Time of measurement also had a significant effect on entitativity, 
F(1,73) = 15.22, p <.001, η2 = .17, which was qualified by a significant 
interaction with diversity, F(1,73) = 5.96, p = .017, η2 = .08. Entitativity 
significantly increased between the two time points for heterogeneous 
groups, ΔM =.66, p < .001, but not for homogenous groups, ΔM =.15, p < 
.310. 
 
Normative outcomes. Participants had three minutes to generate 
arguments. In line with the explicit group norm, and participants private 
opinions considerably more norm-consistent arguments (M = 2.18, SD = 
1.20) than norm-inconsistent arguments (M = 1.63, SD = 0.78) were 
generated, F(1,73) = 11.30, p = .001, η2 = .13.  

















Norm-inconsistent arguments. The interaction effect of diversity 
and social identity formation on norm-inconsistent arguments was not 
significant, F(1,73) = 2.59, p = .112, η2 =.034. The cross over pattern did 
seem to match that of Study 4.1 (see Figure 4.5). The data revealed a trend: 
participants in the heterogeneous condition seemed to generate slightly 
more norm-inconsistent arguments, when identity was formed inductively, 
rather than deductively, F(1,73) = 1.53, p = .220, η2 =.02. As before, this 
pattern was reversed (again slightly) for participants in the homogenous 




Figure 4.5. Interaction effect of diversity, and social identity formation on number of 
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Norm-consistent arguments. Diversity had a significant effect on 
the number of norm-consistent arguments generated, F(1,73) = 4.93, p = 
.029, η2 =.06. This time, more norm-consistent ideas were generated in 
heterogeneous groups, than in homogenous groups (See Figure 4.6). All 
other effects were non-significant, F’s < 0.60. The pattern of results 
appeared to be opposite to the results in Study 4.1. Participants in 
heterogeneous groups that inductively formed a social identity appeared the 
most likely to generate norm-consistent arguments, whereas participants 
within the homogeneous groups that deductively formed a social identity 
appeared the least likely to generate norm-consistent arguments. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Interaction effect of diversity, and social identity formation on number of 


























The results of Study 4.2 replicated previously found effects of social 
identity formation and diversity on identification (and entitativity; Jans et al., 
2012). While participants in groups perceived to be homogenous can form a 
stronger social identity through deductive processes, participants in groups 
perceived to be heterogeneous formed a stronger social identity inductively, 
as reflected by higher identification and entitativity. 
 However, compared to Study 4.1, the effects on norm-inconsistent 
arguments were less clear, and not significant. The pattern of results did 
suggest that deviance was higher in heterogeneous groups when identity 
was induced, instead of deduced. However, unexpectedly the pattern of 
results also suggested that participants in homogeneous groups generated 
more norm-inconsistent arguments when social identity was deductively 
formed than when social identity was inductively formed. Furthermore, 
participants in the heterogeneous/induction condition generated the most 
norm-consistent arguments.  
Post hoc, there are several possibilities why the effects on argument 
generation in Study 4.2 were not as clear-cut as in Study 4.1. For example, 
participants had far less time to generate arguments, and the explicit group 
norm was much clearer. However, we believe that there was one important 
difference in particular that may explain the different pattern of results: the 
established group norm in this study was opposite to the attitude of an 
outgroup (the Government). This means that group members who have 
distinctive (pro-outgroup) ideas need to perform a balancing act of showing 
some allegiance to the in-group whilst displaying their independent ideas. 
This may explain why in this context, in heterogeneous groups there were 
more norm-consistent ideas: these are overt displays of ingroup support. In 
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other words, going against group norms was less harmless for the group 




Although not all results were statistically significant in both studies, 
the pattern of results appeared quite similar, except for the results on norm-
consistent arguments. In order to better assess the underlying strength of 
the effects, we conducted a meta-analysis calculating average effect sizes 
across studies.  
 
Identification 
We aggregated identification after argument generation (i.e., at T2 in 
Study 4.2) as these were measured at identical time points. Across studies, 
the interaction of diversity and social identity formation had on average a 
moderately large effect on identification, η2 = .06, Z = 2.81, p = .002. The 
simple main effects of social identity formation within the conditions of 
diversity were also significant over studies. Within the heterogeneous 
conditions, participants on average identified more strongly with their 
group when the social identity was induced, instead of deduced, d = .56, Z 
= 2.14, p = .016. This pattern significantly reversed within the 
homogeneous conditions, although the effect was slightly smaller, d = -.43, 
Z = -1.77, p = .039.  
 
Entitativity 
Across studies, the average interaction effect of diversity and social 
identity formation on entitativity was significant, η2 = .02, Z = 1.82, p = 




significant within the heterogeneous conditions, d = .20, Z =0.99, p = .162, 
and only marginally significant within the homogeneous conditions, d = -
.35, Z = -1.50, p = .067.  
 
Norm-Inconsistent Arguments 
Average effect sizes were calculated on the basis of the log-
transformed measure of Study 4.1 in view of the skewedness of this data. 
The average interaction effect of diversity and social identity formation on 
norm-inconsistent arguments was moderately large, η2 = .07, Z = 2.82, p = 
.002. Within the heterogeneous conditions, participants on average came up 
with more norm-inconsistent arguments when the social identity was 
induced, instead of deduced—a moderate size effect, d = .56, Z = 2.06, p = 
.019. The pattern was significantly reversed within the homogenous 
conditions, d = -.52, Z = -1.81, p = .034.  
 
Norm-Consistent Arguments  
Across studies, the average effect of diversity was not significant, η2 
= .00, Z = 0.31, p = .377, nor was the effect of social identity formation, η2 




In this paper, we aimed to replicate and extend the work on the 
interplay of individuality and social identity formation, by testing whether 
inductive social identity formation does not only allow for the 
incorporation of within-group differences in the emergent shared identity, 
but also provides group members more leeway to continue expressing 
themselves in distinctive ways.  
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First, the two studies in combination replicated previous found 
effects of social identity formation and perceived diversity on identification 
and entitativity (Jans et al. 2012). While individuals in groups perceived to 
be homogeneous can form a stronger social identity through deductive 
processes, than though inductive processes, this is reversed for individuals 
in perceived heterogonous groups, as indicated by higher identification (and 
entitativity). Within groups perceived to be heterogeneous, inductive 
processes foster the formation of a social identity. This supports the 
suggestion that within-group differences do not need to obstruct social 
identity formation, confirming that induction is a pathway to social identity 
formation with characteristics very different from deduction based on 
overarching similarities (cf. Turner, 1985).  
Second, our research shows that individuals in groups perceived to 
be heterogeneous generate more norm-inconsistent arguments when social 
identity was inductively formed. This suggests that individuality may not 
only be the “input” for social identity formation (Jans et al., 2012), but that 
in situations where diversity is perceived to be at the basis of group 
formation, the display of individuality can also be the “output” behaviour 
of group members. Through inductive processes of social identity 
formation, individuality and social identity can thus become mutually 
reinforcing.  
We suggested that this was because the norms created through 
inductive social identity formation may be interpreted quite differently: as 
organically emergent rather than pre-fixed and given. This fits with the 
distinction between cultures that are “tight”—have strong norms and a low 
tolerance of deviant behaviour— and cultures that are “loose”—have weak 
norms and a high tolerance of deviant behaviour (Gelfand et al, 2011; Pelto, 




also differ in their tolerance for individuality. We studied this assumption 
indirectly by looking at the number of norm-inconsistent arguments group 
members generated. Future research could begin to explore whether group 
members are actually conscious of group norms being more or less tight, 
and whether group members are also more tolerant of other’s deviant 
behaviours when social identity is inductively formed. 
An alternative explanation for why inductive social identity 
formation can foster norm deviance in heterogeneous groups is that 
heterogeneity itself became the “norm” (cf. Homan, Van Knippenberg, Van 
Kleef, & De Dreu, 2007; Luijters, Van der Zee, & Otten, 2008; Rink & 
Ellemers, 2007). In other words, inductive groups simply develop a norm 
that encourages independence from existing norms. This alternative 
explanation fits with the suggestion in self-categorization theory, that when 
social identity is salient, group members will internalize group norms and 
conform their behaviour in line with such norms (Turner, 1991; Hogg & 
Turner, 1987). However, this alternative explanation strikes us as unlikely. 
There were no significant associations between identification and deviance 
in the inductive-heterogeneous conditions of either study: it were not the 
high identifiers who were responsible for these effects. Similarly, Study 4.2 
showed that in contexts in which the ingroup norm conflicted with an 
outgroup norm, members of inductive-heterogeneous listed numerous 
norm-consistent ideas too: they made sure that they balanced their 
independence from the group norm by simultaneously displaying adherence 
to it. 
In sum, our results extend self-categorization’s suggestion that 
group members will conform their behaviour in line with group norms as 
an expression of social identity (Turner, 1991; Hogg & Turner, 1987). 
Individuals were expressing more norm-inconsistent arguments in those 
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instances in which social identity was strongest. This suggests that social 
identity may in general be more positively related to norm-deviance than 
has hitherto been assumed (see also Hornsey, 2006; Packer, 2008). We 
believe that it is likely this would take on two distinct forms. Within 
homogeneous groups with a strongly deductive social identity, high 
identifiers and central group members may experience enough 
psychological safety to go against group norms (Edmondson, 1999; Paulus 
& Dzindolet, 2008) and/or may make strategic choices to do so (Packer 
2011; Morton et al., 2007). Within heterogeneous groups with induced 
social identity, however, all group members might feel more secure in 
expressing their own viewpoints: because similarity and unanimity is no 
longer at the foundation of group unity, deviance is less of a threat to the 
individual and the group. 
Our results may have important implications for the possibility of 
benefitting from diversity in groups. Heterogeneous groups have the 
potential to outperform homogenous groups, as they may possess a broader 
range of task-relevant knowledge, skills, abilities, opinions and perspectives 
that are distinct and non-redundant (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). However, 
whether heterogonous groups fulfil this potential depends on the extent to 
which group members also elaborate on these differences (Van 
Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004). In other words, group members 
need to share their unique knowledge and perspectives within the group, 
and integrate them into a group product (Van Knippenberg, & Van Ginkel, 
2010). As inductive social identity formation allows group members to 
create a shared identity, without giving up their mutual differences, it may 
create the possibilities for heterogeneous groups to benefit from their 






Identity as an individual and identity as a group member seem to be 
largely interdependent. Where strong groups can arise out of the 
individuality of its members, so can expressions of individuality be the 
consequence of strong groups and group memberships. Paradoxically, the 
individual and the group might therefore exist, in part, because of each 
other.
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19 Chapter 5 is based on: Jans, L., Leach, C. W., Garcia, R., & Postmes, T. (2013). A multi-
level approach to the emergence of identification in newly formed groups: Differential effects of “group-being” 









Individuals differ in how strongly they identify with in-groups. The strength 
of an individual’s in-group identification has important implications for the 
self-concept, relations with others, and social behaviour (for reviews, see 
Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 
1999). Despite the widespread assumption that individuals’ identification 
with in-groups is at least partly a function of group-level processes, most 
research focuses on identification at the individual level of analysis (for 
reviews, see Ashmore et al., 2004; Ellemers et al., 1999; Haslam, Turner, 
Oakes, McGarty, & Reynolds, 1997). That is, researchers distinguish higher 
identifiers from lower identifiers, without examining how the group 
influences the identification of its members. Yet some groups encourage 
higher identification than others, and individuals within a particular in-
group may identify to a more similar degree than individuals in other in-
groups. These group-level processes cannot be examined at the individual 
level of analysis; they must be examined by making comparisons between 
different groups.  
In this paper, we make novel use of a multi-level modelling 
statistical approach to study between- and within-group emergence of 
identification in newly formed groups. We first distinguish two dimensions 
of identification, then formulate hypotheses for how these dimensions 
emerge in newly formed groups, and finally outline our multi-level 
approach to studying this process. 
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The Emergence of In-Group Identification 
 
Individuals’ identification with in-groups is multi-dimensional (for a 
review, see Ashmore et al., 2004). Leach et al. (2008) distinguished two 
dimensions of in-group identification: self-definition and self-investment. 
Self-definition refers to the extent to which individuals perceive themselves 
and other in-group members as a category (Turner, 1982). This dimension 
is reflected in two components: individuals’ self-stereotyping as a typical 
group member and perceiving the in-group as homogenous. Self-investment 
refers to individuals’ psychological investment in the in-group (Tajfel, 
1978a). This is expressed in three components: a sense of solidarity with 
group members, feeling satisfied about one’s group membership, and seeing 
the in-group as central to the self. These two dimensions echo other 
distinctions made in the social sciences, such as the distinction between 
mechanical and organic solidarity (Durkheim, 1893/1984), gemeinschaft and 
gesselschaft (Toennies, 1887/1988), and common identity and common bond 
groups (Prentice, Miller, & Lightdale, 1994). 
Recent research has shown that the self-definition and self-
investment dimensions of in-group identification are empirically distinct 
and perform distinct roles in individuals’ experience of in-group 
membership (e.g., Crane & Platow, 2010; Leach, Rodriquez Mosquera, 
Vliek, & Hirt, 2010; Leach et al., 2008; Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 
2013). However, past research has only considered within-group 
(individual-level) differences between the dimensions of in-group 
identification. In this paper, we are interested in whether the two 
dimensions can also be empirically distinguished at the group level of 
analysis. We do so by studying the emergence of in-group influence on 




good reason to expect that the group differentially influences self-definition 
and self-investment in newly formed groups. 
 
Self-Definition as a Function of Group-Being 
Groups are self-defining to the extent that individuals’ self-
perception is shaped by their group membership (Leach et al., 2008). A high 
degree of self-definition is reflected in depersonalized perceptions of group 
members (in-group homogeneity) and depersonalized perceptions of the 
self (self-stereotyping, see Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987). A logical precondition for such depersonalized perceptions is that 
group members have a clear perception of what the group is (Leach & 
Vliek, 2008; Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005a). From the moment a group 
is formed, some groups form a clearer entity than other groups (for 
example because they are more homogeneous or more distinctive; Arrow, 
McGrath, & Berhdahl, 2000; Lickel et al., 2000). Therefore, some groups 
should foster higher self-definition than other groups.  
Self-definition and its consequences are typically studied in social 
categories such as gender or ethnicity. But the process is also observed in 
zero-history “minimal groups” that allow little or no interaction. Thus, it 
appears that in existing categories and in newly formed groups alike, the 
mere fact of belonging to a group can already shape individual members’ 
perceptions of self and other group members. In other words, processes of 
self-definition may occur from the moment a group is formed, as a result of 
the simple fact of “group-being” – the existence of the group as a social 
entity. Thus, no actual interaction within a group – “group-doing” – should 
be necessary for the in-group to influence members’ self-definition in terms 
of the group. 
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To illustrate this, Figure 5.1 depicts various conceivable pathways 
by which group influence on in-group identification emerges. The graph 
depicts developments in individual-level (within-group) variation and 
group-level (between-group) variation over time, as groups interact. We 
predict that there should be between-group differences in self-definition 
from the moment groups are formed, and that increasing interaction should 
have little effect on these perceptions of the group as an entity (i.e., Figure 
5.1a). 
 
Self-Investment as a Function of Group-Doing 
Self-investment is anchored in a different set of social-psychological 
processes than self-definition. Thus, self-definition can be independent of 
self-investment, to some extent. The independence of self-investment and 
self-definition should be clearest in newly formed groups: The mere fact of 
the group’s existence (group-being) should not provide a solid basis for 
collective investment in the group. Without shared experience in the group, 
members’ feelings of solidarity and of satisfaction with the group should be 
largely independent of each other. In newly formed groups, in other words, 
members of the group should not agree with each other about the value of 
that group membership to the self. That changes when members gain some 
common experience with the in-group. Indeed, research shows that shared 
experiences of group membership emerge out of direct interaction in small 
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Figure 5.1a-d. The emergence of two group-level properties of in-group identification 
with greater group interaction: decreasing individual-level variance and increasing group-
level variance. Group 1 is represented by squares, and group 2 is represented by 
circles. The group mean is represented by x. The left brackets indicate group-level 
variance whereas the right brackets indicate individual-level variance. 
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We thus expect that group-level influences on self-investment 
emerge out of direct interactions within the group: “group-doing”. This can 
take two forms. First, through interaction each group acquires its own 
peculiarities (such as: norms or styles of interaction, see Postmes, Spears, & 
Lea, 2002; Sherif, 1935). For example, some groups will be friendly or 
efficient whereas other groups will be unfriendly and inefficient. Thus, with 
increased interaction, groups should increasingly differ from each other. 
These between-group differences should influence the extent to which they 
invite members’ self-investment in the group (see Figure 5.1c). Over time, 
some groups will therefore be characterized by greater solidarity and 
satisfaction and others will be characterized by lesser solidarity and 
satisfaction. Second, through direct interaction, group members share and 
“elaborate” the experience of being a group member (Arrow et al., 2000; 
Van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004). Thereby, they should 
develop a collective basis for satisfaction and solidarity with their in-group. 
Thus, through direct interaction, in-group members’ self-investment should 
become more alike (see Figure 5.1b).  
In sum, we expect that in newly formed groups, self-definition and 
self-investment emerge in distinct ways. The simple fact of group-being 
should be enough for the group to influence members’ self-definition in 
terms of their group membership. In contrast, self-investment in the group 







Many scholars have suggested that individual members are 
influenced by their in-group and by group characteristics such as size or 
status (e.g., Deaux & Martin, 2003; Ellemers et al., 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979; Turner et al., 1987). This means that within-group and between-group 
differences in identification should be considered in conjunction with each 
other. One can achieve this in a multi-level analysis (e.g., Bliese, 2000) in 
which individual identification is nested within groups. Conceptually many 
have argued that group processes necessitate such an approach (e.g., Arrow 
et al., 2000), but with respect to group identification, our literature search 
suggests that researchers have rarely studied it in a multi-level analysis.  
The social identity literature has focused mainly on individual-level 
differences in identification. However, we know that group-level factors can 
influence individual-level identification (e.g., group size and status, see 
Brewer, 1991; Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, De Vries, & Wilke, 1988). 
Although there are many studies of individuals nested within teams in the 
organizational literature, there is a tendency to choose either an individual-
level or a group-level analytic strategy (Bliese, 2000). With respect to studies 
of identification it appears to be quite common to examine identification 
with multiple groups such as team and organization at the individual level 
(e.g., Riketta & Van Dick, 2005). Although no studies known to us adopt a 
multi-level approach to studying the emergence of in-group identification in 
the manner we pursue, there is one prior study that has examined the 
emergence of identification in groups (Bouas & Arrow, 1996). Our 
predictions are consistent with that prior work, but our methods differ 
because we adopt a multi-level approach and use a validated multi-
dimensional identification scale.  




This paper examines the influence of the group on in-group 
identification. We take a multi-level approach to assess group influence on 
the self-definition and self-investment dimensions of identification among 
individuals who are nested in small groups. We predict that we will replicate 
the two-dimensional factor structure of Leach et al (2008) at both the 
individual and the group levels of analysis. With respect to the emergence 
of in-group identification, we expect that the self-definition and self-
investment dimensions will emerge differently.  
 
Group-Level Effects 
In a multi-level approach, in-group identification at the group level 
refers to the part of individuals’ identification that is influenced by the 
particular group to which the individual belongs. As indicated above, we 
expect that at this group level, the two dimensions of in-group 
identification emerge differently. Self-definition should emerge out of 
group-being, even with little interaction. In a multi-level analysis, this is 
shown in the existence of group-level variance whereby some groups have 
higher self-definition than other groups (Figure 5.1a). In contrast, self-
investment should emerge out of group-doing. As explained above, with 
increased interaction, groups should become more different from each 
other in their degree of self-investment, leading to increased group-level 






In a multi-level approach, in-group identification at the individual 
level is solely based on the individual and his or her personal representation 
of the group (for general discussions, see Bliese, 2000; Kenny, Kashy, & 
Bolger, 1998). Thus at the individual level, identification is independent of 
the group and of other group members, and reflects group members’ 
idiosyncratic representations of their in-group. Such individual-level 
variation in identification is likely to be quite large with actual or anticipated 
groups (Amiot, De la Sablonnière, Terry, & Smith, 2007, Turner et al., 
1987). For example, research shows that individuals’ in-group identification 
is partly anchored in personal self-perceptions (Otten & Epstude, 2006; 
Van Veelen, Otten, & Hansen, 2011).  
As explained above, we predict that group interaction should reduce 
such individual-level differences in self-investment. With increased 
interaction, group members should become more similar in their self-
investment. The emergence of this group-level property is shown 
empirically in decreased individual-level variance (see Figure 5.1b). Putting 
group- and individual-level predictions for self-investment together, we 
expect group interaction to result in both increased variance at the group 
level and decreased variance at the individual level (see Figure 5.1d). 
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Overview 
 We analysed in-group identification data collected in three small 
group studies that, between them, varied in the amount of interaction 
within the group.20 In all three studies individuals were randomly assigned 
to small groups. After completing a group task involving limited to 
extensive interaction, identification was measured with Leach et al.’s (2008) 
multi-component scale.  
All three studies examined groups formed solely for the purpose of 
the experiment. Study 5.1 allowed only minimal interaction. Participants did 
not work together, face-to-face, on a task, but were able to send sparse 
interaction via an asynchronous on-line communication system. Although 
this sort of computer-mediated communication allows only limited 
asynchronous interaction, past research shows that identification with this 
sort of on-line group can be quite high (Bouas & Arrow, 1996; Postmes, 
Spears, & Lea, 1998). Study 5.2 had greater interaction in face-to-face 
groups. Participants interacted face-to-face for ten minutes. Study 5.3 used 
the same task as Study 5.2, but after completion of this task, participants 
completed another ten-minute face-to-face task. Thus, the amount of face-
to-face interaction in the small groups to which participants were assigned 
was twice that in Study 5.2.  
To test our hypotheses we compared individual- and group-level 
properties of self-definition and self-investment across studies with a Multi-
                                                
20 The primary purpose of these studies was to examine the effects of the nature of the 
interaction on group outcomes and on mean-level self-investment. Importantly for the 
present paper is that although the nature of the interaction may have varied, the amount of 
interaction was identical for each condition. Important for the present analyses, too, is that 
we carried out Multi-group Multi-level CFAs to check if the differences between condition 
would qualify the results that we focus on in the present paper. This analysis showed that 
differences between conditions were independent of the effects reported here. The 
between-condition differences in Study 5.3 of the present paper are reported in detail in 





Group (between-studies) Multi-level Confirmatory Factor Analysis (Muthén 
& Muthén, 1998-2010) that specified Leach et al.’s (2008) two-dimensional 
model of in-group identification at the individual and the group level21. The 
results of the three studies were compared in a multi-group analysis. In this 
way, we could examine how the amount of interaction allowed in each 
study affected the emergence of group influences on the two dimensions of 
in-group identification. We make formal comparisons across studies to test 
our hypotheses about the emergence of self-definition and self-investment 
with increased interaction, after reporting group influence on in-group 




We examined identification with small groups in three studies that 
varied in their possibility for interaction. Study 5.1 required only minimal 
on-line discussion, whereas Study 5.2 required work on a task face-to-face, 
and Study 5.3 required work on two such tasks. In all three studies, 
individuals were randomly assigned to small groups and identification with 
these small groups was measured. In all studies, participants were recruited 
in exchange for course credits. 
                                                
21 The hierarchical model of in-group identification by Leach et al. (2008) specifies a third 
component of self-investment: The extent to which the group is a central aspect of 
someone’s self-concept. This component is not taken into account in the current research, 
because we expected a floor effect of centrality in newly formed groups. To illustrate the 
conceptual point’s practical implications: We considered questions such as “this group is 
central to who I am” to be somewhat unrealistic and therefore unlikely to generate 
meaningful and interpretable responses from members of newly formed groups. We 
therefore decided not to measure this dimension. 
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Study 5.1 
In Study 5.1, First-year university students (N = 140) were 
randomly assigned to 28 different five-person on-line discussion groups.22 
Each member was assigned a number and a colour that represented them 
on-line. Participants were asked to introduce themselves to each other by 
posting at least three messages in the first four days of the study. In these 
posts, participants typically wrote about their characteristics, such as where 
they lived, what their hobbies were, and what their strengths were. Typical 
posts were: “I am 18 years old, and I am sharing a house with another 
student, I like to go out and play hockey, I am studying psychology and I 
would like to work with children”; “I am really spontaneous and I like to 
please people”; “I have a Facebook account, just as the other group 
members. But in contrast to the others I am not religious.” Five participants 
did not post any messages and thus their data was excluded from analyses. 
The remaining participants (N = 135, 17 men, 117 women, 1 unknown, 
Mage = 19.16) posted an average of 3.13 messages (SD = 0.88, range =1-5). 
The average message consisted of 64 words. 
After the four days of acquaintance, participants were sent an on-
line questionnaire measuring, among other things, their identification with 
their group. Eleven items were adapted from Leach et al. (2008) to assess 
four components of group identification: individual self-stereotyping, in-
group homogeneity, solidarity, and satisfaction. For example, an individual 
                                                
22 Groups were randomly assigned to a common characteristics vs. an individual 
characteristics condition, where they were asked to discuss either the common or 
individual characteristics within the group. Comparisons between Multi-group Multi-level 
CFAs did not provide any evidence for differences in variances across condition. A model 
in which we constrained all variances and covariances to be equal across condition did not 
significantly decrease model fit, in comparison to a baseline model in which we did not 
constrain any of the factor (co)variances to be equal across condition, Δχ2 (6) = 8.651, p = 
.194. An equally good fitting constrained model indicates that there is little difference in 




self-stereotyping item stated “I am similar to the average member of this 
group”, and an in-group homogeneity item stated “Members of this group 
have a lot in common with each other.” A satisfaction item stated “I am 
glad to be in this group”, and a solidarity item stated: “I feel solidarity with 
this group.” Responses were given on a six-point scale that ranged from 1 
(completely disagree) to 6 (completely agree). In the other studies a more standard 
seven-point scale was used. Therefore, the present responses were 
converted to a seven-point scale for analysis. 
 
Study 5.2 
Study 5.2 built on Study 5.1 by increasing the degree of interaction. 
University students (134 women, 37 men) were randomly assigned to 55 
different three-person groups.23 Participants were seated around a table and 
interacted in a group task in which they had to make a team shirt. They had 
approximately 10 minutes to finish the task. Afterwards, participants 
completed questionnaires, measuring their identification with the group (see 
Study 5.1), among other things. Responses were given on seven-point scales 
that ranged from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). The data of two 
groups were deleted, because its members’ identification scores were 
significant (multivariate) outliers on Mahalanobis distance (p < .001). 
                                                
23 Groups were randomly assigned to a 2 (Diversity: Homogenous vs. Heterogeneous 
personalities) x 2 (Social Identity Formation: Deductive vs. Inductive) design. Participants 
were told that group members had either very similar or very different personalities. In 
deductive group formation, members were given a team logo whereas in the inductive 
group formation each member contributed to the design of a logo. Again, a comparison 
between the baseline model and the fully constrained model did not provide any evidence 
for differences in variances across condition, Δχ2 (18) = 17.399, p = .496. 
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Study 5.3 
Study 5.3 was very similar in design to Study 5.2, but allowed for 
twice as much interaction. University students (115 women, 40 men; Mage = 
20.26) were randomly assigned to 39 different four-person groups.24 They 
were seated around a table, and interacted in two group tasks. The first task 
was the same ten-minute task used in Study 5.2. In a second task, 
participants interacted an additional ten minutes to build a house of Lego 
blocks. Afterwards, participants completed questionnaires measuring 
identification with their group among other things. Responses were given 
on seven-point scales (1 = completely disagree; 7 = completely agree). One 
participant was deleted from analyses because he had already participated in 
an earlier session of the study.  
 
Analyses  
MPlus 4.21 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010) was used to perform a 
Multi-group (between-studies) Multi-level Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
(CFA) that specified the two-dimensional model of in-group identification 
(Leach et al., 2008) at both the individual (Level 1) and the group level 
(Level 2). In the model, the individual self-stereotyping and in-group 
homogeneity components loaded on a self-definition factor, and the 
solidarity and satisfaction components loaded on a self-investment factor. 
We used scale scores for each of the components, to minimize the number 
of estimated parameters at the group level, relative to N groups. The items 
at the group level are represented by ovals in Figure 5.2a, because they are 
                                                
24 Groups were randomly assigned to a 2 (Diversity: Homogenous vs. Heterogeneous 
personalities) x 2 (Social Identity Formation: Deductive vs. Inductive) design parallel to 
that of Study 2. Again, a comparison between the baseline model and the fully constrained 
model did not provide any evidence for differences in variances across condition, Δχ 2 (18) 




the latent variables (i.e., group intercepts) and not the measured variables. 
Additionally, the model was specified in two ways that ensured 
measurement equivalence across studies and across the individual and the 
group levels (see Figure 5.2a) and reduced the model’s complexity. First, all 
the item loadings for all factors were fixed to 1 at both levels. In this way 
we forced every item to have an equivalent loading on its expected factor. 
Second, the item error variances were also fixed to zero at the group level. 
We tested these two sets of constraints in all our models and the fit did not 
worsen with these constraints.  
Multi-level CFA allows us to assess the extent to which the group 
influences the two dimensions of in-group identification, within each study. 
Within Multi-level CFA, group influence is shown in the intra-class 
correlation (ICC) -- the proportion of the total variance in individuals’ 
responses attributable to their group membership. The ICC ranges from 0 
to 1. Thus, a higher ICC for self-definition (or self-investment) shows that 
individuals within a group are more similar in their degree of self-definition 
(or self-investment) than individuals in general (Bliese, 2000; Kenny & 
LaVoie, 1984). If the ICC were 0, individuals within the same group would 
be no more similar in their self-definition (or self-investment) than 
individuals in general regardless of group membership. If the ICC were 1, 
individuals in the same group would be complete replicates of one another 
in their degree of self-definition (or self-investment). Group influence on 
self-definition and self-investment can be examined more precisely with the 
two statistics used to calculate the ICC !!!!!!!!! : individual-level variance 𝜎!  and group-level variance 𝜏!!  (see Bliese, 2000).  





Figure 5.2a. Hypothesized two-dimensional measurement model of in-group 
identification. 



















































Figure 5.2b. Alternative two-dimensional measurement model of in-group identification. 
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We conducted our analyses in two steps. As a baseline, Step 1 
estimated a model that did not constrain individual- and group-level 
variances of self-definition and self-investment to be equal across the three 
studies. This model provides the same results as when we would have run 
the specified model in each study separately. In Step 2, we provide a formal 
test of the hypothesized differences across studies. We statistically assess 
whether individual-level variance of self-investment decreased, and group-
level variance of self-investment increased over studies (with increased 
interaction), while individual- and group-level variances of self-definition 
remained unchanged across studies. If a factor variance can be constrained 
to be equal across the three studies with no significant decrease in model fit, 
it shows that this constrained model is superior to the baseline model. As a 
model that constrains a factor variance to be equal across the three studies 
is more parsimonious, it should be preferred to the less parsimonious 
baseline model. In other words, an equally good fitting constrained model 





The base line model specified the two-dimensions of in-group 
identification at both the individual and the group level, in all three studies. 
This base-line model fitted the data well, χ2(30) = 46.673, p = .027, CFI = 
.982, RMSEA = .060 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Importantly, this model fitted 
the data better than a comparable model that specified only a single factor 




.001. Results are displayed in Table 5.1. Below we discuss the results of each 
study. 
 
Table 5.1. Grand means, and group influence statistics for in-group identification in 
Studies 1-3. 





Self-definition 5.1 4.75a 1.02 .182* .726 (.123)***  .162 (.096)*  
5.2 3.82b 0.97 .134† .716 (.115)***  .111 (.084)†  
5.3 4.18b 1.16 .172* .954 (.151)***  .198 (.115)*  
Self-investment 5.1 4.43a 1.02 .023 .895 (.141)***  .021 (.068) 
5.2 4.38a 0.88 .269** .490 (.082)***  .177 (.076)** 
5.3 4.93b 1.02 .404*** .552 (.087)***  .374 (.124)*** 
Note: Responses were given on a 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree) scale. The original 6-point 
scale used in Study 5.1 was transformed to be comparable to Studies 5.2 and 5.3. Means with 
different superscripts for each dimension are significantly different, p(2-sided) < .05. The standard 
errors for the variances are reported between brackets. A z-test was used to test whether variances 
were significantly higher than 0 (1-sided, as suggested by Snijders & Bosker, 1999, p. 90).  
†p < .100. *p < .050. **p < .010. ***p < .001. 
 
Study 5.1 
 In Study 5.1 there was only minimal interaction. The ICCs in Table 
5.1 show that in this study, already 18% of the total variance in individuals’ 
self-definition was explained by their group membership, while only 2% of 
the variance in self-investment was explained by individuals’ group 
membership. Examination of the variances of each dimension of in-group 
identification, at each level, offers a more fine-grained analysis than the ICC 
of how much individuals and groups differ from each other (see Table 5.1).  
At the individual level, both self-definition and self-investment had 
statistically significant variances. Thus, individuals differed a good deal from 
each other in their degree of self-definition and self-investment. At the 
group level, there was only significant variance between groups in self-
definition, which indicates that groups differed in the extent to which group 
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members defined themselves in group terms. But, as expected, with only 
minimal interaction within the groups, groups do not significantly differ 
from each other in their degree of self-investment. Thus, simply by being a 
group, the group influenced the degree to which its members defined 
themselves in terms of the group. However, as expected, with the limited 
interaction in Study 5.1, self-investment was almost exclusively an 
individual-level phenomenon.  
 
Study 5.2 
Study 5.2 built on Study 5.1 by increasing the degree of interaction. 
In Study 5.2, the percentage of variance explained by the group was quite 
similar to Study 5.1 for self-definition, 13%. However, the ICC for the self-
investment factor was much greater than that for Study 5.1 as 18% of the 
variance in self-investment could be explained by group membership. Thus, 
with increased group interaction, the group influenced members’ self-
investment.  
As indicated by the significant individual-level variance of the two 
dimensions, individual differences in self-definition and self-investment 
remained. But as expected, the individual-level variance of self-investment 
was smaller than in Study 5.1. Despite a decent ICC and a relatively large 
number of groups, the group-level variance of the self-definition factor was 
only marginally significant in Study 5.2. Given that the variance here is very 
similar to that in Study 5.1, it seems likely that the small size of the three-
person groups in this study hampered statistical power at the group level 
(see Kenny et al., 1998). As a result, it is all the more impressive that the 
group-level variance of self-investment was statistically significant. Thus, 
groups differed from each other in their degree of self-investment in the 




in Study 5.2 appeared to be enough to enable the group to influence 
individuals’ degree of self-investment in their group. 
 
Study 5.3 
Study 5.3 allowed for twice as much interaction as Study 5.2. As 
expected, the ICC for self-definition was quite similar to that of Study 5.1 
and 5.2. Nineteen percent of the variance in individuals’ self-definition was 
explained by their group membership. However, with increased interaction, 
group influence on group-members’ self-investment was larger than in 
Study 5.1 and 5.2. The group individuals belonged to explained a notable 
40% of the variance in self-investment. This is quite high for groups of 
such small size (Bliese, 2000). Examination of the variance at each level 
shows that although individuals still differed in the extent of self-definition 
and self-investment, groups also differed in the extent of self-definition and 
self-investment. With twice the interaction of Study 5.2 in Study 5.3, group 
differences in self-investment were larger in Study 5.3 than in Study 5.2. 
Thus, results indicate that across the three studies, members’ self-
investment in their in-group increasingly became a group-level 
phenomenon. As the amount of group interaction increased, the group 
individuals belonged to explained a greater proportion of the total variance 
in self-investment. More precisely, with greater interaction the group-level 
variance of self-investment increased and the individual-level variance 
decreased. However, we have not yet offered a formal test of these 
hypothesized differences across studies.  
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The Effect of Increased Interaction Across Studies 
In a second statistical step, we formally assessed whether individual- 
and group-level variance in self-definition remained unchanged across 
studies (Figure 5.1a), while for self-investment individual-level variance 
decreased and group-level variance increased with greater interaction from 
Study 5.1 to Study 5.3 (Figure 5.1d).  
 
Figure 5.3a. Individual-level variance of self-definition and self-investment dimensions of 
in-group identification across studies. 
 
Constraining the individual-level variance of self-definition across 
the three studies did not significantly reduce model fit, Δχ2 (2) = 2.045, p 
= .360. Thus, as expected, group members’ self-definition did not change 
with increased group interaction over studies (see Figure 5.3a). However, 
constraining the individual-level variance of self-investment across studies 
significantly reduced model fit, Δχ2 (2) = 8.071, p = .018. Thus, group 
members’ self-investment became more similar with greater group 


























similar degrees of self-investment in the two studies with face-to-face 
interaction than in the study with minimal interaction on-line (see Figure 
5.3a).  
 
 Figure 5.3b. Group-level variance of self-definition and self-investment dimensions of 
in-group identification across studies. 
 
As hypothesized, constraining the variance of self-definition to be 
equal at the group level across all three studies did not worsen model fit, 
Δχ2 (2) = 0.402, p = .818. In other words, groups did not differ more from 
each other in their degree of self-definition with greater interaction (see 
Figure 5.3b). However, there was a significant decline in fit when 
constraining the group-level variance of self-investment to be equal across 
studies, Δχ2 (2) = 6.700, p = .035. As shown in Figure 5.3b, the group-level 
variance of self-investment increased from .021 in Study 5.1 to .177 in 
Study 5.2, to .374 in Study 5.3. As hypothesized, with greater group 
interaction, groups came to differ more from each other in their degree of 
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increased the group’s influence on the self-investment dimension of in-
group identification. In contrast, increased interaction did not increase the 




We aimed to demonstrate the value of a multi-level approach to in-
group identification by examining how group influences on in-group 
identification emerge in newly formed groups. We used the conceptual 
distinction between the self-definition and self-investment dimensions of 
in-group identification to hypothesize that merely being a group would 
influence members’ self-definition, while group influence on self-
investment would emerge out of interaction (or group-doing). Comparisons 
between data collected in three small-group studies, ranging in the amount 
of group interaction, supported our predictions. Specifically, the results 
showed that there was a consistent group influence on self-definition in all 
three studies, irrespective of the amount of interaction within each study. In 
contrast, group influence on self-investment increased (as predicted) with 
interaction increasing from very little (in Study 5.1) to quite extensive (in 
Study 5.3).  
We reasoned that from the moment a group is formed, the 
existence of the group as a collective entity provides a common reference 
point for members’ self-definition. Thus, no actual interaction within a 
group is necessary for the in-group to influence individuals’ perceived 
similarity to other members (individual self-stereotyping) and perceived 
homogeneity of the group as a whole (i.e., in-group homogeneity). In fact, 
the group affected members’ self-definition even when members did not 




messages with one’s fellow group members was enough for member’s self-
definition to be affected by their group membership. This is consistent with 
the Social Identity model of Deindividuation (e.g., Lea & Spears, 1991, 
Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995; Postmes et al., 1998), which argues that 
the in-group has a strong influence on how members define themselves in 
online settings. 
We reasoned that self-investment in the group is qualitatively 
different from self-definition by the group. For the group to influence 
solidarity and satisfaction with the group, members must have some shared 
experience of what it is like in the group. This is why we believe the group 
explained no variance in self-investment in Study 5.1, which had only 
minimal, on-line interaction. Through group interaction shared experiences 
emerge that should provide a common basis for group members’ self-
investment. Indeed in Study 5.2, after 10 minutes of face-to-face 
interaction, the group explained a moderate amount of variance. This was 
doubled in Study 5.3, in which there was twice as much interaction as in 
Study 5.2. Thus, self-investment became increasingly a group-level 
phenomenon as interaction in the group increased. Our results suggest that 
this occurs in two ways. As each group develops its own shared experiences 
through interaction (1) groups increasingly differ in the extent to which they 
invite members to self-invest in the group, and (2) within a group 
individuals’ self-investment become increasingly similar. For example, some 
cities provide much more opportunity for interaction between individuals 
than other cities, perhaps because they offer good public transport. In cities 
with greater interaction, the quality of those interactions should be a bigger 
group-level influence on residents’ level of self-investment in the city. In 
cities with much less interaction between individuals, there should be much 
less of a city-level influence on resident’s self-investment in the city. Indeed, 
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self-investment should be more of an individual-level phenomenon in cities 
with little group interaction. 
The results corroborate and extend the two-dimensional model of 
in-group identification by Leach et al. (2008) by showing that the two-
dimensional model is also applicable to newly formed small groups, at both 
the individual and the group level of analysis. Thus, at the individual level, 
identification with small groups seems to be two-dimensional, like 
identification with large social categories such as sex, ethnicity, nationality, 
or university. This suggests that the psychological side of groups may be 
similar despite notable differences in size and other features (see Jans, 
Postmes, & Van der Zee, 2011; Postmes, Baray, Haslam, Morton, & Swaab, 
2006; Turner et al., 1987). Moreover, the differential influence of the group 
on individuals’ self-definition and self-investment provides novel evidence 




Categorical vs. Dynamic Groups. The distinction between self-
definition and self-investment echoes the distinction between groups as 
categories (defined on the basis of similarity or common identity), and 
groups as dynamic (defined on the basis of interaction or common bonds 
(Deaux & Martin, 2003, Prentice et al., 1994; Wilder & Simon, 1998). 
However, group identification does not seem to be either categorical or 
dynamic in nature: individuals can identify with groups through self-
definition and self-investment, simultaneously. In fact, in many groups both 
categorical and dynamic processes play a role (Postmes et al., 2005a; 
Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005b). This more flexible view of the 




that the more categorical property of self-definition is present at the group-
level from the moment a group is formed, while the more dynamic group-
level property of self-investment depends on actual group interaction. 
 
The Importance of Multi-level Approaches. Individuals’ in-
group identification seems to be influenced by the particular group as well 
as by the particular individual. Inattention to group-level effects is likely to 
lead to an overestimation of individual-level effects (for discussions, see 
Bliese, 2000; Kenny et al., 1998). This may inadvertently reinforce the view 
that in-group identification is solely an individual difference characteristic. 
On the other hand, focusing only on measurement at the group level 
ignores the potentially important variance across individuals that may 
explain their experience and behaviour. Thus, whenever social 
psychological phenomena may operate at multiple levels of analysis it is 
important to examine these phenomena with a multi-level approach.  
In addition, when in-group identification is considered as a 
predictor of group- and individual-level outcomes, identification at the 
group level should be examined. For instance, the question of which groups 
are most likely to engage in collective action is one that may be best 
answered with attention to between-group differences in in-group 
identification. Although strong in-group identification at the individual level 
increases individual’s willingness for collective action (for a review, see Van 
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), strong in-group identification at the 
group level might help to turn this willingness into specific action. Being in 
a group that is highly identified may provide the sort of social support 
required of complicated or dangerous collective action. Distinguishing 
individual-level variance from group-level variance as we have done here 
allows for a more precise examination of the group-level processes at work.  
GROUP-BEING, GROUP-DOING, AND SOCIAL IDENTITY FORMATION 
 153 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Multi-level analyses of individuals in groups are difficult for a number 
of practical reasons (e.g. finding enough participants). In addition, for a 
number of statistical reasons, it is difficult to find a multiple factor structure 
at the group level and to observe group-level properties in groups of three 
to five members (see Kenny et al., 1998). In general, multi-level analyses of 
the sort we performed here tend to be low in statistical power (Kenny et al., 
1998). It seems important to also explore the group-level properties of in-
group identification with a large number of large-scale groups typically 
examined in social psychological studies of in-group identification (e.g., 
ethnicity, nationality, university). For example, this may help us examine 
whether previous found effects of group status on identification, are also 
reflected in equivalent degrees of identification with a wide variety of 
groups with similar status. 
It may be important to note that our examination of experimentally 
created groups may not parallel exactly the emergence of group-level 
properties of identification with pre-existing social categories, such as 
nationality. In these large groups, it is impossible to interact directly with all 
members of the group. Thus, direct interaction cannot be the only means 
through which members achieve shared group experiences. It is likely that 
modes of indirect or symbolic interaction have a stronger influence on the 
emergence of group-level self-investment in large social categories. For 
example, entrepreneurs of identity, the media, history, and inter-group 
events (such as important sport matches or war) can provide a shared 
experience for group members of what the group is like (see also Postmes 
et al., 2006). Furthermore, since larger groups can often be subdivided into 
smaller subgroups, interaction within these subgroups might be high, while 




of self-investment are similar within subgroups, but differ between 
subgroups. 
 Although group identification is often treated as a characteristic that 
varies across individuals, this does not mean that it is a strictly individual-
level phenomenon. Groups can influence members’ degree of self-
definition by the group and self-investment in the group. Where in-group 
identification is investigated as having both individual- and group-level 
properties, differences between groups and similarities within groups can 
both be examined simultaneously. Both of these group-level effects have 
seldom been studied by social psychologists. However, a multi-level 
approach enables better examination of the uniquely social psychological 
interplay of the individual and the group as distinct and yet inter-linked 
phenomena.  















In this dissertation we asked the question whether individuality and social 
solidarity can be reconciled. Lay theorists and social scientists alike assume 
that the two are somehow opposites of each other (e.g., Putnam, 2000). 
Increasing individualisation is assumed to obstruct social solidarity, diversity 
in groups is assumed to hamper group unity and cohesion, and feeling 
different from others is assumed to imply feeling excluded. However, we 
argued and showed that such reconciliation is possible and that individuality 
and solidarity can be mutually reinforcing. 
In answering our overarching question, we took the interactive 
model of identity formation (IMIF, Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005a) as 
our point of departure. This model suggests that who “we” are might not 
only be determined by what makes “us” different from “them” (deductive 
processes of social identity formation) but also by the contributions of 
distinctive individuals within the group (inductive processes of social 
identity formation). These inductive processes through which individuals 
can contribute to a social identity could hypothetically bring individuality 
and group membership together.  
In order to examine this idea, we focused on several areas where 
deductive and inductive processes were hypothesized to have distinct 
effects. First, whereas deductive processes suggest that perceiving oneself as 
similar to other group members can be an underlying mechanism for social 
identity formation, inductive processes suggest that perceiving oneself as 
individually distinct might be an underlying mechanism for social identity 
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formation (Chapter 2). Second, whereas heterogeneity of group members 
should hamper the formation of a shared identity when deductive processes 
are at work, perceived heterogeneity should enrich the formation of a 
shared identity when inductive processes are at work (Chapter 3). Third, 
whereas deductive processes of social identity formation suggest that once 
social identity is formed, group members will “depersonalize” in terms of 
shared group characteristics and behave in line with group norms, social 
identities that are inductively formed might leave more room for expressing 
individuality in ways that could be considered “deviant” to group norms 
(Chapter 4). Finally, whereas deductive processes of social identity 
formation suggest that intragroup dynamics are unnecessary for shared 
social identity formation to take place, inductive processes suggest a more 
important role for intragroup dynamics in the formation of shared social 
identity (Chapter 5). 
 
What Did We Find? 
 
Before discussing the theoretical and practical implications of this 




In Chapter 2, we showed that inductive processes of social identity 
can be observed in small interactive groups and large social categories alike, 
and that perceived individual distinctiveness is an underlying mechanism for 
inductive processes resulting in social identity. In particular, we tested the 
model that to the extent a group is perceived as inductively formed, 




perceived groupiness, and in turn will enhance identification. Three survey 
studies consistently supported the validity of our model over other 
theoretical models in various group contexts.  
In Study 2.1, we asked participants to think of small self-relevant 
groups (ranging from 4 to 15 members) they were a member of, such as 
their group of friends or their work group. We asked them to answer 
questions concerning perceived inductive social identity formation, 
individual distinctiveness, entitativity and identification. Study 2.2 tested the 
same model for a much broader set of groups. This time, we asked 
participants to think about specific “types” of groups from Lickel’s (e.g. 
Lickel et al., 2000) group taxonomy (i.e. intimacy groups, task groups, social 
categories, and loose associations) when answering the questions. Finally, in 
Study 2.3 we tested causality by using group size as an extraneous indicator 
of inductive social identity formation, as it should be easier to make an 
individual contribution to the group’s identity, the smaller the group is. As 
in Study 2.1, we asked participants to think of groups they were a member 
of but this time the group they had to think about was either of small (4-15 
members), medium (30-50 members) or large (over 200 members) size.  
Together the results of the three studies in Chapter 2 consistently 
supported our theoretical model. The perception that individual members 
could influence the group’s identity was related to individuals’ feeling more 
distinctive within the group. Moreover, this perceived individual 
distinctiveness was associated with greater entitativity of the group, which 
in turn was highly related to identification with the group. Furthermore, 
even though perceptions of inductive processes of social identity formation 
were weaker as group size increased (Study 2.3), to the extent that inductive 
processes were perceived to play a role, perceived individual distinctiveness 
was still associated with indicators of social identity formation (entitativity 
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and identification) in the predicted way. This suggests that, in contrast to 
what can be expected from deductive processes of social identity formation, 
individuality and group membership do not need to be antagonistic. 
Thus Chapter 2 provided first empirical support for the possibility 
that inductive processes of social identity formation can reconcile 
individuality with group solidarity. However, this survey research still 
focused on individual perceptions of the relation between individual 
distinctiveness and group membership and did not test whether 
individuality and group solidarity can be reconciled in interaction with other 
group members. In other words, the fact that perceptions of individuality 
and group unity might co-exist at the level of perceptions does not allow 
for any conclusions about the possibility for a set of distinctive individuals 
to form a group with a strong sense of unity and a shared social identity.  
 
Chapter 3 
 In Chapter 3, we showed that small lab-created groups can form a 
shared social identity through inductive processes, and that groups 
perceived to be heterogeneous can form a stronger shared identity through 
inductive processes, than through deductive processes.  
In Study 3.1, we manipulated the process of social identity 
formation (deductive vs. inductive) by varying the manner in which group 
members were asked to create team shirts. After that, we measured group 
members’ identification and perceived entitativity as indicators of social 
identity. This study provided support for the possibility of groups forming a 
shared social identity inductively. Inductive processes resulted in a stronger 
sense of social identity than deductive processes did. Although this study 
showed that shared identities can be formed out of distinct contributions by 




processes of social identity formation would be a good method to unite 
groups that are heterogeneous.  
Study 3.2 therefore tested the prediction that outcomes of perceived 
group diversity might depend on the process of social identity formation. 
To this end, in addition to manipulating the process of social identity 
formation, we manipulated perceived group diversity (homogenous vs. 
heterogeneous) by providing bogus feedback about the differences in 
personality within the group. Furthermore, we measured group cooperation 
as an additional indicator of shared identity. As expected, groups that were 
perceived to be homogeneous formed a stronger shared identity deductively 
than inductively. However, in line with predictions derived from the IMIF, 
groups that were heterogeneous were shown able to form a stronger social 
identity inductively than deductively, as evidenced by higher identification 
and more group cooperation. This suggests that individual differences can 
be combined with a high degree of in-group solidarity, when social identity 
is inductively formed. Chapter 3 thus demonstrated the possibility of 
forming social identities from the bottom-up, and the positive 
consequences this can have in groups perceived to be heterogeneous. 
Individuality and group membership can be reconciled by inductively 
forming a shared social identity that did not exist before. However, these 
studies did not explore the extent to which individuality might also be an 
outcome of inductive social identity formation, or in other words, the 






In Chapter 4, we showed that within groups perceived to be 
heterogeneous, inductive social identity formation can foster the expression 
of idiosyncratic arguments that are inconsistent with group norms. In two 
studies with bogus groups, social identity formation and diversity were 
manipulated in a similar vein as in Study 3.2. However, rather than actually 
being in a “real” group, participants were made to believe they were 
interacting in a real group with real group members. After manipulating 
social identity formation and diversity, we established a clear group norm 
regarding a particular attitude topic. Then, participants were asked to 
generate arguments, which could either be consistent or inconsistent with 
the pre-established group norm. The two studies differed in the attitude 
topic that participants generated arguments about. 
In Study 4.1, German participants were asked to generate pro- and 
contra-arguments toward a university proposal for mandatory Dutch 
courses for all foreign students. Before argument generation participants 
were made to believe that German students in general and their 
experimental group in particular, held a clear norm that this proposal was a 
good idea. In Study 4.2, Dutch participants were asked to generate pro- and 
contra-arguments toward a new governmental law stating that students who 
did not finish their university study within 6 years would be fined, 
irrespective of personal circumstances. Before argument generation 
participants were made to believe that Dutch students in general and their 
experimental group in particular, held a clear norm that this law was bad.  
Results of the two studies together showed that participants within 
groups perceived to be heterogeneous formed on average a stronger social 
identity inductively, than deductively. Furthermore, they also generated 




rather than deductively. Individuality and social identity thus became 
mutually reinforcing. Interestingly, we found an opposite effect over studies 
within groups perceived to be homogeneous: Participants on average 
expressed more norm-inconsistent arguments when social identity was 
deductively formed than when social identity was inductively formed. It 
thus seems that within Chapter 4, group members were expressing more 
norm-inconsistent arguments in those instances in which social identity was 
strongest. 
Together, Chapters 2 to 4 were all consistent with the idea that 
inductive processes can lead to social identity formation. But although the 
measures and manipulations of induction used were all geared towards the 
idea that the process of induction relies on social interactions within the 
group, they do not yet provide insight in the extent to which individual 
group members’ involvement in the dynamics of intragroup interaction is 
also necessary for shared psychological group formation, nor does it 
differentiate among different aspects of social identity. 
 
Chapter 5 
In Chapter 5, we took another approach to studying social identity 
formation, by exploring the extent to which intragroup interaction (group-
doing) is necessary for the emergence of shared social identity. In this 
research, we distinguished between a self-definition dimension of 
identification that refers to the extent to which individuals perceive 
themselves and other in-group members as a category, and a self-
investment dimension of identification that refers to individuals’ 
psychological investment in and solidarity with the in-group (see Leach et 
al., 2008). We compared three studies of zero-history small groups with 
varying extents of intragroup interaction. In a Multi-level Confirmatory 
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Factor Analysis, we could examine the extent to which shared identification 
emerged on these two dimensions. Due to the multi-level approach, we 
could differentiate between identification effects at the individual level and 
at the group level. 
As expected, mere categorization as a group was enough for the 
group to influence members’ self-definition. In contrast, intragroup 
interaction was necessary for the development of group-level self-
investment. This suggests that although intragroup interaction might not be 
necessary for shared perceptions of categorizations, it seems key for the 
emergence of shared solidarity with the group. 
 
What Have We Learned? 
 
In the introduction, we indicated some key issues and questions in 
the IMIF that we aimed to resolve in this dissertation. First, we tested 
whether inductive processes of social identity formation can reconcile 
individuality with social identity. Second, we improved the manipulation of 
social identity formation. Third, we explored whether inductive processes 
of social identity formation can be generalizable to a variety of groups. Last, 
we examined whether inductive social identity formation can have different 
consequences than deductive social identity formation.  
In the remainder of this discussion, we will consider how our 
research speaks to these issues, and what the implications of our research 
are for the IMIF and other theoretical approaches. Furthermore, we will 
raise new questions that can serve as input for future research, and we will 





Can Inductive Social Identity Formation Reconcile 
Individuality and Social Identity?  
 As mentioned above, the results of Chapter 2 and 3 (and 4) 
supported the idea that inductive social identity formation can reconcile 
individuality and social identity. While the individuality and group 
membership are assumed to be opposites when social identity is deductively 
formed, we showed that they can come into agreement through inductive 
social identity formation.  
 
 Elaboration on the traditional social identity perspective. The 
traditional social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1985) 
does not seem to provide a full explanation of the relation between the 
individual and the group. The individual and the group are not necessarily 
antagonistic but can also be salient at the same time. Through inductive 
social identity formation, a (shared) social identity can be formed despite 
within-group differences (Chapter 3 and 4) and despite individual 
distinctiveness (Chapter 2). This suggests that there is more to social 
identity formation than outlined in self-categorization theory by the 
principle of meta-contrast (Turner, 1985; Turner & Oakes, 1986). Social 
identity formation is not necessarily fostered to the extent that the within-
group differences are smaller than the between-group differences: When 
social identity is formed through inductive processes, within-group 
differences do not obstruct, and sometimes even foster, social identity 
formation. Our findings also contradict optimal distinctiveness theory’s 
assumption (Brewer, 1991) that the need for distinctiveness and the need 
for belongingness are always in conflict. Given that individual 
distinctiveness and group membership go together through inductive social 
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identity formation, individuals should be able to maximally satisfy both 
needs at the same time.  
 
Reconciling diversity in organizations. The finding that within-
group differences can be reconciled through inductive social identity 
formation may provide opportunities for reconciling diversity within 
organizations and organizational teams. Within organizational psychology, 
problems of diversity have predominantly been explained from a social 
categorization perspective; within diverse organizations clear ingroup-
outgroup distinctions may arise (such as black women vs. white men) which 
hamper the solidarity with the team or organization as a whole (Williams & 
O’Reilly, 1998). Translated to the IMIF, it thus seems that problems of 
diversity have been explained reasoning from deductive social identity 
formation. In line with this perspective, organizational psychologists seem 
to have predominantly focused on top-down solutions for overcoming 
problems of diversity. That is, it has been argued that organizations can 
manage diversity by incorporating a particular diversity perspective, ranging 
from eliminating or ignoring diversity to valuing diversity (Van der Zee & 
Otten, 2013). However, in contrast to these top-down (deductive) solutions, 
our research suggests that problems of diversity might also be overcome 
through inductive social identity formation. Rather than the organizational 
management superimposing a norm that diversity needs to be valued (e.g. 
Homan, Van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2007; Luijters, Van der 
Zee, & Otten, 2008), through inductive social identity formation, 
individuals may create a shared identity that is organic and open to diversity 
(cf. Haslam, Eggins, & Reynolds, 2003). This bottom-up solution to 
problems of diversity might even provide a better solution than the top-




does not value a particular difference over other differences (such as the 
case in affirmative action procedures for minorities) but allows for 
individuals to contribute the distinctiveness that they themselves consider 
important. Future research could begin to explore whether these inductive 
solutions to overcoming diversity have advantages over top-down solutions. 
  In addition to overcoming the problems of diversity, inductive 
processes of social identity formation may allow groups to grasp the 
benefits of diversity. Heterogeneous groups have the potential to 
outperform homogenous groups (i.e. in creativity, innovation, and decision 
making) as they may possess a broader range of task-relevant knowledge, 
skills, abilities, opinions and perspectives (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). 
However, whether heterogonous groups fulfil this potential depends on the 
extent to which group members elaborate on their differences (Van 
Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004). In other words, group members 
need to share their unique knowledge and perspectives within the group, 
and integrate them into a group product (Van Knippenberg, & Van Ginkel, 
2010). As inductive social identity formation allows group members to 
create a shared identity without sacrificing their diversity, it may create 
possibilities for heterogeneous groups to benefit from their diversity and 
become more creative (see also consequences of inductive social identity 
formation). 
 
Boundaries to reconciliation. Although our research shows that 
perceived differences between individuals do not need to obstruct the 
formation of shared social identity, there might be boundary conditions to 
the differences that inductive social identity formation can reconcile. We 
believe that inductive processes might not result in a shared identity when 
differences between individuals are so fundamental that individuals are 
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unwilling to take joint action or interact (cf. Chapter 5). Individuals from 
groups that are in intractable conflict, such as Israelis and Palestinians, 
might for this reason be unable to form a shared identity through inductive 
processes. In addition, we expect that inductive processes might not result 
in shared identity if the topic of interaction concerns a fundamental 
difference between group members. For example, pro-abortion and anti-
abortion supporters might be quite able to inductively form a shared 
identity around an environmental issue, but not around an abortion issue. 
Future research could begin to explore these boundary conditions to 
inductive social identity formation as a method for reconciling groups.  
 
What is Inductive Social Identity Formation and How Does It 
Work? 
A second aim of this dissertation was to better operationalize 
inductive social identity formation in order to learn more about its 
characteristics. We operationalized the process of inductive social identity 
formation quite carefully so that it could more clearly be separated from 
other related theoretical constructs. In the introduction we criticized 
previously used manipulations of inductive social identity formation 
because they did not really capture the process of induction. Rather they 
highlighted “common bonds” (Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005b; 
Swaab, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), making it hard to disentangle inductive 
social identity formation from relational identity salience. Or they 
highlighted a focus on individuality or a focus on within-group diversity 
(Brooke, Postmes, Jetten, & Dyson, 2009), making it hard to disentangle it 





The manipulations of induction in Chapter 3 and 4 addressed these 
issues by manipulating the extent to which group members could make an 
individual contribution to the representation of the group as a whole, 
without referring to interpersonal relations. These manipulations fitted 
better with the operationalization of inductive social identity formation as 
an active process through which individual group members contribute to 
the formation of a shared social identity (relying not just on their own pre-
existing ideas of the group but also on the input they and other group 
members have in the process). We showed that these manipulations allowed 
for an integration of individual differences in a group, without focusing on 
interpersonal relations.  
 
Difference between induction and relational identity salience. 
In comparison to previously used manipulations of inductive social identity 
formation, our manipulations manipulated more than just relational identity 
salience (cognitively defining the self in terms of the interpersonal relations 
with others; Brewer & Gardner, 1996). We took into account that inductive 
social identity formation requires input from others: group members need 
to do things together (what we call group-doing in Chapter 5). 
Furthermore, we highlighted that inductively formed social identity 
concerns the individual’s relation to the group as a whole (social identity), 
and not the individual’s relation to close others (relational identity). This 
was also reflected in our manipulations having an effect on our indicators 
of shared social identity formation (i.e. group identification, entitativity and 
cooperation). Still, theoretically it may be possible that inductive processes 
stimulate the emergence of relational identity in addition to social identity as 
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they may make the relations between individuals salient as well (although 
this would be very unlikely according to Brewer & Chen, 200725).  
 
Difference between induction and group self-verification. 
Furthermore, we argued and showed that inductive social identity 
formation is different from self-verification (Swann, 1983, 1996), a 
construct that has been linked to identity theory (see Stets & Burke, 2000). 
According to self-verification theorists (Swann, 1983, 1996; see also Mead 
1934), people actively strive to ensure that their experiences in groups 
confirm their self-views. Self-verification by the group has been shown to 
be related to group identification (e.g., Swann, Milton, & Polzer, 2000) and 
has been proposed to help groups find value in diversity (Swann, Polzer, 
Seyle, & Ko, 2004). Although self-verification may have similar 
consequences to inductive social identity formation, the process of 
inductive social identity formation is theoretically distinct from self-
verification. Self-verification is something that groups do for individuals, 
and which in turn may result in increased identification with that group. In 
contrast, inductive social identity formation concerns the influence and 
contribution of individuals to the group. The results of our pilot study in 
Chapter 2 supported the distinctiveness of inductive social identity 
formation from self-verification. However, it could be that self-verification 
is a consequence of inductive social identity formation, as individuation 
fosters self-verification (Swann, Kwann, Polzer, & Milton, 2003). 
                                                
25 Brewer and Chen (2007) argue “… that relational and group collectivism may be more 
incompatible overall than are aspects of individualism with aspects of either form of 
collectivism…, connectedness to others based on strong interpersonal ties and networks 
may inherently conflict with a depersonalized representation of social groups and 




Inductive social identity formation, thus, concerns the process 
through which individual group members actively contribute to the 
formation of a shared social identity, and is different from relational identity 
salience and self-verification. The next aim we had for this dissertation was 
to explore whether inductive processes can be observed beyond small 
interactive groups. 
 
How Generalizable are Inductive Processes of Social Identity 
Formation? 
Originally the IMIF was proposed as a model for small interactive 
groups. However, we suggested that to the extent that the model could 
apply to all sorts of groups (ranging from small dynamic groups to large 
social categories), inductive processes might create opportunities for 
reconciling today’s increasing individualization with social solidarity.  
Chapter 2 provided support for the applicability of inductive 
processes of social identity formation beyond the groups that have hitherto 
been considered. Results confirmed that inductive processes of social 
identity formation were perceived to be operating across the board in 
intimacy groups, task groups, social categories, and loose associations. This 
suggests that the IMIF might be useful for understanding the relationship 
between individuality and group membership in all groups.  
Having said this, we should also acknowledge that our research 
showed that inductive processes of social identity formation are perceived 
to be weaker the larger the group is. It seems that in these larger social 
categories, individuals’ interactions influence the group’s identity more 
indirectly, by influencing their subgroup’s identity, which in turn influences 
the overarching identity. This stepwise process in which individuals first 
influence their subgroup identity, and then the overarching identity has 
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been described by the ASPIRe model as the path to creating more organic 
organizational identities (Haslam et al., 2003; Peters, Haslam, Ryan, & 
Fonseca, 2013). Thus, although not always directly, it might be inductive 
processes through which even the shared identity of large pre-existing social 
categories can be changed.  
 
Categorical and dynamic groups. Our research suggests that 
social identity formation in all sorts of groups might best be understood by 
considering both categorical and dynamic processes (see also Postmes, 
Baray, Haslam, Morton, & Swaab, 2006). We found that small groups can 
form a shared social identity through a deductive process (Chapter 3 & 4; 
see also Postmes et al., 2005a/b). This finding goes against the suggestion 
that categorical (or deductive) processes described within the traditional 
social identity approach are less applicable to small interactive groups (cf. 
Prentice, Miller, & Lightdale, 1994). Furthermore, we found that inductive 
social identity formation can also play a role in large social categories 
(Chapter 2). This finding goes against the suggestion that the dynamics 
between individuals are irrelevant or unnecessary for understanding 
processes in large social categories or minimal groups (Turner, 1982, 1984). 
Thus, while the IMIF was meant as a theoretical model for understanding 
social influence in small interactive groups, our research shows a broader 
applicability. Rather than requiring different psychological theories for 
different types of groups (as for example implied by Prentice et al, 1994), 
our “broader” IMIF may be used as a single theoretical model for 





Categorical and dynamic processes across cultures. The 
distinction between groups in which categorical processes play a stronger 
role and groups in which dynamic processes play a stronger role could also 
be relevant to issues in the cross-cultural literature. On the one hand, cross-
cultural researchers (e.g. Triandis, 1989; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, 
& Lucca, 1988) have suggested that individuals within collectivistic cultures 
are more likely to define themselves in group terms and behave in line with 
group norms than individuals in individualistic cultures. At the same time, 
cultural researchers have criticized the traditional social identity approach 
(e.g. Yuki, 2003) for being too Western in its assumption that there would 
be strong contextual variability in the self-concept, and not really “fitting” 
with the permanence of the relational structures found in collectivistic 
cultures. The idea here is that in collectivistic cultures, individuals and 
groups are framed more in terms of networks of relations rather than in 
terms of independent individuals belonging to one or multiple social 
categories (as in individualistic cultures; see Brewer & Chen, 2007). 
However, the IMIF considers the relation of dynamic processes within 
groups to the categorical processes of shared social identity perception. So, 
just as it appears relevant to consider both categorical and dynamic 
processes in western contexts it might also be relevant to consider both in 
highly interdependent or collectivistic cultures. This underscores that the 
strict division between a “Western” individualistic or independent and 
“non-Western” collectivistic or interdependent social structure may be too 
black and white. Indeed, certain collectives appear to operate as much (if 
not more so) on a relational, interdependent basis in the West as in the East 
(e.g., Matsumoto, Weissman, Preston, Brown, & Kupperbusch, 1997). 
Future research could begin to explore whether it might be useful to also 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 173 
separate categorical processes from dynamic processes in collectivistic 
cultures (cf. Brewer & Chen, 2007).  
 
What are the Consequences of Inductive Social Identity 
Formation? 
Although our research supports the IMIF prediction that deductive 
and inductive processes of social identity formation can be differentiated, 
and confirms that both can lead to approximately equal levels of solidarity, 
entitativity and cooperation, we also found some evidence that some 
consequences of inductive and deductive social identity formation may be 
quite different. In particular we examined in Chapter 4, whether inductively 
formed social identities might leave more room for the expression of 
individuality than deductively formed social identities do.  
The results in Chapter 4 on average provided support for our 
hypothesis: Individuals within groups perceived to be heterogeneous 
formed a stronger social identity inductively than deductively, and hence 
expressed themselves in more idiosyncratic ways by going against pre-
established group norms. However, we should note that the effects were 
less clear than expected. First, the effect was weaker and non-significant in 
the second study. It could be that due to the clear presence of an outgroup 
in this study, group members needed to balance their allegiance to the 
ingroup with their expression of pro-outgroup arguments. Second, within 
groups perceived to be homogenous, we found the opposite effect; groups 
formed a stronger social identity deductively than inductively, and also 
expressed themselves in more idiosyncratic ways when social identity was 
deductively formed. Thus on average, group members were expressing 
more norm-inconsistent arguments in those instances in which social 




Elaboration on the traditional social identity perspective. Our 
findings qualify the traditional social identity perspective on the relation 
between social identity and individual behaviour. According to self-
categorization theory, individuals align their behaviour with group norms as 
a consequence of social identity formation (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, 
& Wetherell, 1987; Hogg & Turner, 1987). However, we found that social 
identity may be more positively related to norm-deviance than has hitherto 
been assumed (see also Hornsey, 2006; Packer, 2008). We suggested that 
individuals within groups perceived to be heterogeneous form a stronger 
social identity inductively out of individual contributions, and may therefore 
interpret those norms as organically emergent and therefore less 
prescriptive and fixed, allowing them to express norm-inconsistent 
arguments. It might be that deductively formed social identity may result in 
norm-deviance for different reasons. That is, within homogeneous groups 
with a strong deductive social identity, high identifiers and prototypical 
group members may experience enough psychological safety to express 
norm-inconsistent arguments (Edmondson, 1999; Paulus & Dzindolet, 
2008) and/or may make strategic choices to do so (Packer 2011; Morton et 
al., 2007). Future research could begin to explore whether the reasons why 
group members go against group norms are dependent on the process of 
social identity formation, as the expression of idiosyncratic and norm-
inconsistent arguments can make groups more creative (cf. De Dreu & 
West, 2001; Swann et al., 2000). 
 
Openness of the social identity. Although, for now, we cannot 
draw firm conclusions about the extent to which deductively and 
inductively formed social identities may have different outcomes, 
theoretically we assume that groups that have inductively formed a social 
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identity might be more “open” than groups that have deductively formed a 
social identity.  
In particular, inductively formed groups might be more open to 
outgroups. According to SIT, individuals need to achieve positive ingroup 
distinctiveness to gain a positive social identity, and this might in some cases 
result in ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation (Tajfel, 1978a). In 
addition, according to optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991), 
individuals will identify with highly distinctive groups to achieve optimal 
distinctiveness. However, as inductive social identity formation does not 
require an outgroup and allows for a satisfaction of the need for 
distinctiveness within the group, the distinctiveness from other groups 
might be less relevant and so might be ingroup favouritism and outgroup 
derogation. Future research could begin to explore the possibilities of 
inductive social identity formation for intergroup relations. 
Furthermore, groups that have inductively formed a social identity 
might be more open to new members and their “fresh” input, as differences 
are integrated in the group’s identity through inductive processes. However, 
the opposite hypothesis could also be argued. When a social identity is 
deductively formed, new members only need to be similar or assimilate to 
the group in order to be accepted. In contrast, new members to an 
inductively formed group might have a hard time fitting in, as they 
themselves did not contribute to the group’s identity.  
 
Stability and flexibility of the social identity. These possible, 
alternative hypotheses highlight a new question in the IMIF: How stable or 
open to change are social identities formed through inductive processes? 
Group-doing seems important for inductive social identity formation (see 




acting together vanishes. At the same time, the group’s identity may be 
open to continuous change as long as (new) group members continue to do 
things together and contribute to the group’s identity. Future, research 
could begin to explore the stability and flexibility of inductively formed 
social identities. 
 
Is it still social identity? Given these potential different outcomes 
of deductive and inductive social identity formation, one can wonder 
whether the social solidarity that emerges through inductive processes can 
still be considered a social identity. Tajfel (1978a) defined social identity as 
“that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge 
of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to that membership”. This 
operationalization seems to fit with what was formed through inductive 
social identity formation (i.e. identification, entitativity, and group-
cooperation). Still, what social identity entails might be slightly different for 
deductive and inductive social identity formation.  
First, the cognitive perception of the social identity may be 
different. Whereas deductive social identity formation may result in a 
perception of the group as a distinctive social category, inductive social 
identity formation may result in a perception of the group as a dynamic 
entity (cf. Wilder & Simon, 2008) or social network (cf. Igarashi & 
Kashima, 2011). Second, the “group” that inductively forms a social identity 
may be different. Whereas deductive social identity formation requires clear 
group boundaries, inductive social identity formation may just as well occur 
in a social network composed of a set of individuals and relationships 
connecting them.  
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But even though the group itself may be perceived differently, and 
may have different physical qualities, to the extent that a social identity is 
formed, the group becomes part of one’s self-concept. Thus, our group 
memberships play an important role in who we are and what we do, 
regardless of how social identity is formed. 
 
General Implications and Conclusions 
 
We believe that adopting our new (more organic) perspective on 
how individuals co-operate to dynamically construct a sense social identity 
does justice to the complex interplay between the individual and the group 
in modern Western society. 
In today’s society, many fear that increased individualization will 
erode social solidarity. That is, the achievement of individual freedom and 
autonomy is feared to come with increased selfishness and unwillingness to 
take the interest of the collective at heart. Still human beings are often 
described as inherently social beings, and research suggests that societal 
solidarity may not be eroding at all (De Beer & Koster, 2009; Savelkoul, 
Gesthuizen, & Scheepers, 2011).  
This dissertation suggests that a more nuanced understanding of the 
relation between individualization and social solidarity is at place. On the 
one hand, solidarity within some groups or communities (such as churches 
and the army) that clearly prescribe how individuals should be, may erode. 
The top-down creation of social solidarity by focusing on commonalities is 
unlikely to bring distinctive individuals together. On the other hand, 
individuals may use their individual freedom to actively create new 
communities together, such as setting up a communal garden or a dinner 




can become mutually interdependent. This form of social solidarity may be 
fostered by increased individualization.  
Thus by building solidarity from the bottom-up, the queen’s 
Christmas wish may be fulfilled: Social solidarity that allows for the full 
expansion of the individual and society not falling apart. 
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De samenleving is de afgelopen decennia steeds individualistischer 
geworden (zie SCR, 1998, voor de statistieken in Nederland). Veel mensen 
zijn bang dat deze winst aan individuele vrijheid ten koste gaat van sociale 
cohesie en solidariteit. De algemene aanname is dat het individu en het 
collectief elkaars tegenovergestelden zijn. Een samenleving is ofwel 
individualistisch en verdeeld of collectivistisch en saamhorig. Een groep is 
ofwel heterogeen en conflictueus of homogeen en verbonden. Een individu is 
ofwel afwijkend en alleen of gelijk en verbonden. Met andere woorden, de 
gedachte is dat de distinctiviteit van het individu de eenheid en cohesie van 
het collectief ondermijnt. En andersom, dat een sterk collectief de 
distinctiviteit van het individu bedreigt. Maar is deze aanname juist? De 
vraag die centraal staat in dit proefschrift is of het mogelijk is om groepen 
te vormen waarbinnen individualiteit en saamhorigheid samengaan. 
De aanname dat het individu en de groep tegenover elkaar staan, 
vinden we ook terug in de sociale wetenschappen (zie Tilly, 1973, voor een 
overzicht). Binnen de sociale psychologie is dit idee onder meer te vinden in 
de sociale identiteitsbenadering (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Deze benadering gaat ervan uit dat 
individuen een deel van hun identiteit (hun sociale identiteit) ontlenen aan 
hun groepslidmaatschap. Zij stelt dat mensen een gedeelde sociale identiteit 
vormen op basis van wat zij gemeenschappelijk hebben en wat hen anders 
maakt dan andere groepen (bijvoorbeeld ‘wij’ Groningers vs. ‘zij’ Friezen). 
Dit proces van sociale identiteitsvorming wordt ook wel deductieve 
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(categorische) sociale identiteitsvorming genoemd en laat weinig ruimte 
voor individualiteit. Ten eerste is het lastiger een gedeelde identiteit te 
vormen op basis van gelijkheid, als groepsleden meer van elkaar verschillen. 
Ten tweede gaat de sociale identiteitsbenadering ervan uit dat individuen 
hun gedrag in overeenstemming brengen met de normen van de groep en 
individuele verschillen naar de achtergrond drukken op het moment dat zij 
zich definiëren in termen van een gedeelde identiteit. 
Dit proefschrift toetst de veronderstelling dat sociale 
identiteitsvorming ook anders kan, daarbij voortbouwend op het 
interactieve model van identiteitsvorming in kleine groepen (Postmes, 
Haslam, & Swaab, 2005a). Dit model suggereert dat wie ‘wij’ zijn niet enkel 
bepaald wordt door wat ‘ons’ anders maakt van ‘hen’, maar ook door de 
verschillende identiteiten van individuen binnen onze groep. Individuen in 
interactie dragen bij aan de vorming van een gedeelde sociale identiteit. Dit 
proces van sociale identiteitsvorming wordt inductieve (dynamische) sociale 
identiteitsvorming genoemd. In dit proefschrift hebben we onderzocht in 
hoeverre inductieve sociale identiteitsvorming mogelijk is in verschillende 
groepen en of via deze weg individu en groep elkaar wederzijds kunnen 
versterken.  
Om ons idee te toetsen hebben wij ons in de verschillende 
hoofdstukken gericht op enkele aspecten van sociale identiteitsvorming 
waarbij wij verschillende uitkomsten verwachten bij deductieve en 
inductieve processen. Hoewel we vanuit deductieve processen kunnen 
verwachten dat percepties van gelijkheid ten grondslag liggen aan sociale 
identiteitsvorming, liggen percepties van individuele distinctiviteit mogelijk 
ten grondslag aan sociale identiteitsvorming via inductieve processen 
(Hoofdstuk 2). Hoewel we vanuit deductieve processen kunnen verwachten 




kunnen heterogene groepen mogelijk een gedeelde sociale identiteit vormen 
via inductieve processen (Hoofdstuk 3). Hoewel we kunnen verwachten dat 
een deductief gevormde sociale identiteit leidt tot conformiteit aan 
groepsnormen, kunnen expressies van (normafwijkende) individualiteit 
mogelijk het gevolg zijn van een inductief gevormde sociale identiteit 
(Hoofdstuk 4). Tot slot, hoewel we kunnen verwachten dat intra-
groepsdynamiek onnodig is voor deductieve sociale identiteitsvorming lijkt 
intra-groepsdynamiek wel nodig voor het induceren van een gedeelde 
identiteit (Hoofdstuk 5). 
 
Hoofdstuk 2  
In Hoofdstuk 2 laten we zien dat inductieve processen van sociale 
identiteitsvorming in allerlei soorten groepen worden waargenomen en dat 
het waarnemen van individuele distinctiviteit een onderliggend proces is van 
inductieve sociale identiteitsvorming. We vinden bevestiging voor ons 
model dat hoe meer individuen een groep zien als inductief gevormd, hoe 
meer zij zichzelf zien als distinctief. Dit is vervolgens gerelateerd aan het 
waarnemen van meer groepseenheid, wat vervolgens weer gerelateerd is aan 
meer groepsidentificatie. In Studie 2.1 wordt ons model gevalideerd voor 
kleine groepen (4-15 leden). In Studie 2.2 bevestigen we ons model voor 
verschillende typen groepen (i.e. intieme groepen, werkgroepen, sociale 
categorieën en losse verbanden). In Studie 2.3 laten we zien dat 
groepsgrootte gebruikt kan worden als predictor van inductieve sociale 
identiteitsvorming: Hoe groter de groep, hoe minder groepsleden inductieve 
sociale identiteitsvorming waarnemen. Tegelijkertijd laten we zien dat ons 
model nog steeds gevalideerd kan worden voor grotere groepen. Ook in 
groepen van boven de 200 personen vinden we dat de waarneming van 
individuele distinctiviteit een onderliggend proces is van inductieve sociale 
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identiteitsvorming. Via het waarnemen van inductieve processen kunnen 
groepsleden dus hun waargenomen distinctiviteit in overeenstemming 
brengen met groepslidmaatschap.  
 
Hoofdstuk 3  
 De vragenlijststudies in Hoofdstuk 2 geven inzicht in hoe de relatie 
tussen individuele distinctiviteit en groepslidmaatschap wordt waargenomen 
door individuele groepsleden. Dit zegt echter nog niks over de mate waarin 
waargenomen individuele verschillen samen kunnen gaan met een gedeelde 
sociale identiteit binnen een echte groep, waarin ook andere groepsleden 
invloed hebben op de vorming van de gedeelde sociale identiteit. Met 
andere woorden, het geeft nog geen antwoord op de vraag of individualiteit 
en gedeelde sociale identiteit kunnen samengaan als andere groepsleden fysiek 
aanwezig zijn. 
 In Hoofdstuk 3 laten we daarom zien dat individuen in kleine 
groepen inductief een gedeelde identiteit kunnen vormen en dat via deze 
weg individuele verschillen de vorming van een sociale identiteit niet in de 
weg staan. We hebben dit onderzocht in twee experimentele kleine 
groepsstudies waarin we manipuleren of groepsleden een sociale identiteit 
kunnen vormen via een deductief of een inductief proces (Studie 3.1) en of 
de groep als homogeen of heterogeen wordt gezien (Studie 3.2). Als 
indicatoren van sociale identiteit hebben we de waargenomen eenheid van 
de groep, de mate van identificatie (Studie 3.1) en de bereidheid tot 
samenwerking (Studie 3.2) gemeten. Deze studies tonen aan dat 
individualiteit en groepslidmaatschap kunnen samengaan als andere 
groepsleden aanwezig zijn (i.e. niet alleen cognitief, maar ook interactief) 
door het vormen van een nieuwe gedeelde sociale identiteit. De resultaten 




suggereren dat individualiteit als input kan dienen voor het inductief 
vormen van een sociale identiteit. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 
De resultaten van Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 geven nog geen inzicht in de 
vraag of individualiteit ook een uitkomst kan zijn van inductief gevormde 
sociale identiteit: via inductieve sociale identiteitsvorming kunnen 
individualiteit en sociale identiteit elkaar mogelijk wederzijds versterken.  
In Hoofdstuk 4 tonen we aan dat inductieve sociale 
identiteitsvorming binnen heterogene groepen ertoe leidt dat groepsleden 
hun distinctiviteit blijven uiten door argumenten te genereren die tegen de 
groepsnorm ingaan. Voortbouwend op Hoofdstuk 3 hebben we in twee 
studies met kleine pseudo-groepen sociale identiteitsvorming en diversiteit 
gemanipuleerd. Vervolgens hebben we een groepsnorm over een bepaalde 
kwestie saillant gemaakt. Proefpersonen werden gevraagd zoveel mogelijk 
(voor- en tegen-) argumenten over deze kwestie te bedenken die ze daarna 
met de andere groepsleden zouden bespreken. De twee studies verschillen 
in de kwestie waarover argumenten gegenereerd dienden te worden (Studies 
4.1 en 4.2).  
De resultaten in Hoofdstuk 4 komen grotendeels overeen met de 
resultaten uit Hoofdstuk 3 op indicatoren van sociale identiteit. Daarnaast 
laten ze zien dat inductieve sociale identiteitsvorming binnen heterogene 
groepen leidt tot het uiten van idiosyncratische argumenten die tegen de 
groepsnorm ingaan. Daarnaast vinden we, in tegenstelling tot onze 
verwachting, dat binnen homogene groepen groepsleden juist meer norm-
inconsistente argumenten genereren wanneer sociale identiteit deductief 
gevormd is dan wanneer deze inductief gevormd is. In het algemeen lijkt 
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een sterkere sociale identiteit het uiten van meer idiosyncratische norm-
inconsistente argumenten dus te stimuleren. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 
Hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 4 bieden gezamenlijk een nieuwe kijk op 
sociale identiteitsvorming door in te zoomen op de interactie tussen 
individualiteit en groepslidmaatschap. De studies laten zien dat de relatie 
tussen individualiteit en sociale identiteit afhangt van het proces van sociale 
identiteitsvorming. Hoewel deze studies zijn gebaseerd op de aanname dat 
intra-groepsdynamiek een belangrijke rol speelt bij inductie, geven 
Hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 4 geen inzicht in de mate waarin intra-
groepsinteractie nodig is voor gedeelde psychologische groepsvorming. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 benaderen we deductieve en inductieve processen 
in sociale identiteitsvorming daarom op een andere manier. We 
onderzoeken de mate waarin intra-groepsinteractie (groepsdoen) nodig is 
voor het ontstaan van een gedeelde identiteit. We maken hierbij 
onderscheid tussen een zelf-definitiedimensie van identificatie (i.e. de mate 
waarin individuen zichzelf en andere groepsleden waarnemen als één 
categorie) en een zelf-investeringsdimensie van identificatie (i.e. de mate 
waarin individuen psychologisch investeren in de groep, zie Leach et al., 
2008). Met behulp van een multi-groep multi-level confirmatieve 
factoranalyse over drie groepsstudies die verschillen in de mogelijkheid tot 
intra-groepsinteractie, kunnen we onderzoeken in hoeverre intra-
groepsprocessen nodig zijn voor het ontstaan van gedeelde identificatie op 
deze twee dimensies.  
Onze resultaten laten zien dat enkel het bestaan van de groep al 
invloed heeft op de zelfdefinitie van groepsleden, terwijl intra-




groepsleden. Dit suggereert dat hoewel intra-groepsinteractie niet nodig 
hoeft te zijn voor een gedeelde waarneming van de groep als categorie, 
intra-groepsinteractie wel nodig is voor het ontstaan van gedeelde 
solidariteit met de groep. 
 
Wat Hebben We Geleerd? 
 
In dit proefschrift bouwen we voort op het interactieve model van 
identiteitsvorming (Postmes et al., 2005a) dat suggereert dat zowel 
deductieve als inductieve processen een rol spelen bij het vormen van een 
sociale identiteit in kleine groepen.  
Ten eerste tonen we aan dat individualiteit en sociale identiteit 
elkaar niet in de weg staan bij inductieve sociale identiteitsvorming. In 
tegenstelling tot de algemene aanname binnen de sociale wetenschappen en 
binnen de traditionele sociale identiteitsbenadering in het bijzonder, kunnen 
individuele distinctiviteit en sterke verbondenheid samengaan net als 
waargenomen diversiteit en eenheid. De relatie tussen individu en groep lijkt 
dus af te hangen van het proces van sociale identiteitsvorming. Enerzijds 
lijken individualiteit en diversiteit het vormen van een gedeelde identiteit op 
basis van gelijkheden (deductie) tegen te werken. Anderzijds kunnen 
individualiteit en diversiteit samen gaan met solidariteit en identiteit 
wanneer een gedeelde identiteit gevormd wordt van onderaf uit individuele 
bijdragen van groepsleden (inductie). Wij denken dat zolang individuen nog 
met elkaar in contact willen zijn en zolang hun interactie niet draait om de 
kern van de verschillen, inductieve sociale identiteitsvorming de manier kan 
zijn om verschillen te verenigen en te benutten. 
 Ten tweede hebben we het proces van inductieve sociale 
identiteitsvorming op een meer heldere manier geoperationaliseerd en 
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gemanipuleerd. Hierdoor is duidelijk geworden dat inductie wezenlijk 
afwijkt van andere theoretische benaderingen waarin de relatie tussen 
individu en groep centraal staat. Het proces van inductieve sociale 
identiteitsvorming verwijst naar een actief proces waardoor individuele 
groepsleden bijdragen aan de vorming van een gedeelde sociale identiteit. 
Sociale identiteit is dus niet enkel gebaseerd op iemands eigen of de van 
bovenaf opgelegde percepties van (of ideeën over) de groep, maar ook op 
de inbreng van andere groepsleden. 
 Ten derde laten we zien dat inductieve processen buiten kleine 
groepen ook een rol spelen in allerlei andere groepen (ook erg grote 
groepen). De rol van inductieve processen neemt echter wel af naarmate de 
groep groter is. Het zou kunnen dat de invloed van individuen op de 
gedeelde identiteit van grote sociale categorieën meer indirect verloopt: 
individuen hebben invloed op de sociale identiteit van kleinere subgroepen 
die uiteindelijk het beeld van een grote sociale categorie kunnen veranderen. 
Zowel deductieve (categorische) als inductieve (dynamische) processen 
lijken in meer of mindere mate een rol te spelen in alle groepen. Daarom 
lijkt het belangrijk om zowel de categorische als dynamische kwaliteiten van 
groepen in acht te nemen als we groepsprocessen en de interactie tussen 
individu en groep willen begrijpen. 
 Tot slot hebben we onderzocht of groepen wiens identiteit door 
inductie tot stand is gekomen ander gedrag kunnen vertonen dan deductief 
gevormde groepen. We laten zien dat binnen heterogene groepen 
inductieve sociale identiteitsvorming leidt tot het uiten van meer 
idiosyncratische (norm-inconsistente) argumenten dan deductieve sociale 
identiteitsvorming. Daarnaast lijken in tegenstelling tot wat de traditionele 
sociale identiteitsbenadering voorspelt, leden van homogene groepen niet 




argumenten te genereren via deductieve processen dan via inductieve 
processen. Hierdoor kunnen we geen stellige conclusies trekken over de 
mate waarin inductief gevormde sociale identiteiten meer norm-inconsistent 
gedrag stimuleren dan deductief gevormde sociale identiteiten. Op 
theoretische basis kunnen we echter wel speculeren over de verschillende 
uitkomsten van de twee processen. Deductieve sociale identiteitsvorming 
vereist een inter-groepscontext. Hierdoor zijn deductief gevormde groepen 
mogelijk meer afwijzend tegenover andere groepen dan inductief gevormde 
groepen. Daarentegen vereist inductieve sociale identiteitsvorming intra-
groepsinteractie. Aan de ene kant verzwakt een inductieve sociale identiteit 
hierdoor mogelijk sneller als groepsleden niets met elkaar hoeven te doen. 
Aan de andere kant is een inductieve sociale identiteit hierdoor mogelijk 




 Men neemt algemeen aan dat toenemende individualisering de sociale 
solidariteit uitholt. Zo kan het, als gevolg van toenemende individualisering, 
mogelijk zijn dat bepaalde groepen en gemeenschappen uiteen vallen als 
groepsleden die zich individu voelen geconfronteerd worden met sterke 
voorschriften over hoe zij moeten zijn. Ons onderzoek laat zien dat in 
groepen waarin groepsleden van elkaar verschillen, het lastig is om sociale 
solidariteit te creëren op basis van de bovenaf opgelegde overeenkomsten. 
Maar dit proefschrift suggereert tevens dat individualiteit en solidariteit 
elkaar kunnen versterken. We laten zien dat individuen hun toegenomen 
individuele vrijheden kunnen gebruiken om (nieuwe) groepen en 
gemeenschappen te creëren. Via initiatieven van onderaf leveren individuen 
zo een directe bijdrage aan de vorming van een gedeelde sociale identiteit. 
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Ons onderzoek laat zien dat het via dit proces van inductie mogelijk is om 
groepsverbanden te creëren waarin individualiteit en solidariteit elkaar 
wederzijds versterken.  
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Het eerste wat ik altijd doe wanneer ik een proefschrift ontvang is het 
dankwoord lezen. Ik voel daarom enige druk nu ik aan die van mij begin. Er 
zijn zoveel mensen die op de een of andere manier een bijdrage hebben 
geleverd aan de totstandkoming van dit proefschrift, dat ik bang ben dat ik 
er een aantal vergeet. Om me vast in te dekken: Allemaal bedankt! 
Wie ik in ieder geval wil bedanken zijn mijn twee promotoren: Tom 
en Karen. Zonder jullie betrokkenheid was dit proefschrift er niet geweest. 
Allebei hebben jullie op je eigen unieke manier mijn ideeën verhelderd en 
structuur gegeven aan de warboel in mijn hoofd. Bedankt voor jullie 
inzichten, jullie steun en de meta-gesprekken die we vooral in het laatste 
jaar hebben gevoerd. Tom: bedankt voor de tissues als ik het even niet zag 
zitten. Karen: bedankt voor je openheid over de uitdagingen die de 
wetenschap met zich meebrengt. 
In addition to my promoters, I would like to thank Colin and Jack. 
My visits to UConn and Yale have provided me with a deeper 
understanding of my project and its connection with other research in the 
field. Thank you for providing me with such a warm welcome in such a 
cold winter, and thank you for the pleasure of working with you.  
Daarnaast wil ik graag het KLI bedanken en specifiek de collega’s 
binnen de GPIR-track. Bedankt voor de waardevolle feedback op mijn 
project, de interessante discussies en de gezellige bijeenkomsten in Leiden, 
Amsterdam en Groningen. Also thanks to the EASP for supporting my 
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visit to the US, and for the fun, hot, and inspiring experience of the 
summer school in Aegina. 
Dichterbij heb ik altijd veel gehad aan mijn directe collega’s, eerst bij 
het ISW en later bij sociale psychologie. In het bijzonder, mijn 
kamergenoten. Bij het ISW was dat Joep: Joep bedankt voor je hulp bij al 
mijn praktische en minder praktische vragen en het warme welkom. Bij 
sociale psychologie waren dat eerst Thijs en Hedy: Jullie bedankt voor de 
thee, het verzorgen van mijn monsterlijke planten, en de gezelligheid. Nu is 
mijn kamergenoot Anne Marthe: Anne Marthe bedankt voor de grote steun 
tijdens het afronden van mijn proefschrift, de discussies en de nieuwe 
mooie plantjes. Je bent een top kamergenoot! 
Promoveren is voor mij een voorbeeld van hoe individualiteit kan 
samengaan met solidariteit. De collega’s zijn altijd een fijne groep geweest 
met wie ik, naast over onderzoek, ook over onzin kon praten, kon borrelen, 
eten, en roken (Ela bedankt!). Daarbij is een klein groepje vooral het laatste 
jaar erg fijn geweest: De Giraffen en Zebra’s: Meiden (Anne Fetsje, Ellen, 
Namkje, Ruth en Sarah) bedankt voor de gezelligheid en steun. Samen zijn 
we de uitdagingen die komen kijken bij het afronden van een proefschrift 
aangegaan.  
Eén Zebra en één Giraffe zijn nu mijn paranimfen. Ruth: Wij 
leerden elkaar kennen tijdens de researchmaster en zijn altijd erg gelijk 
opgegaan. Na de researchmaster werden we allebei promovendus op het 
thema individualiteit in groepen. Samen mochten we naar de summerschool 
en samen ronden we nu ons proefschrift af. Ondanks een paar dipjes, 
hebben we altijd erg veel aan elkaar gehad. Bedankt dat jij ook samen met 
mij de verdediging wil aangaan. Bedankt voor alles en de koelise! Anne 
Fetsje: Eerst was jij mijn gezellige collega en wandelmaatje bij het ISW. 




herdefiniëren als vriendinnen. Dat zijn we nu nog steeds. Ik ben heel blij 
dat je naast me staat bij de verdediging.   
De rest van mijn vrienden ken ik al veel langer, al vanaf de 
basisschool of in ieder geval de middelbare school. Hulde aan mijn elftal 
(Floor, Hannah, Irma, Josha, Maike, Mirthe, Sharla, Sunna, Welmoet en 
Ya’ala), de meiden die op de voorkant van het proefschrift staan. Ik houd 
van jullie! Bedankt voor alle steun, alle liefde, altijd en overal. Daarnaast ook 
dank aan “de andere groep van de middelbare school”, bedankt voor al 
jullie gezelligheid, de borrels en de kledingruil (Ik heb weer een zak staan!). 
Ook mijn familie: Allemaal bedankt! In het bijzonder, pap en mam: 
Bedankt dat jullie er altijd voor mij zijn, dat jullie in mij geloven en dat jullie 
jullie zijn. Zusje: Je bent lief! Douwe en Margriet: Bedankt voor het 
meeleven met de laatste jaren van mijn promotie.  
Tot slot Kees: Net toen je dacht dat je van de promotieperikelen af 
was, ontmoette je mij. Je bent er altijd voor me als ik je nodig heb. Je weet 
me gerust te stellen als ik de stresskip uithang. Je bent mijn alles! 
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